The Principles of Passive Defense from the Holy Quran's Viewpoint and their Deterrent Role in Confronting Military Threats

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Research Article

Abstract

The main goal in this study is extracting the principles of passive defense from the Quranic teachings and its deterrent role in confronting the military threats. The present study is founded on the hypothesis that the principles of passive defense are extractable from the verses of the Holy Quran and their deterrent role can be explained in the light of the Quranic teachings. The research method is descriptive-analytical using the method of purposive analysis of Quranic verses and by relying on library sources. The results show that the Holy Quran refers to the principles of passive defense in many verses, and those principles play a prominent deterrent role in a processual form. That is, first, using the principle of 'concealment', we try to prevent enemies from seeing the special centers. Then, in case they are seen, we use the principles of

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'camouflage' and 'deception' to prevent enemies from identifying those centers. In case they are identified, we consider the principle of 'location' to prevent those centers from being targeted. And in case they are targeted, we use the principles of 'strengthening', 'dispersion' and 'announcement' to make them invulnerable. If they become vulnerable, then, we use the principle of 'management of crisis' to reconstruct and renew them for using them again.

Keywords

passive defense, military threats, the Holy Quran.

1. Introduction

To prevent enemy's military threats, there are two deterrent strategies: (1) preventing with arms, warfare, and military techniques, which is called active defense; and (2) preventing with factors other than arms, which is called passive defense. The latter type of deterrence is enforced mainly in the form of a series of principles and fundamental measures through which one can achieve the goals of passive defense and prevent the enemy's military threats or reduce their destructive effects. Since implementing those principles is – on the one hand – less costly from the viewpoint of damages, more humanitarian from the moral viewpoint and more peaceful from the political viewpoint, and – on the other hand – afflicts more damages to the enemy, wastes more time of it and reduces its military morale, it is more important than other deterrent methods. The Holy Quran as the first and the most important source and text of political thought puts much stress on the principles of jihad and defense and, in many verses, it has paid attention to the principle of passive defense. Thus, the main goal in this study is extracting the principles of passive defense from the teachings of the Quran and their deterrent role against the enemy's military threats.

Accordingly, the main question that the present article is seeking to answer is as follows: "What are the principles of passive defense from the Quran's viewpoint and their deterrent role in confronting the military threats?" The hypothesis of the study is that with purposive analysis of the political and military verses of the Holy Quran, we can infer the principles of passive defense and, in the light of them, we can explain their deterrent role in confronting the military threats.

The main subject of the passive defense has a history as long as the human's civilization. However, specifying the systematic principles for it is among the newly emergent issues that some scholars of the political sciences and international relations have dealt with. Of

course, extracting these principles from the Holy Quran's verses and their deterrent role against the military threats with the approach used in this study is unprecedented.

The research method in this study is descriptive-analytical, the principles of passive defense have been explained by adducing the Holy Quran's verses, and their deterrent role in confronting the enemy's military invasion is clarified.

2. Concepts and theories.

2-1. The principles of passive defense

A) Definition of defense: literally, 'defense' is derived From French *défense*, itself from Late Latin *défensa*, meaning "protection". In Persian, the word *padāfand* is composed of the prefix *pad* (meaning 'anti') and *āfand* (meaning 'invasion' or 'struggle') (Dehkhuda, 1377 SH, vol. 1, p. 173). Thus, the concept of *padāfand* refers to 'preventing war' and is equivalent to the term 'defense' (Yasi, 1390 SH, p. 36). Terminologically, it refers to any measures taken for repulsing, neutralizing, or reducing the effects of enemy's invasion and preventing it from accessing its goals (Iskandari, 1391 SH, p. 17).

B) Types of defense: in a general look, 'defense' is divided into two types: the active defense (armed defense), based on using arms and warfare; and the passive defense (unarmed defense) based on taking unarmed measures.

C) Definition of passive defense: the passive defense refers to a series of deterrent actions that necessitate warfare and indirect struggle, through which one can prevent loss and damage to the military and non-military facilities as well as human casualties, or reduce harms (Mir-Sami'i, 1395 SH, p. 14; Iskandari, 1390 SH, p. 9-10; Yasi, 1390 SH, p. 48).

D) Definition of the principles of passive defense: a series of fundamental actions through which we can achieve the goals of passive defense including reduction of damage and vulnerability,

reduction of enemy's capability of identification and imposing more cost on it, protecting substructures and, finally, national stability (Iskandari, 1391 SH, p. 12).

2-2. Deterrence

A) Definition of deterrence: deterrence is derived from the major theories of conflict in international relations and refers to 'persuading a rival that the costs or risks of his probable policy is more than its benefits' (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1996, p. 388).

B) Components of deterrence: through reflecting on the Holy Quran's verses, some components for deterrence can be extracted as follows:

- 'Invading actor': It refers to the tyrants and domineering countries whom the Quran calls '*Ḥizb al-Shayṭān*' (Mujādila: 19) and who endanger the material or spiritual benefits of the 'target actor' through transgression.

- 'Target actor': It refers to a group of believers or an Islamic country or a union of Islamic countries whom the Quran calls '*Ḥizb Allāh*' (Māʾida: 56; Mujādila: 22) and who prevent the plots, threats and military measures of the invading actors by taking deterrent strategies.

- 'Deterrence tool': a series of military and non-military actions of the target actor in the form of menace and scaring (*turhabūna bihī*) that deter the invading actor (*ʿaduwallāh wa ʿaduwakum*; Anfāl: 60) from starting or continuing invasion.

- Action (invasion/ threat): when the invasive actions of the invading actor is conducted to threat the values of the target actor, the preventive action is performed by the target actor in the form of deterrent action to prevent the undesirable action of the enemy (Sayf-zada, 1398 SH, p. 113). For instance, in the battle of *al-Ḥamrāʾ al-Asad,* the troops of Abu Sufyan decided to invade Medina when they faced Muslims' threat and military array and,

consequently, gave up their plan (the Quran, Āl ᶜImrān: 172; Zamakhshari, 1407 AH, vol. 1, p. 440-441).

2-3. Military threats

The military threats are among the most apparent threats mainly focused on a specified region by the foreign enemy using force and military equipment. The military invasion and bombarding the important centers and vital facilities, military or non-military, of the target actor by the invading challenger are among the most prominent instances of military threats (Iftekhari, 1385 SH, p. 167).

3. Analyzing the deterrence of principles of passive defense in confrontation with the enemy's military threat

Now, after some preliminary discussions, the most important principles of passive defense and their deterrent effect are discussed by adducing the verses of the Holy Quran.

3-1. The principle of concealment

'Concealment' is derived from the word conceal, which literally means 'hiding' and making invisible (Ragheb Isfahani, 1412 AH, p. 289). In terminology, it refers to "All actions that hinder deployment of the equipment and facilities in enemy's direct sight or make identification of facilities and equipment as well as being informed of certain activities impossible or difficult for them" (Mir-Samiᶜi, 1395 SH, p. 22).

Considering the above definition, the principle of concealment includes facilities, equipment and human forces. Thus, the equipment that can harass enemy and repulse them must be hidden, and the enemy must not discover the elite individuals, their relations, and their organization easily (Fardrou, 1389 SH, pp. 20-21).

Of course, along with the fact that somethings must be hidden from

the enemy, there are some elements that must be proclaimed due to their deterring effect and showing the military power (Iftekhari, 1399 SH, p. 393).

Regarding the story of deliverance of Israelites from the oppressions of Pharaoh, The Holy Quran says, 'Then We revealed to Moses, 'Set out with My servants at night,…'' (Shuʿarā: 52; Ṭāhā: 77; Dukhān: 23). God's command for setting secretly and moving at night was an instance of considering the principle of concealment and was for being hidden from the Pharaoh's agents (Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1386 SH, vol. 11, p. 112; vol. 13, p. 54), because the darkness of the night was a proper option for being protected from those agents. Thus, in the military struggles, transposition of forces, transferring equipment, deployment and strategic points and the like are normally done at night, hidden from the enemy.

Using the principle of concealment, the Prophet Muhammad directed the military movement of an army consisting of ten thousand soldiers from Medina to the walls of Mecca without enemy's knowledge of it, and used numerous tactics to conceal those movements to prevent bloodshed. As a result, Mecca was conquered without any struggle (Ibn Kathir, 1407 AH, vol. 4, pp. 278-290). There are also many instances in the Prophet's way of life, wherein he used techniques of concealment to prevent the enemy from achieving their goal. For instance, we can refer to hiding in Thowr cave in his way to migrate to Medina (see: the Quran, Towba: 40) that prevented Quraysh from harming the Prophet.

2-3. The principle of camouflage

Literally, 'camouflage' means covering and veiling something (Ibn Manzur, 1414 AH, vol. 4, p. 334); and terminologically, it means "the technique or artifice that reduces the possibility of discovering and identifying forces, equipment and facilities by enemy's observer or hides and protects them" (Mir-Samiʿi, 1395 SH, p. 22). Camouflage is

performed by hiding, assimilation, transforming, creating deceiving lure and deleting the geometric regular shape for preventing discovery and identification of forces, equipment, facilities and insider's activities by the enemy's revealing systems (Amini, 1391 SH, p. 20).

The difference between 'principle of concealment' and 'principle of camouflage' lies in the fact that the former provides a protection against enemy's eyesight, but the latter reduces the possibility of discovering the facilities, equipment, forces and activities by the enemy (Amini, 1391 SH, p. 21).

The Holy Quran has referred to the principle of camouflage on numerous occasions, as in the story of People of Cave, the Quran says, "When the youths took refuge in the Cave, they said, 'Our Lord! Grant us a mercy from Yourself, and help us on to rectitude in our affair. So We put them to sleep in the Cave for several years." (The Quran, Kahf: 10-11). Also it says, "You will suppose them to be awake, although they are asleep. We turn them to the right and to the left, and their dog [lies] stretching its forelegs at the threshold. If you come upon them, you will surely turn to flee from them, and you will surely be filled with a terror of them. Let him be attentive, and let him not make anyone aware of you." (The Quran, Kahf: 18-19).

From the above verses, we get the following points:

1. The phrase 'took refuge' shows that in selecting the place for camouflage, one must pay special attention to be in peace as soon as one gets there, because 'took refuge' in Arabic (*āwā*) is derived from *ma'wā* meaning the peaceful and safe place (Qurashi, 1371 SH, vol. 1, p. 145).

2. Bravery and manhood are among the essential tools for combat and defense. *Al-fitya* (plural for *fatā*) means adolescent (Ragheb Isfahani, 1412 AH, p. 625). This shows that a group of brave youths escaped and sought refuge in a cave to combat the tyrant of their

time and preserve their faith and life from the corrupted milieu (Makarem Shirzai, 1374 SH, vol. 12, p. 354).

3. The camouflage operation can be effective and deterrent when it is accompanied by spirituality and prayer. As soon as the People of Cave reached a safe place, they started to pray God and request patience, aliment, and security (they said, 'Our Lord! Grant us a mercy from Yourself…) (Fakhr Razi, 1420 AH, vol. 21, p. 429).

4. If there are benefits and reasons in the camouflage operation, it may last for a long time (So We put them to sleep in the Cave for several years).

5. Considering the verses 14 and 15 of the same chapter of the Quran, the combat and rising of the People of Cave was against polytheism and they did camouflage for preventing polytheists from harming them.

6. In the deterring operation, one must pretend in a way that the weak points of the target actor are not revealed for the invading actor (You will suppose them to be awake, although they are asleep).

7. In addition to camouflage, one must enjoy defensive readiness so that the enemy cannot destroy him with a surprising attack (and their dog [lies] stretching its forelegs at the threshold).

8. One must enjoy such a deterrent power that the enemy cannot – if they discover the hiding place – attack him (If you come upon them, you will surely turn to flee from them, and you will surely be filled with a terror of them) (see: Maraghi, 1365 AH, vol. 15. P. 129).

9. In case one remains under siege and the camouflage lasts for a long time, wherein access to sources are cut off, it is necessary to do something to get access to them, of course in a way that the enemy's information device cannot identify you (Let him be attentive, and let him not make anyone aware of you).

Besides, the Holy Quran has used some words that convey the meaning of 'camouflage' for deterrence purposes, including the following ones:

– *Khufya, khafiyy^{an}, akhfā, ukhfīhā, yakhfā* (An‹ām: 63; A‹rāf: 55; Maryam: 3; Ṭāhā: 7, 15; A‹lā: 7), meaning hiding and concealing (Qurashi, 1371 SH, vol. 2, p. 267) and being or putting something under a cover in any possible way (Mustafavi, 1360 SH, vol. 5, p. 105).

– *Ḥijāb^{an} mastūrā* (Asrā: 45), meaning a cover over a cover (Turayhi, 1375 SH, vol. 3, p. 323). *Mastūr* in this verse is in the agentive case; that is, *ḥijāb sātir* (i.e. a covering veil) that can be deterrent and preventive (Tabarsi, 1377 SH, vol. 4, p. 24).

– *Al-khab᾽* (Naml: 25) means exaggeration in hiding and severe camouflage that cannot be perceived and revealed with outer senses and inner reasons (Mustafavi, 1360 SH, vol. 3, p. 3).

– *Akinna/ maknūn* (An‹ām: 25; Wāqi‹a: 78) mean camouflage and something that is covered from people's eyes (Ibn ‹Ashour, 1984, vol. 27, p. 304).

– *Ghashiya/ ghashshā/ ghishāwa/ ghawāsh* (Ṭāhā: 78; Najm: 54; Baqara: 7; A‹rāf: 41) mean an overarching cover (Qurashi, 1371 SH, vol. 5, pp. 100-101).

– *Al-khunnas al-jawār al-kunnas* (Takwīr: 16). *Khunnas* is the plural form of *khānis* meaning obstruction, retardation, and camouflage. *Al-jawār* is the plural form of *jāriya* meaning fast run (Tabataba᾽i, 1417 AH, vol. 20, p. 216). And *kunnas* is the plural form of *kānis* meaning going from one place and hiding in another place; and in effect, it means achieving a safe and assuring position (Mustafavi, 1360 SH, vol. 10, p. 121).

Considering the notions of the above terms, one can infer their deterring usages as follows:

a) **The broadness of camouflage factors:** in camouflage operation, there are numerous natural and artificial factors for deterrence

used in view of the type of threat and the existing states (the related terms: *khufya, khafiyy^{an}, akhfā, ukhfīhā, yakhfā*).

b) **Effective use of camouflage factors:** the factors for camouflage can be deterring when they are rightly used (related terms: *ḥijāb^{an} mastūrā*).

c) **Disorder in the invader's cognitive system:** camouflage disorders or confuses the invaders' right transfer of data, and thus, affects his cognitive system, which – finally – makes them hesitant in relation to launching an attack or causes them to make ineffective decisions (related terms: *ḥijāb^{an} mastūrā, akinna/ maknūn*).

d) **Making the information system of the invader blind:** camouflage must be so precise and severe that disables the spying system of the invader in acquiring and gather information (related terms: *al-khabʾ*).

e) **Overarching camouflage:** the camouflage must be so pervasive that can be deterrent against all types of tracking and radar sensors, laser, acoustic, magnetic, thermal and other sensors of the invaders (related terms: *ghashiya/ ghashshā/ ghishāwa/ ghawāsh*).

f) **Changing the invaders' behavior:** the invaders' behavior follows some information from the target actor without which the invaders cannot launch an attack or, if they can, they will be afflicted with failure and losses. Thus, when all ways of acquiring information are blockaded to the invaders, their behavior regarding the invasion will naturally change (related terms: *al-khunnas al-jawār, al-khabʾ*).

g) **Security and generating peace:** camouflage – in order to be deterrent – must be so effective that leads the insider forces to security and peace (related term: *al-kunnas*).

3-3. The principle of deception

Literally, 'deception' means trickery, saying something contrary to

what it reals is (Ibn Mazur, 1414 AH, vol. 8, p. 63) and showing something unreal in a way that its reality is covered (Tantavi, 1997, vol. 3, p. 356). In terminology, deception means "all actions designed deceptively that cause enemy to wander and be deviated in achieving the data and right calculation of the qualitative and quantitative ability of the rival, making them hesitant in identifying and aiming at the targets" (Amini, 1391 SH, p. 21).

The invaders never take a blind action; rather, they attempt to acquire the greatest amount of information from the target actor and organize their military movements accordingly (Fardrou, 1389 SH, p. 21). Thus, it is necessary to take a series of measures to deceive the invaders in a way that they cannot acquire the information rightly and either relinquishe the idea of attacking or perform a wrong action that benefits the target actor.

With a look at the teachings of the Holy Quran, we can find occasions wherein one has prevented enemy's attack or even has caused their failure by using the deception operation. For instance, the Quran uses the policy of 'aggrandizing the force' to deceive the enemy: "There was certainly a sign for you in the two hosts that met: one host fighting in the way of Allah and the other faithless, who saw them as visibly twice as many. Allah strengthens whomever He wishes with His help. There is indeed a moral in that for those who have insight." (The Quran, Āl ·Imrān: 13).

Similarly, we can consider the followings among the items deceiving the enemy: Imam Ali's sleeping in the Prophet's bed in *Laylat al-Mabīt* (Baqara: 207), the way he exited Mecca and went to Medina, going to the other side of the road (the Thowr cave is in south of Mecca and Medina road is in the north of it.) (Anfāl: 30; Makarem Shirazi, 1374 SH, vol. 7. P. 419), staying in Thowr cave and behind the spider web in the threshold of the cave that deviated the enemy. (Towba: 40; Makarem Shirazi, 1374 SH, vol. 7, p. 424).

In the Prophet's practical way of life and in traditions also, 'deception' has been introduced as an effective deterrent factor. By explicitly stating that "War is a deception" (Bukhari, 1422 AH, vol. 7, p. 586), the Prophet stresses on the policy of deception in war. Elsewhere, considering his men's changing figures by coloring their hair and beards, the Prophet regards it as a factor for scaring the enemy and says, "The best matter to color your beards is this black matter… it scares your enemies most" (Qazvini, 1430 AH, vol. 4, p. 611). The Prophet dispatched a group under the command of Abdullah bin Jahsh to Nakhla to ambush the caravan of Quraysh. When they saw the caravan, they felt scared and to cover their goal, some members of that group shaved their heads to pretend that they are heading for *umra* pilgrimage. The caravan felt security and stopped to rest, going to prepare food. In this way, Abdullah and his men could surprise the enemy (Vaqedi, 1409 AH, vol. 1, pp. 14-15).

In the battle of Ahzab, all forces of polytheists, Jewish tribes and opponents of Islam mobilized in a union against Muslims. Under such a conditions, creating schism in the enemy's union was among the necessary principles of warfare. The Prophet commissioned a person called Na'im bin Mas'oud Ashja'i, whose Islam inclination was unknown to polytheists, to deceive the enemy and make schism among them. Since he had already been a friend to Bani Qurayza Jews, he advised them to take hostages from Quraysh and Ghazfan tribe to make sure they support them in the battle, for they could return home undisturbed and leave them alone. He, then, went to Quraysh and Ghazfan and informed them of their treachery to the union by planning to take hostages and surrender them to the army of Islam. Due to this deception, there emerged a schism in the enemy's union and this breached their solidarity (Vaqedi, 1409 AH, vol. 2, pp. 480-482).

3-4. The principle of location

Another principle of passive defense is location and choosing the most proper and the best point for deployment of defensive and deterring headquarters and special equipment in a way that it makes it possible to hide the human force, equipment, and other military activities in the most desirable way. Or they may be deployed in a place to over-watch the enemy's movements and – if necessary – put them under pressure while hindering their infiltration. In short, "choosing the proper place for deployment of certain items with which that place can be in harmony" (Yasi, 1390 SH, p. 129).

Finding a desirable strategic place, strengthening and creating defensive fortifications and taking other deterrent measures in an effective manner leads to prudence in using human forces, arms, and large amounts of organizational costs (Mir-Samiꞏi, 1395 SH, p. 20), slowing down, stopping or deviating the enemy's transgressing movements.

The Holy Quran has considered stepping towards and conquering strategic places that angers the enemy, from which one can inflict effective blows on the enemy and overcome them as righteous actions (The Quran, Towba: 120).

Similarly, the Holy Quran proclaims that resisting against the enemy's invasion is obligatory and turning away from it as unlawful. Of course, if this turning away aims at taking a new strategic position, the Quran admires it: "Whoever turns his back [to flee] from them that day—unless [he is] diverting to fight or retiring towards another troop—shall certainly earn Allah's wrath" (The Quran, Anfāl: 16).

Taḥarruf means going from the middle point to the sides and other points. It means going away from the current position to its other side (Ibn ꞌAshour, 1984, vol. 9, p. 47), indeed, this changing the place is done to find a suitable place and surprise the enemy.

Taḥayyuz means getting a place, and *fiꞌa* means a piece of population. That is, a warring man chooses a place for fighting, which

is both good from strategic viewpoint and enjoys good force support (Tabataba'i, 1417 AH, vol. 9, p. 37).

Some of the verses of the Quran refer to the principle of location and stress on good situation and security. Among them are the verses that refer to Mecca as the secure city (Baqara: 125-126; Āl ʻImrān: 97) and Jerusalem (Baqara: 58; Aʻrāf: 161); as the secure lands to Syria (Anbiyā: 71) and Egypt (Māʼida: 21-22; Yūsuf: 21, 56, 99; Yūnus: 87; Asrā: 103); as the safe cave (Thowr cave the place where the Prophet hid; Towba: 40) and the cave of People of Cave (Kahf: 9-11; 16-19) and as the proper place for building Dhul-Qarnayn's barrier (Kahf: 93-97) and for migration and finding safe places (Nisā: 97, 100).

Thus, we can also extract the principle of location from the Prophet's wars and defensive provisions, like choosing Thowr cave for hiding that could blind Quraysh's information system and deviate their invading operation (Towba: 40; Anfāl: 30; Ibn Kathir, 1419 AH, vol. 5. pp. 109, 129), early deployment on the well and getting the control of water in the battle of Badr

(Andulusi, 1420 AH, vol. 45, p. 328; Tantavi, 1997, vol. 6, pp. 17-21; Vaqedi, 1409 AH, vol. 1, pp. 5-52; Bakhtourtash, 1341 SH, p. 78), choosing strategic point of the hillside of Uhud (higher than the invaders' camp) for deployment of forces and appointing watches and shooters on top of Uhud mount for having control over the invaders (Makarem Shirazi, 1374 SH, vol. 3, pp. 72-73), digging a trench around the city and deploying forces in palm trees and over the Salʻ mount for preventing the exit of Bani Qurayza from their castles in Ahzab battle (see: Makarem Shirazi, 1421 AH, vol. 13, pp. 204-205).

3-5. The principle of strengthening and fortification

Today, considering the logic of power dominating the international arrangements, it is clear that actors must be sensitive to designing safety mechanism for themselves. The target actors, in times of peace

and tranquility, must think of building safe locations for themselves and their military equipment and the infrastructures of the society so that in case of an invasion from the enemy, they may not be harmed severely (Iftekhari, 1399 SH, pp. 386-387). These fortifications can serve as the protective obstacles between the invading actor and the target actor to prevent the direct enforcement of power by them and, considering its influence of the invading actor, dissuade him from launching an attack or keeping on the existing invasion (Iftekhari, 1399 SH, p. 377).

In the military literature, it is "building fortifications, strong places and new fabrics resistant against the direct blow of bombs, rackets, missiles, cannonballs, mortars, and their blowups to prevent any harm to the forces, equipment or facilities and neutralize the effects of blowups and blast waves completely or partially in order to make it impossible or difficult for the enemy to infiltrate and appear in that place" (Mir-Sami·i, 1395 SH, p. 19; Amini, 1391 SH, p. 23) and to prepare the opportunity for the target actor to prevent the invader from keeping on transgressions.

The Holy Quran has referred to various cases in this regard. Among them, we may refer to Dhul-Qarnayn's defensive and deterring barrier. Yaʾjouj and Maʾjouj were barbarian tribes that would always invade another tribe in the neighboring mountains. They suggested Dhul-Qarnayn to build a deterring barrier, which is mentioned in the Quran as follows: "Shall we pay you a tribute on condition that you build a barrier between them and us?... I will make a strong barrier (*radm^{an}*) between you and them." (Kahf: 94-95). *Radm* in this verse is the name for military fortifications created for preventing enemy's infiltration (Nazar-zada, 1396 SH, p. 305). Among the interesting points of that unbreakable barrier was the way it was technically built with precise calculations and its impenetrability and deterrence referred to in the verses 96-97 of the chapter Kahf in the Quran. What we can

infer regarding the deterrence from the above verses are as follows:

1) Strengthening and fortification, including effective policies in the sphere of deterrence, as the aforementioned tribe chose to build a defensive barrier as the best option to prevent enemy's invasions.

2) Fortifications can exhaust the invaders' energy and prevent them from invasion and corruption.

3) The state must be armed with technical and industrial knowledge and have the ability to build defensive fortifications higher than the people's expectations; just as people requested building a barrier and Dhul-Qarnayn built the stronger fortified barrier. Indeed, a radm is stronger than a sad, i.e. a dam (Tabataba'i, 1417 AH, vol. 13, p. 364; Tabarsi, 1377 SH, vol. 2, p. 380).

4) In creating deterrent obstacles, internal sources must be attempted to be used. Here, the iron barrier with copper texture and cover was made from the internal resources of that land. The appearance of the verse shows this fact.

5) Creating obstacles and barriers can be defined under the concept of 'creating power network'. Making power network gets the actor out of the individual state, shows him in a powerful manner along with his unions and increases his deterrent power. In the above verse, that tribe created Dhul-Qarnayn's power network and coalition to build the deterrent barrier.

6) Fortifications must be built in a way that weakens the invaders to disable them so that they may not pass the barriers (So they could neither scale it).

7) The fortifications must be engineered in an undefeatable and impenetrable way so that the invader will be unable to infiltrate or destroy it (nor could they make a hole in it).

8) The stubborn unamendable enemy must be restricted behind the

deterrent barriers to be isolated and surrender. Thus, although Dhil-Qarnayn was the king of the west and east, meeting all countries, he did not travel to the lands of Ya'jouj and Ma'jouj and did no help them. Rather, he cut their relations with other communities to isolate them (Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1386 SH, vol. 10, p. 395).

Besides, the Holy Quran has used some words that convey the concepts of strengthening and fortification for deterrence, including the following ones:

- *Al-ṣakhr* (Fajr: 9) means hard stone and *jawb al-ṣakhr* means cutting the rocks and the mountains (Davar-panah, 1375 SH, vol. 7, p. 264).

- *Ṣayāsī* (Aḥzāb: 26), plural of *ṣīṣ/ ṣīṣa,* meaning the castle or bastion used as the deterrent shelter (Turayhi, 1375 SH, vol. 4, p. 175).

- *Ḥuṣūn* (Ḥashr: 2). Plural of *ḥiṣn,* meaning any strong place with no access to its interior (Haqqi, n.d., vol. 9. P. 418), where one take refuge to it to be safe from the enemy's invasion (Husseini Shirazi, 1424 AH, vol. 5, p. 368).

- *Muḥaṣṣana* (Ḥashr: 14), derived from the root *ḥiṣn,* meaning a bastion; and *qur^{an} muḥaṣṣana* means those villages that are secured from the enemy's invasion by means of towers, ditches and other obstacles (Makarem Shirazi, 1421 AH, vol. 18, p. 202).

- *Sūr* (Ḥadīd: 13), meaning the wall of the city (Qurashi, 1371 SH, vol. 3, p. 351), and the obstacle between two things (Shokani, 1414 AH, vol. 5, p. 205).

Considering the semantic network of the above vocabulary, we can infer the following strategic pieces of advice on deterrence:

1) **Deterrent fortifications in the natural geography.** The geography and strategic situation of a political unit plays an important role in deterring and resistance against the enemy and can highlight the strategic challenges in facing the invaders' progress. For instance, breathtaking deserts, high mountain

ranges, hard-to-pass areas, extreme cold weather, seas and other obstacles of this type serve as defensive shields against the enemy and disables them. this shows that one can use the natural capacities and strategic situations in the form of obstacles for realizing the goal of deterrence, just as the deterring power of sea (or the Nile river) was used to repulse Pharaoh's invasion on Israelites (Baqara: 50) (related terms: *al-ṣakhr, jowb al-ṣakhr*).

2) **Deterrent fortifications in industrial facilities.** All military constructions must be resistant and strong enough not to give enemy any access to their interior and stand against the enemy's invasion (related terms: *ṣayāṣī, ḥuṣūn*).

3) **Creating secure constructions for vital facilities.** Existence and continuation of activities in some of the country's centers is vital, and any harm to them or enemy's seizure of them will cause general disorder in management of the country's affairs. Thus, all the principles of passive defense and security techniques must be observed in the type of its construction to be resistant against being hit by the enemy's weapons (related terms: *muḥaṣṣana; qur^{an} muḥaṣṣana*).

4) **Creating secure constructions for protectable facilities.** Considering that in case of a probable invasion, it is possible that the enemy invades the largest number of vital centers, and interrupt the country's affairs by seizing or destroying them, it is necessary to prevent such risks by constructing secure buildings for such facilities (related term: *sūr*).

3-6. Dispersion

Literally, 'dispersion' means diffusion and scattering (in Persian, *tafarruq, tashattut, iftirāq, nashr* (Dehkhuda, 1377 SH, vol. 4, p. 5453)). Terminologically, it means "dispersal, diffusion, scattering and

decentralizing the forces, equipment, facilities and activities to reduce their vulnerability in facing enemy's threats and operations, in a way that the collection of them does not form a single target for the enemy" (Yasi, 1390 SH, p. 52; Mir-Sami·i, 1395 SH, p. 22).

If all deterrent powers of a country are accumulated in one place, and the enemy can destroy them in one single invasion, they will certainly win the battle. But if they are dispersed and scattered in various points in the country, the enemy cannot certainly invade different points of the country. They may surprise one headquarter, but other centers will resist. Thus, accumulation and presence of all vital centers, equipment and important facilities in one place is so risky and harmful. Similarly, the presence and movement of the manpower and elites must be planned in a precise way in various areas, because in case of a probable risk, all these will be lost. Thus, the principle of dispersion must be observed for all items so that the enemy cannot readily destroy all assets (Fardrou, 1389 SH, pp. 25-26). Of course, this dispersion must be done in a way that does not harm the solidarity of the forces (Kazemi, 1355 SH, p. 82); and if a part of the forces is threatened, another part will not be harmed or harmed to a minimum level (Iskandari, 1390 SH, p. 34).

The Holy Quran refers to the principle of dispersion and says, "then go forth in companies, or go forth *en masse*." (Nisā: 71). In this holy verse, the Quran considers dispersion of forces or concentrating them as dependent on the environmental conditions or the enemy's conditions. That is, if enemy's land provision or military power demands that the deterrent force serve its defensive activities in a dispersive way, the forces must pursue their operation in a dispersed manner. But if the enemy is in a situation that it is possible for the insider forces to launch a collective attack to eliminate the main center of threat or inflict a serious damage upon it, then the forces

must be concentrated (see: Maraghi, 1365 AH, vol. 5, p. 88; Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1386, vol. 3, p. 384).

7-3. Announcement of news

Announcement means: "Informing and warning the insider forces of the approaching enemy's transgressive operations". This warning aims at readiness of the forces and may be announced some minutes, some hours, some days and a longer time after the beginning of the struggles. The devices for announcing the news include radar, watching, alarm, loudspeaker, or other forms of warning messages and announcements (Iskandari, 1391 SH, p. 13). The goal of announcement is informing forces on time so that they may take their defensive policies on time.

This principle can be inferred from numerous verses of the Holy Quran. Consider the following instances:

– Gabriel informs the Prophet of Quraysh's invasive policies so that he may leave Mecca and go to Median to be secure from enemy's harms by pursuing defensive tactics (Anfāl: 30; Ibn ʿUjayba, 1419 AH, vol. 2, p. 325).

– The Prophet alarmed Muslims of the polytheist' invasion after the battle of Uhud for the insider forces' readiness (Āl ʿImrān: 172). Thus, the Muslim army left Medina and Quraysh were scared by their power and grandeur, relinquishing the idea of invasion (Zamakhshari, 1407 AH, vol. 1, pp. 440-441).

– The believer in Pharaoh's dynasty informed Moses of the decision made by heads of the dynasty to murder Moses and advised Moses to leave Egypt: "There came a man from the city outskirts, hurrying. He said, 'Moses! The elite are indeed conspiring to kill you. So leave." (Qiṣaṣ: 20). This blessed verse

shows that for obtaining the news on time, we must have precise and confidential spies.

Apart from the abovementioned items, we can refer to the followings as other instances of 'announcement' in the Quran's verses:

- Gabriel informed the Prophet of enemy's decision to attack Muslims in the time of the evening prayer. Thus, they said the *khowf* prayer along with military readiness (Nisā: 102; Tabataba'i, 1417 AH, vol. 18, p. 264).

- Gabriel informed the Prophet of the plan for urgent attack on Bani Qurayza tribe and destroying the main source of threat to Muslims (Aḥzāb: 26; Ibn ʿAtiya, 1422 AH, vol. 4, p. 379).

- God warned the believers to prevent enemy's psychological operations and the danger of their gossips (Āl ʿImrān: 173-175; Thaʿlabi Neyshaburi, 1422 AH, vol. 3, pp. 214-215).

- God Warned Muslims about the neighboring enemy's infiltration and sabotage, and ordered them to attack the enemy (Towba: 123; Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1386 SH, vol. 7, p. 246).

- Noah clearly warned his clan to beware of the danger of the overwhelming torment if they insist on infidelity and polytheism (Shuʿarā: 115; Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1386 SH, vol. 13, p. 101).

- Jesus commanded his followers to be ready to stand against the infidels (Āl ʿImran: 42-54; Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1386 SH, vol. 2, p. 439).

3-8. Management of crisis

'Crisis' refers to a situation wherein the order of the main system or part of it (subsidiary system) is disrupted and destabilized (Kazemi, 1366 SH, p. 14).

'Management of crisis' is the knowledge and art of planning, organizing, guiding and leading in a monolithic, harmonious and comprehensive manner through systematic observation of past crises and analyzing them along with using other available tools for

searching tools that help us in preventing other crises or – in cases they emerge – reducing their effects by having necessary readiness, fast investigation and improving the conditions (Yasi, 1390 SH, p. 269; Iskandari, 1391 SH, p. 118).

Since military invasion and threat are always changing in their content and structure, and sometimes, are done surprisingly, the crises arising from them are also various and surprising. Thus, it is necessary to have management of crisis in a dynamic and intelligent manner. This makes the management of crisis be considered as one of the important principles in passive defense.

The Holy Quran refers, in many verses, to the principle of 'management of crisis'. For instance, the battle of Aḥzāb was one of the most sensitive battles in the history of Islam, because the union of various 'confederates' (in Arabic '*aḥzāb*', plural form of *ḥizb*) and clans were threatening and invading Muslims. Thus, that battle constituted an all-out crisis, and the Prophet prevented enemy's mortal blows by wise management of the events. To prevent the destructive effects of a crisis, it is necessary to manage affairs in four crucial stages including before the crisis, at the beginning of the crisis, amid the crisis, and after the crisis. Now, we analyze the historical event of Aḥzāb in those four stages by adducing the Quran's verses.

A) The stage before the crisis. In that stage, we must pay necessary attention to the principles of 'prediction', 'prevention', and 'power display' to prevent the occurrence of the crisis. Using the principle of 'prediction', the Prophet concluded that the Jewish tribes of Medina, who had betrayed Muslims on numerous occasions, will be accomplices of the foreign enemy in the probable future invasion on Muslims to vanquish Muslims (Bakhtourtash, 1341 SH, p. 138). One of those tribes was Bani Nazir Jewish tribe who, in addition to breaching their promise, had planned plots to murder the Prophet. Thus, the Prophet,

resorting to the principle of 'prevention', decided to have a preemptive defense. So, by mobilizing the forces and taking deterrent measure, Bani Nazir Jews were defeated and exiled (Ḥashr: 2-5; Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1386 SH, vol. 18, p. 445-451). Besides, to prevent the crisis of confederates, the Prophet took other measures also to suppress other enemies, including 'chastisement of Bani Asad' in the *sariyah* of Abi Salama, 'displaying military power' to Bani Ghaṭfān, Abu Sufyan's army in *ghazwah* Dhāt al-Riqā‘ and *ghazwah* Badr Mow‘ūd, military attack to the tribes in the region of Domat al-Jandal in *ghazwah* Domat al-Jandal, and military attack to Bani Muṣṭalaq in *ghazwah* Bani Muṣṭalaq (Muhammadi Sirat, 1391 SH, pp. 161-162).

B) The stage of beginning of crisis. In this stage, the principles of 'announcing news', 'preliminary evaluation and mobilizing forces', and 'rapid reaction' must be noticed. When the Prophet was informed, with his ally (Bani Khuza‘a), of Quraysh's military movement, he formed a military council and promised Muslims to be victorious using the above three principles (Aḥzāb: 22; Anfāl: 7; Davar-pnah, 1375 SH, vol. 16, p. 39-40). He ordered Muslims, based on Salman Farsi's idea, to dig a ditch for deterring enemy's progress and called the Muslim army to be fully on alert. When the united confederates attacked Muslims from the east and west ("When they came at you from above and below you"), the crisis sparked ("it was there that the faithful were tested"), and its severity made Muslims agitated ("when the eyes rolled [with fear] and the hearts leapt to the throats") (Aḥzāb: 10), and shook them strongly ("and jolted with a severe agitation") (Aḥzāb: 11).

C) The stage amid the crisis. If the crisis reached this stage, the principles such as 'the principle of special operation', 'principle of combat', 'principle of resistance', 'principle of repulsing and repelling', and 'the principle of control' are applicable. Quraysh's army consisting of tens of thousands with their allies on the one hand, and the polytheists' psychological operations for breaking the spirit of

resistance (Aḥzāb: 13) on the other hand amplified the severity of the crisis. However, the Prophet – considering the principles of combat, repulse and control – made the enemy stuck behind the ditch and cheered up the army (Aḥzāb: 22). Then the divine special operation came to assist Muslims, and the invaders remained in the hard conditions of bad weather and food crisis so that they were made to leave the battlefield. They escaped with no result and with loss of life and property.

D) The stage after the crisis. After the crisis was controlled and prevented, what comes to scene is reconstruction and return to normal conditions and taking lessons as well as studying the crisis. After the return of normal conditions, the Prophet immediately went to the Jews of Bani Qurayza for eradicating some of the crisis generating factors in Medina, because they breached their promise during the battle of Aḥzāb and cooperated with polytheists, and cleansed that threatening factor forever (Aḥzāb: 26-27). The Holy Quran refers to the principle of 'study and investigation of crisis' and says: "O those who believe! Remember [the crisis of Aḥzāb]…" (Aḥzāb: 9).

Conclusion

The results of this study are as follows:

1. If the military threats of the invading actor work, they can harm the land, the important centers and the facilities of the target actor seriously.

2. To prevent such threats, there are two types of defense: active defense and passive defense. Of course, the latter type, considering its merits, is one of the best deterring methods that is realized by implementing a series of principles.

3. These principles can be extracted from the Quran's verses and play a prominent role for military deterrence.

4. In the first stage, considering the principle of concealment, measures are taken that the special centers, facilities, equipment, etc. remain hidden from the enemy so that they cannot inflict any harm upon them.

5. In the second stage, if they are subject to enemy's watch, the principles of camouflage and deception are used to neutralize enemy's ability of identification and discovery or delude them to prevent them from performing effective operations.

6. In the third stage, if they are discovered by the enemy, the principle of location is used so that the facilities and equipment are located in places that are unable to be targeted and slow down, stop or deviate the enemy's invasive operations.

7. In the fourth stage, if they are targeted, using the principles of strengthening and fortification, dispersion and announcement, they become invulnerable and neutralize the enemy's military operations or reduce their destructive effects.

8. In the fifth stage, if any harm is inflicted, using the principle of management of crisis, necessary level of readiness for quick handling of the conditions and retuning them to normal conditions is managed.

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