

An Argumentative Analysis of the Intrinsic Consequences of the Islamic Revolution from the Perspective of Contemporary Political Philosophy*

Research Article



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Abstract

The Islamic Revolution, beyond its historical manifestations and in its philosophical essence, holds intrinsic consequences that have been conceptualized by contemporary political philosophers. Analyzing and systematically reasoning through these consequences enable the formation of a general framework for revolutions, independent of time and place. This study seeks to address two core questions: Firstly, what are the intrinsic philosophical consequences of the Islamic Revolution from the perspective of contemporary political philosophy? Secondly, how are these consequences systematically framed by modern thinkers? Through an argumentative method based on fundamental data analysis within the works of contemporary political philosophers, this research provides a comprehensive explanation of the intrinsic consequences of the Islamic Revolution. These are categorized into domestic consequences—such as the establishment of an Islamic system, revival of

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national pride and identity, realization of social justice, freedom, and independence—and international consequences, including the awakening and mobilization of the Islamic community, inspiration for oppressed nations, and resistance against global hegemony. Each consequence is systematically argued within the framework of the Islamic Revolution model. This analysis reveals that the Revolution's impact extends beyond the geographical boundaries of the revolutionary society, influencing relationships between nations and states. Its consequences span various cultural-social, political-security, and economic levels, affecting both individual and collective life, and ultimately, its inspirational power makes it a model for other revolutions.

Keywords

Islamic Revolution of Iran, contemporary political philosophy, social justice, identity, political philosophers.

Introduction

The academic study of the various dimensions of the Islamic Revolution gained prominence following the success of the Iranian Revolution, attracting the attention of researchers in the field of revolutions, particularly notable contemporary political philosophers. This interest raised a fundamental question: Should the Iranian Revolution be examined as a unique phenomenon, distinct from other revolutions, or should the causes of revolutions be reassessed in light of the Iranian experience? (Foran, 2000, p. 328). Over time, the Islamic Revolution of Iran, recognized as one of the most significant political events of the contemporary world, generated extensive works. These included contributions from historians and economists seeking to uncover the reasons behind this movement, as well as political analysts drawn to its outcomes and especially its international implications (Digard, 2005, p. 116).

The undeniable differences between the Islamic Revolution and other revolutions led to its early recognition as a unique phenomenon and quickly attracted critiques labeling it as "irrational," rooted in foundations unfamiliar to the modern world and incompatible with the classical models and expectations of Western revolution theorists. This distinction prompted Muslim political philosophers to conduct extensive studies on the Islamic Revolution to explain its essence, motivations, and mechanisms through argumentative analysis, thereby paving the way for new theoretical frameworks around revolutions.

This study aims to examine the philosophical approach of contemporary political philosophers regarding the intrinsic consequences of the Islamic Revolution. It strives to offer an accurate understanding of the revolution's nature and analytically explore its various dimensions, presenting the Islamic Revolution not merely as a historical occurrence but as a universal model of social mobilization and revolution, particularly for the global Muslim community.

Furthermore, articulating the philosophical approach of contemporary thinkers concerning the Islamic Revolution can enhance the foundational knowledge surrounding the Revolution, facilitating a better grasp of its nature and positive impacts on the intended audience.

What sets this research apart from others in the field is its focused analysis of some of the most prominent modern political philosophers, such as Imam Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, Morteza Motahari, Allameh Tabataba'i, Ayatollah Sadr, and others. Thus, this work provides an overview of contemporary political philosophers' perspectives on the intrinsic outcomes of the Islamic Revolution. The study's primary innovation lies in employing a philosophical approach in content analysis; this involves systematically organizing philosophers' discussions based on foundational premises to construct argumentative (in the general sense) arguments, thereby offering multiple justifications for the influence of these elements on the Islamic Revolution.

Two points require clarification here: firstly, there is a distinction between political philosophy and philosophy of politics. While political philosophy is more theoretical and examines political entities, the philosophy of politics encompasses both theoretical and practical aspects, aiming to produce sound, strong, and reliable political knowledge that leads to righteous and desirable political actions. Hence, political philosophy, in its theoretical aspect, prevents political ignorance, and in its practical aspect, it restrains people from engaging in erroneous political behavior. Moreover, the concept of soundness in political philosophy emphasizes its resistance to error (Khosropanah, 2009, pp. 18-20). Based on this conception of political philosophy, it possesses several key characteristics:

1. The ultimate goal of political philosophy is the theoretical and practical well-being of individuals.

2. Its subject is human beings and their well-being.
3. In addition to rational methods, it incorporates revelation, self-purification, and human experience, with Muslim political philosophers committed to drawing from revelatory sources and teachings to explain their ideas through argumentative methods

(Alikhani, 2018, pp. 246-249).

Secondly, by "philosophical approach," we do not imply a purely abstract philosophical method; rather, the goal is to explain the components of the revolution systematically.

This article is developed within the framework of argumentative content analysis, focusing on the explicit and implicit themes within contemporary philosophical sources to deduce and systematically explain the meanings relevant to the subject. Content analysis is a process aimed at more than just understanding and increasing knowledge about a subject; beyond enhancing our awareness of a topic through its breakdown, it also establishes, from an applied perspective, the foundation for decision-making based on the analysis outcomes. Analysis can be approached through descriptive and argumentative methods. In descriptive content analysis, the analyst details a topic's elements without necessarily validating the acceptance of its outcomes. However, in argumentative content analysis, emphasis is placed on the validity and importance of accepting the results. The analysis is conducted following established principles, and the findings are conveyed to the audience in an argumentative and structured manner (in the general sense of logical proof).

In this research, the insights of political philosophers on the intrinsic consequences of the Islamic Revolution are treated as a cohesive theoretical framework, with the elements composed of insights derived from the views of a collection of contemporary philosophers. The author seeks, firstly, to combine these insights

within a theoretical structure that cohesively presents contemporary philosophers' understanding of the Revolution's consequences and, secondly, to validate these perspectives in an argumentative form using both rational and textual premises, appropriate to the philosophical nature of the topic. To achieve this, the study first deconstructs the conceptual framework and then, in the main section, examines the intrinsic consequences of the Islamic Revolution in two parts: internal and external consequences.

1. Conceptual Framework

An accurate conceptual analysis of the fundamental terms in research contributes to effective outcomes across various fields for several reasons. Firstly, by defining the semantic boundaries of concepts, it prevents the conflation of topics and misinterpretation of their scope, providing a clear, agreed-upon understanding of the intended meaning and fostering a practical consensus between the researcher and the audience. Secondly, a scholarly approach to conceptual analysis can shape the research roadmap, as clarifying fundamental concepts and their role within the research structure helps outline their potential to advance the researcher's goals, thereby facilitating the application of these concepts throughout different sections of the study. Thus, it is essential to carefully examine both the clear and nuanced dimensions of the main concepts before delving into the discussion.

1.1. Islamic Revolution

The term "revolution" traditionally refers to a complete circular movement around a central point, a major transformation in conditions, work methods, beliefs, etc., that impacts a large number of people, and ultimately, to the collective effort by many people to change a country's government, often through violent actions (Oxford Learners Dictionaries, 2020, under "revolution"). Although the term is frequently

used metaphorically to describe significant societal shifts, such as the scientific or technological revolutions (Robertson, 2004, pp. 428-429), political philosophers understand "revolution" as a rapid, intense, and fundamental transformation that occurs through popular uprising, leading to a shift in the political, legal, and economic order, as one system is replaced by another (Mesbah Yazdi, 2013, pp. 24-25).

Muslim philosophers have offered various definitions of the Islamic Revolution, which can be categorized into several groups. Some emphasize its divine, human, and Islamic foundations and goals. From the perspective of Motahari, the Islamic Revolution is one with an Islamic nature, path, and purpose (Motahari, 1999, Vol. 10, p. 65) and is a divine and human revolution rooted in divine inspiration, spiritual vitality, and human values (Motahari, 1989, Vol. 2, p. 464). According to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, the Islamic Revolution is one that derives all its dimensions from an Islamic worldview (Mesbah Yazdi, 2011a, p. 410). Similarly, Imam Khomeini describes it as a revolution carried out within the framework of Islamic teachings (Khomeini, 1999, Vol. 8, p. 271).

The second group of definitions describes the Islamic Revolution in terms of the transformation it brings to society. From this perspective, the Islamic Revolution means changing a tyrannical society based on oppression into an Islamic society based on Islamic principles (Khomeini, vol. 10, p. 480). In another definition, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi views the Islamic Revolution as a fundamental movement and transformation in the political conditions of society, rooted in Islamic teachings and aimed at replacing the existing order with one based on Islamic principles and laws (Mesbah Yazdi, 2011b, p. 98). Ayatollah Khamenei similarly characterizes the Islamic Revolution as an upheaval against tyrannical traditions and systems (Khamenei, 08/15/2011). In his view, the Islamic Revolution is a movement toward national progress that brings profound change to cultural, political, and economic structures (Khamenei, 05/13/2000) and, in essence, is a revolution

that revives Islam (Khamenei, 07/13/1992). The third category of definitions emphasizes the revolutionary and rebellious nature of the Islamic Revolution, seeing it as an uprising against the values of ignorance and tyrannical systems that spread oppression, corruption, discrimination, and other social injustices among nations (Khamenei, 06/16/1991). Based on these definitions, the Islamic Revolution can be understood as a revolution grounded in human values and Islamic teachings, aimed at replacing a tyrannical system with an Islamic one and bringing fundamental transformation across all social dimensions.

2. Consequences of the Islamic Revolutions from the Perspective of Contemporary Political Philosophy

Muslim philosophers analyze the goals of the Islamic Revolution in terms of its nature. According to Ayatollah Khamenei, the Islamic nature of the revolution requires a combination of material and spiritual goals. Islam, beyond its focus on otherworldly matters such as salvation, piety, moral growth, and spiritual refinement, also emphasizes worldly issues like justice, security, welfare, access to wealth, freedom, and independence (Khamenei, 05/03/2008). As Motahari explains, these combined goals represent the collective aims of the revolution and are not limited to any single objective. In this view, an Islamic revolution cannot be limited in its aims, as Islam is, by its nature, an “indivisible whole” and does not conclude upon achieving any single goal. This does not mean, however, that the revolution, in terms of strategy, does not prioritize some goals over others or overlook the stages required to achieve its objectives; Islam itself was implemented gradually in terms of tactics (Motahari, 1989, vol. 24, p. 71). The diversity of the revolution's goals naturally results in a diversity of outcomes. This is why Imam Khomeini considered the impacts of the Islamic Revolution far broader than those of other revolutions (Khomeini, 1999, vol. 12, p. 13). Based on this understanding, contemporary

philosophers examine the impacts of the Islamic Revolution across both internal and external dimensions (Mesbah Yazdi, 2013, p. 140).

A. Internal Dimensions

Some of the most significant internal impacts of the Islamic Revolution identified by political philosophers include:


1. Active System Building

From a political philosophy perspective, the most crucial feature of the Islamic Revolution is its cultural nature. Human identity is deeply tied to knowledge, values, and orientations; thus, a truly human-centered revolution must be cultural, fostering correct values and perspectives in people. Therefore, the primary and ultimate aim of the Islamic Revolution is to elevate the principle of monotheism and revive divine insights and values (Mesbah Yazdi, 2011a, p. 393). In line with this, the promotion and implementation of Islamic teachings across various social structures and interactions are essential objectives (Khomeini, 1999, Vol. 12, p. 392). Ayatollah Khamenei sees the establishment of Islamic principles as creating a system of Islamic values within society and establishing Quranic and Islamic jurisprudence as the basis for social governance. Islam outlines both the foundations of the political system and the broader social governance framework, specifying general laws governing three levels of interactions: among citizens, between citizens and the government, and between the government and citizens (Khamenei, 06/04/2016).

It is within this framework that Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi views the Islamic Revolution as a renewal and revival of the global Islamic movement, showing practically that Islam can govern society and provide solutions to both material and spiritual challenges (Mesbah Yazdi, 2004, p. 147). Contemporary philosophers see the Islamic Revolution as a response to the disillusionment with non-Islamic methods of


governance and a re-establishment of Islamic collective identity. It is not merely a revolt against political or economic oppression but a rebellion against non-religious culture and ideology, a return to Islamic identity and the collective spiritual identity of the citizens rooted in the Quran. Consequently, the revolution has the potential to influence other Islamic societies as well (Motahari, 1989, vol. 24, p. 323).

According to Ayatollah Khamenei, the Islamic Revolution sets out the main lines for an ideal society and moves toward creating a community grounded in Islamic values. The ultimate goal of the revolution is the realization of a “pure life” (*al-ḥayāt al-ṭayyiba*) within society: “We will grant him a goodly life” (Quran, 16:97), signifying a society that is materially endowed with prosperity, security, independence, and progress and spiritually rooted in faith and divine ethics (Khamenei, 05/31/1990, 06/04/1990, 10/14/1995).




In addition to establishing an Islamic society, Muslim philosophers view the Islamic Revolution as a movement against autocratic governments, leading to the elimination of internal despotism and laying the groundwork for equitable public participation in managing their own social life (Khomeini, 1999, vol. 6, p. 125). From this perspective, establishing an Islamic government is one of the revolution's primary goals; without it, other reform efforts cannot fully succeed. According

to Motahari, the Islamic Revolution focuses on the foundational aspect of social order, namely, the formation of an Islamic government, following the same path the Prophet took in the early Islamic era. In this framework, religious leaders cannot limit their duties to merely educating people about Islam and Islamic ethics or confining societal oversight to enjoining good and forbidding evil. Rather, they must direct the revolutionary movement toward dismantling corrupt regimes and establishing an Islamic government. Without this fundamental social transformation, efforts to achieve other objectives will be ineffective (Motahari, 1989, vol. 24, p. 110). Imam Khomeini emphasized that one of the major demands of the revolution's leaders is to guarantee the fundamental rights of the people and to establish a fair mechanism for managing relations between citizens and rulers. He argued that only within an Islamic government can these rights be secured, as a true and genuine connection between the people and the government is only achievable through a just political system (Khomeini, 1999, vol. 7, p. 114; vol. 13, p. 96). In light of this, contemporary philosophers consider the establishment of an Islamic government as a critical component of the Islamic system and one of the significant outcomes of the Islamic Revolution (Javadi Amoli, 1999, vol. 9, p. 123).



2. Providing Identity and Esteem

One of the most fundamental outcomes of the Islamic Revolution is the restoration of national dignity. Ayatollah Khamenei views the Islamic Revolution as a force that restored the lost honor of a people who, under a tyrannical regime, had suffered alienation and humiliation. According to him, the Revolution's success was rooted in widespread public participation, which in turn awakened the people to their own true power. The Islamic Revolution, he asserts, reintroduced the nation to its inherent dignity, empowering individuals with the freedom to think, choose, decide, and take action. Beyond establishing new ideals, the Revolution mobilized the public toward achieving these goals, replacing submissiveness to foreign powers with resilience and authority. Furthermore, the Revolution validated the people's role in governing society by creating participatory structures that involved them directly in social management, thereby reclaiming their dignity (Khamenei, 05/12/2009, 10/14/2003, 09/16/2015, 02/08/2008, 07/09/1989).



Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi analyzes the role of the Islamic Revolution in restoring national dignity by examining its impact on the recovery of national identity and character within the revolutionary society. From this perspective, exploitation and

domination of a society—especially when accompanied by foreign colonialism—necessitates the erasure of that society’s identity and national character. A society that values its own identity will never accept internal or external domination. The Islamic Revolution, by emphasizing the prideful national and religious elements, reinforces the people's belief in their inherent strengths, thus reviving both national credibility and confidence (Mesbah Yazdi, 2011c, vol. 2, p. 278).



3. Training Revolutionary Individuals


The ultimate goal of the Islamic Revolution is the spiritual perfection of humanity, a goal that can only be achieved through voluntary actions. Therefore, to bring more people into the revolutionary fold, the leaders of the revolution avoid coercive or oppressive methods. Instead, they aim to cultivate the society’s moral and cultural growth, fostering a sincere belief in the revolution’s ideals so that individuals join freely and wholeheartedly seek the downfall of the existing regime and the establishment of a revolutionary order (Mesbah Yazdi, 2011a, p. 410).

From the perspective of Sadr, the prophetic revolution, unlike other social revolutions, liberates the human being both inwardly and outwardly, achieving external freedom through internal liberation. This type of revolution builds society on a renewed foundation of

innate human nature, preparing citizens to reclaim their divine role as God's vicegerents on earth. In contrast to other social revolutions, which often replace one form of exploitation with another or one form of rebellion with another, the prophetic revolution frees humankind from both exploitation and the inner roots of oppression, fundamentally reshaping one's view of existence and the world. As the Quran states, "And We desire to bestow a favor upon those who were oppressed in the land and to make them leaders and inheritors of the earth" (Quran, 28:5).

Thus, the process of revolutionary transformation led by the prophets is distinct from transformations such as those from feudalism to capitalism or from capitalism to a workers' state in Marxist social revolutions, where only the oppressors change. The work of the prophets aims for the ultimate eradication of all forms of human oppression by fostering an "inner revolution" in humanity. Moreover, the struggle of the prophets against oppression is unlike most social revolutions, which are marked by class conflict; rather, it is a universal human revolution, with its social aspects forming only the outer layer of a deeper inner transformation (Sadr, 2014, pp. 174, 47-49).


In this light, the Islamic Revolution can be seen as a comprehensive revolution that operates on both internal and external dimensions. Unlike other so-called sacred social revolutions, which focus primarily on empowering the oppressed to rise against their exploiters, the Islamic Revolution not only rallies one group against the oppression of another but also initiates a profounder revolution akin to that seen only in the prophets' movements. It encourages individuals to stand up against the injustices within themselves and to hold themselves accountable in the court of justice and fairness (Motahari, 1989, vol. 3, p. 382).



4. Realization of Social Justice

Examining the history of revolutionary movements confirms that there is a direct connection between revolutions and the pursuit of social justice within revolutionary societies. Fundamentally, in the process of revolution, people who are dissatisfied with the current situation and seek justice or the alleviation of inequality rise up to eliminate the dominance of specific classes, groups, or individuals over national resources and assets. Their aim is to create a new system for distributing common goods more equitably. From the perspective of philosophers, the Islamic Revolution, grounded in its human and religious principles, also began with the pursuit of justice, with social justice as one of its primary objectives, or indeed, its core slogan and grand goal (Khamenei, 02/08/2005, 02/08/2015, 04/03/2005). In analyzing why the Islamic Revolution emphasizes the ideal of social justice, Ayatollah Khamenei asserts that justice in society was the objective of all prophets. Since the Islamic Revolution is a religious movement and, in a way, a continuation of the prophets' historical mission, it places the realization of social justice as its primary goal. Furthermore, he argues that social life, supported by justice, can progress materially towards spiritual goals (Khamenei, 01/07/1993; 05/17/2011; 05/08/2005). Motahari also stresses the necessity of social justice in the Islamic Revolution, arguing that the Revolution's sustainability depends on it; without justice, it cannot endure. From this viewpoint,


social justice is a fundamental condition for the success of the Islamic Revolution, which has no path forward but to apply and expand methods centered on justice and the pursuit of equitable ideals (Motahari, 1989, vol. 24, pp. 179, 234, 308).



5. Freedom

Freedom is one of the primary objectives and foundational principles of the Islamic Revolution (Khamenei, 02/08/2005, 02/08/2013). Imam Khomeini highlights the distinct nature of the Islamic Revolution by comparing the extensive freedom granted to society after its victory with other significant contemporary revolutions, where limitations on press, assembly, associations, and other freedoms are typically imposed from the outset. According to him, this freedom stems from the Islamic nature of the Revolution (Khomeini, 1999, vol. 10, p. 350). The Islamic Revolution not only promotes freedom of thought and expression but also liberates society in broader dimensions of social management, removing restrictions that hinder people's active participation. By involving the public in administrative affairs, the Revolution empowers citizens to govern society based on laws they establish, reflecting their own will and choices (Khamenei, 01/09/2003, 02/13/2004). To achieve this aim, the Revolution dismantles the autocratic rule over society, effectively eliminating oppression within the Islamic community. Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi considers the


removal of such oppression as one of the greatest blessings of the Islamic Revolution. He argues that, under tyrannical rule, the majority of society—except those affiliated with or supportive of the regime—endure repression and suffer from the unjust actions of the government (Mesbah Yazdi, 2013, p. 142).



6. Independence

The necessity of independence and avoiding dependence on foreign powers in Islamic thought is rooted in both rational and scriptural grounds. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli emphasizes the alignment of reason and scripture regarding the need for independence, arguing that, on the one hand, the Quran stresses the importance of autonomy in various realms—political, military, economic, and more—through verses like, “And Allah will never grant the disbelievers a way over the believers” (Quran 4:141). On the other hand, reason itself promotes independence in all aspects and views submission to the dominance of others as inherently disgraceful. Thus, the necessity for an independent Islamic system is established by both scriptural evidence and rational arguments, with scripture essentially guiding reason toward this conclusion (Javadi Amoli, 2002, pp. 129-130). From the perspective of political philosophers, independence is a fundamental goal of the Islamic Revolution and a crucial aspect of its identity. The Revolution was born out of the desire for comprehensive independence and the

ambition to free the country from foreign dependence to build a free and prosperous society. Ayatollah Khamenei underscores that the ideological foundation of the Islamic Revolution enables it to establish an independent political system that eliminates foreign influence and hands the country's destiny and resources to its own people. Independence and freedom from foreign powers are therefore foundational policies of the Islamic Revolution. This approach signifies a deep reliance on and faith in God in all areas of individual and social life (Khamenei, 03/12/2001, 06/04/2002, 06/04/1993, 03/31/1987). Similarly, Imam Khomeini asserts that divine mercy is contingent upon renouncing oppressors at every level of Islamic society. For this reason, the Islamic Revolution advances the pursuit of independence as a principal slogan and, indeed, an emblem for the entire Muslim community. Abandoning this international Islamic policy would mean forsaking the ideals of the Islamic doctrine and betraying Prophet Muhammad, ultimately leading to the decline of the Islamic society (Khomeini, 1999, vol. 20, p. 319).



B. International Dimensions

Contemporary philosophers regard the Islamic Revolution as encompassing the broader realm of humanity and the global Muslim community, considering it the starting point for transformation, a new perspective, and a fresh trajectory in the intellectual movement of


human society. In their view, the Islamic Revolution is a global movement (Khamenei, 06/04/1995, 02/13/2009, 07/19/1989) because the innate nature of all humans is inclined toward God, and divine leaders are tasked with conveying God's message to all of humanity (Javadi Amoli, 2003, vol. 3, pp. 373-375).

1. Awakening the Islamic Nation

According to Motahari, the Islamic Revolution, alongside its uprising against existing political despotism, represents a movement against foreign intellectual and political colonialism, placing a return to Islamic identity and collective Islamic spirit at the forefront of its objectives. He sees the Islamic uprising as a response to disillusionment with materialistic solutions, leading to the rediscovery of collective, national, and religious identity. Due to its foundations in core Islamic principles, he argues that this movement naturally possesses the potential to impact other Islamic countries (Motahari, 1989, vol. 24, p. 323), spreading its main message of Islamic identity revival, Islamic awakening, and a return to Islamic principles and movements (Khamenei, June 4, 1995).

Theorists of revolution generally regard the transnational influence of revolutions as an inherent aspect of these movements, asserting that any revolution, wherever it occurs, can affect neighboring countries by inspiring revolutionary sentiments, even if it lacks a universal ideology, according to the diffusion or dissemination theory. Hence, the Islamic Revolution, founded on Islam's global mission and commitment to high values in both thought and practice, and rejecting all forms of oppression and submission, rapidly impacted the Islamic world and then spread to other regions and peoples. This revolution fostered a wave of awareness and self-confidence among Muslims worldwide, as Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi describes, restoring the lost confidence and forgotten identity of the Islamic Ummah (Mesbah Yazdi, 2010a, p. 122).

Muslim philosophers also see the Islamic Revolution's example-setting as a key factor in Islamic awakening. According to Ayatollah Khamenei, the success and stability of the Islamic Revolution in establishing a strong, advanced Islamic system provides Muslims with a model, showing Islam as a dynamic, viable doctrine capable of effectively governing and addressing the material and spiritual needs of humanity. Additionally, the revolution's resilience against the pressures of hegemonic powers encourages resistance within the Muslim community, elevating Islam as the most powerful and reliable model for combating global oppression. As a result, independence and freedom become principal concerns for Muslims worldwide (Khamenei, March 10, 2011, September 21, 1992, October 4, 2001).




2. Inspiring the Impoverished Nations

Revolutions, by introducing new ideas and aspirations, often inspire other nations toward change, whether they succeed or even, at times, if they fail. Muslim philosophers view inspiring other nations as a key outcome of the Islamic Revolution. They argue that its purpose extends beyond reforming its own society, positioning it as a model for all human societies, advancing in both material and spiritual domains (Khamenei, June 3, 2016; May 4, 2008). From this perspective, the Islamic Revolution is seen as a divine blessing for all impoverished and oppressed peoples, awakening them and potentially leading to further revolutions among them. In a monotheistic worldview, all

humans are considered servants of God; thus, the goals of the Islamic Revolution are tied to the overall fate of humanity. While certain priorities and levels may be applied in achieving these ultimate goals, political philosophers point out that wherever it takes root, the Islamic Revolution should be regarded as a divine blessing intended to inspire all nations to seek freedom from oppression and exploitation (Mesbah Yazdi, 2010b, p. 271).

Muslim philosophers suggest that the Islamic Revolution inspires oppressed nations through several pathways. According to Ayatollah Khamenei, the Revolution's success demonstrates the essential role of a nation's will in addressing its own issues, relying on God and trusting in His promises to overcome dominating powers. This provides other nations with a basis for self-confidence, encouraging them toward action and change. He also highlights that the Islamic Revolution has dismantled the myth of the invincibility of imperialist powers, showing nations that submission to these powers perpetuates unjust dominance; as such, it awakens them and prompts them toward liberation from oppressors (Khamenei, April 13, 1990; September 5, 1986).



Ayatollah Javadi Amoli emphasizes the ideological transformation brought about by the Islamic Revolution, asserting that it exemplifies a shift in belief and an elevation of thought. He argues that by introducing ideals such as justice and the fight against international

oppression, the revolution attracts those committed to these principles, encouraging them to oppose oppressive powers. In essence, the revolution inspires movement by introducing new ideas and fostering ideological transformation within revolutionary society. This transformation's tangible impact on motivating the revolutionary nation becomes a visible example for other nations, encouraging them to rise as well (Javadi Amoli, 2004b, vol. 15, p. 261).



3. Fight Against Global Arrogance

Anti-arrogance is one of the goals of the Islamic Revolution, as the essence of Islam, based on the Quranic verse, "Whoever rejects false gods and believes in Allah has grasped a firm handhold" (Qura, 2:256), includes disbelief in tyrants—meaning all systems of global oppression—alongside belief in God. Since Islam views opposition to injustice as boundless, combating global arrogance becomes a vital duty of the Revolution (Khamenei, August 10, 2011; May 23, 2008; September 20, 1990). From the perspective of the Quran, social behavior is a factor influencing the emergence of social hierarchies, leading to the formation of a dominant-subordinate dynamic. The internalization of an arrogant nature in some individuals swiftly pushes society toward a master-servant and oppressor-oppressed relationship, redirecting society's public benefits toward a privileged class. Thus, preventing the spread of arrogance and working to free the oppressed are

considered essential objectives of the prophets and divine leaders (Javadi Amoli, 2004, vol. 17, p. 129). Islamic political thought holds that remaining silent in the face of blatant oppression and violation of the rights of the underprivileged is subject to divine accountability and sees all people as responsible for addressing this anti-humanitarian issue (Mesbah Yazdi, 2004, p. 42).

According to the principles of Islamic social philosophy, eradicating social phenomena such as tyranny and colonialism depends on fostering and institutionalizing the values of freedom and independence at various societal levels. For this reason, the prophets, in their anti-arrogance campaigns, sought to eliminate servitude and promote a culture of freedom and independence, thus ensuring liberation from oppressive systems (Javadi Amoli, 1999, Vol. 4, p. 341). In light of this, philosophers explain the fight against global arrogance as one of the outcomes of the Islamic Revolution, emphasizing the role of Islamic culture in transforming nations into strongholds against foreign domination. Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi asserts that the spread of Islamic culture and thought worldwide challenges the existence of colonialism. He contends that the primary issue for the world's power-seekers with the Islamic Revolution lies in its culture, vision, and governing spirit. First, they recognize that the Islamic Revolution is, in essence, a renewal of Islam's global movement, and the spread of its culture and thought empowers societies to become centers of resistance against domination, marking the demise of oppression and colonialism (Mesbah Yazdi, 2004, p. 147). Additionally, as Ayatollah Khamenei notes, the Revolution has intensified a global turn toward spirituality, challenging anti-spiritual political systems worldwide, while also instilling in nations an understanding of their inherent power, thereby strengthening their will and faith to stand against oppressive powers (Khamenei, January 29, 1990; February 8, 2009).




Conclusion

The Islamic Revolution, in its philosophical sense, is rooted in divine-Islamic theoretical foundations and in the inherent, God-given nature and human aspirations of a people striving to establish an Islamic society by resisting the prevailing oppressive order. What profoundly distinguishes the Islamic Revolution from other revolutions are its unique characteristics, which together shape its identity due to its divine and popular nature. In this light, Muslim political philosophers consider the inherent outcomes of the Islamic Revolution in two categories: internal and external.

On the internal level, the establishment of an Islamic political system stands as one of the Revolution's major outcomes, stemming from disillusionment with non-Islamic approaches to governance and from a collective Islamic self-realization. The Revolution empowers the people with self-worth, enabling them to think, choose, decide, and act, thus restoring national pride and identity by affirming their authority over their society. Social justice is also considered a fundamental outcome; some philosophers argue that the Revolution's continuity depends on the establishment of justice, without which it cannot sustain itself. Freedom and national independence are also among the resulting achievements, as tyranny is eradicated, and oppression is lifted. As an independent ideological movement, the Revolution establishes a self-sustaining political system that ends foreign influence, allowing the people to control their destiny and

resources. It also addresses the developmental lags left by the previous regime, presenting the revolutionary society as a model of progress that considers both material and spiritual dimensions. The goal is to create a model nation where material well-being, social justice, and Islamic values coexist alongside a spirit of revolutionary idealism.

Externally, the Islamic Revolution has at least three foundational outcomes. Firstly, it awakens and energizes the Muslim community (Ummah). The Revolution's success in building a strong, advanced Islamic system presents a model to Muslims, showcasing Islam as a vibrant and dynamic framework capable of addressing society's material and spiritual needs. Secondly, it serves as an inspiration for oppressed nations, instilling self-confidence and a drive for change, and dispelling the myth of the invincibility of oppressors. Finally, combating global hegemony is another major external outcome, as the Revolution is seen as a renewal of the global Islamic movement. Its Islamic values and thought spread to other societies, transforming communities into bases of resistance against foreign domination. By raising awareness among nations of their own potential, the Revolution strengthens their resolve and faith to stand against oppressive powers.



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