A Comparative Study of the Theory of State by Hassan al-Banna and Maududi

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Abstract

This article presents a comparative analysis of the state theories in the thoughts of Hassan al-Banna and Abul A'la Maududi, two prominent thinkers of the Islamic world in the 20th century who sought to redefine the role of religion in the political structure and offer solutions to postcolonial challenges and modernity. The primary objective of the research is to identify the commonalities and differences in their views on the foundations, structure, and functions of the Islamic state. The main hypothesis is that Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, presents a more hierarchical and centralized theory of the Islamic state, while Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, proposes a more consultative and participatory approach. To test this hypothesis, content analysis and a comparative theoretical framework are employed to reveal deeper similarities and differences by carefully examining the texts of both thinkers and the historical-cultural contexts that influenced them.

The findings of the research indicate that both theories consider Islamic Sharia as the primary source of legislation and administering the society, emphasizing the necessity of a just government to combat corruption and implement religious rulings. Both believe that ultimate sovereignty belongs to God and that the state is merely a tool for realizing religious objectives. However, there are fundamental differences in the organization of power. Influenced by the political conditions in Egypt and the need to resist Western colonialism, Hassan al-Banna presents a centralized image of the Islamic state, where the ruler acts under the supervision of the "Ahl al-Ḥall wa-l-ʿAqd" (people of decision and contract), and the principle of Da'wah (invitation) serves as the core of the state. He emphasizes the importance of Islamic brotherhood beyond national and ethnic identities, viewing the state as a mission-oriented institution responsible for educating society and reviving Islamic values. In contrast, Maududi proposes the concept of theodemocracy, a system where ultimate sovereignty belongs to God, but the implementation of laws and management of affairs is carried out through a council of Muslims. He stresses the broad

participation of Muslims in decision-making, though subject to the condition of conformity with Sharia.

In the comparative section, the article highlights several other key differences:

1) View on Democracy: Maududi considers Western democracies to be authoritarian and suggests a system under the supervision of Sharia, while al-Banna focuses more on transparency and accountability in political processes.

2) Non-Muslim Participation: Maududi asserts that non-Muslims do not have the right to participate in the Islamic government, whereas al-Banna ignores this issue.

3) Electoral Structure: Maududi believes that no individual can nominate themselves for governmental responsibilities, while al-Banna emphasizes councils and accountability.

In the field of political science, this research contributes to a better understanding of contemporary Islamist movements and demonstrates how Islam, as a dynamic intellectual system, can adapt to modern challenges such as democracy, human rights, and social justice. In policymaking, a precise understanding of the theories of these two thinkers can be valuable for politicians and diplomats in their interactions with Islamic movements. Ultimately, the results of the research highlight that the theoretical differences between al-Banna and Maududi not only reflect the diversity in Islamic thought but also offer models for the adaptability of political systems in Islamic societies. This analysis further shows that Islam, based on its general principles and jurisprudential foundations, has vast capacities to address the needs of the times and contemporary challenges. Therefore, understanding these differences can contribute to the reform of political and social processes in Islamic societies and provide solutions for engaging with modern issues.

Keywords

Introduction

The collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, as the last manifestation of a unified political system in the Islamic world, marks a turning point in the history of this civilization. This event, which accompanied the gradual decline of Ottoman power and the onslaught of Western modern ideologies, confronted the Islamic world with fundamental challenges in the political and social spheres. Following this collapse, Muslim thinkers sought to address the fundamental question of how to redefine the ideal political structure for Islamic societies. This search led to the emergence of a wide range of thoughts and theories, some of which, inspired by Western models and based on the separation of religion from politics, aimed at creating modern secular governance systems, while others, emphasizing the inseparable connection between religion and politics, sought to revive religious sovereignty and reconstruct the caliphate system.

Among the thinkers who followed the first approach were figures such as Ali Abdel Raziq, Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, and Shibli al-Aysami. In contrast to this group of thinkers, another set of Muslim intellectuals emphasized the intrinsic connection between religion and politics. They believed that Islam, from its inception, has been a social and worldly religion, and the separation of religion from politics not only contradicts the foundational principles of Islam but also constitutes a colonial conspiracy aimed at weakening Islamic societies. In the contemporary era, the economic, political, and social challenges facing the Islamic world prompted them to seek solutions by Islamizing the state and society. Therefore, by emphasizing the role of religion in public life, rule of law, participation, separation of powers, and the preservation of national independence, they sought to revive Islamic values and establish a just political system. However, the models proposed by these movements were accompanied by fundamental challenges and differences. Among them, the theories of two prominent thinkers of the Islamic world, Hassan al-Banna and Abul A'la Maududi, hold a special place. Each of these thinkers, in their own way, sought to provide a comprehensive interpretation of Islam to address the fundamental questions regarding the Islamic state and society.

This article provides a comparative analysis of the state theories of Hassan al-Banna and Abul A'la Maududi. The main goal of this research is to identify the commonalities and differences in the views of these two thinkers regarding the foundations, structure, and functions of an Islamic state. Accordingly, the central hypothesis of this study is that the emphasis on the "hierarchical"

structure of the Islamic state in the writings of Hassan al-Banna is significantly greater than that in the writings of Maududi. To test this hypothesis, content analysis and a comparative theoretical framework will be employed to closely examine the texts and historical contexts in order to more accurately explain the similarities and differences in the theories of these two thinkers.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to end the introduction by referring to the practical applications of the article. This paper can have multiple uses in the fields of political science, Islamic studies, and sociology. Some of these applications include:

1) Comparative Analysis of Islamic Political Thought: This article can assist researchers in understanding the similarities and differences in the theories of the state in the thoughts of Hassan al-Banna (founder of the Muslim Brotherhood) and Abul A'la Maududi (founder of Jamaat-e-Islami). This comparison can contribute to a better understanding of contemporary Islamist political and intellectual movements.

2) Strengthening Critical Discourse: Comparing these two theories can provide a platform for critiquing and examining Islamist political ideas, thus helping to expand the critical discourse in this field.

Ultimately, such a paper can contribute to a deeper understanding of the role of ideology in the formation of modern Islamic states and its impact on Muslim societies.

The Analytic Framework: Concept and Theory of State

Comparative studies are a valuable tool for gaining a deeper understanding of complex phenomena. These types of studies help us examine different theories in detail and identify their strengths and weaknesses. Ultimately, by synthesizing various ideas, a more comprehensive and complete understanding can be achieved.

Despite the widespread acceptance and popularity of comparative studies in academic circles, some view them as unproductive, while others limit their scope of application. The key question is: Is comparing the political theories of Hassan al-Banna and Abul A'la Maududi a valid and feasible approach?

To answer this question, we must first examine the nature of comparative studies and the method of conducting them. Comparative study refers to the examination and analysis of two or more phenomena or viewpoints with the aim of identifying their similarities and differences. This process helps in gaining a more accurate understanding and clearer explanation of the shared

and conflicting positions of these phenomena.

The stages of comparative research generally include the following:

1) Description: Providing a detailed account of each theory.

2) Classification: Grouping and organizing the characteristics of each theory.

3) Explanation: Explaining and analyzing the features and relationships within each theory.

4) Validation: Assessing the accuracy and credibility of the findings based on evidence and documentation (Chilcote, 2010, pp. 47-48).

The most important point in conducting comparative studies is determining the comparability of two phenomena (Gharamaleki, 2001, pp. 247-249). Some argue that any two phenomena are comparable, while others believe that certain conditions must be met for a valid comparison. If the goal of the comparative study is to identify the similarities and differences in viewpoints, the existence of differences in the foundations and intellectual systems does not hinder this process. In fact, the presence of similarities in certain aspects (such as the subject being discussed or the ultimate goal) can serve as the basis for comparison (Gharamaleki, 2001, p. 258).

In the case of the political theories of Hassan al-Banna and Maududi, the shared points in their intellectual foundations, the subject of discussion (Islamic governance), and the ultimate goal (establishing justice) make a comparative study possible.

This research will be conducted in five stages:

1) Defining the Problem: Providing a detailed description and clarification of the topic under investigation.

2) Determining the Scope of the Study: Identifying the boundaries and limits of the research.

3) Comprehensive Analysis of Similarities and Differences: Identifying the maximum number of similarities and differences, both superficial and fundamental.

4) Distinguishing Superficial Differences and Similarities from the True Aspects: Separating the apparent aspects from the essential and foundational points.

5) Explaining Common and Opposing Positions: Providing a thorough analysis and interpretation of the findings.

Next, we will first briefly discuss the formulation of post-Ottoman state ideas and the concept of the state, and then we will examine and explain the common and opposing positions in the political theories of Hassan al-Banna

and Abul A'la Maududi in two separate sections:

   1) The Theory of the State in the Thought of Hassan al-Banna

   2) The Theory of the State in the Thought of Abul A'la Maududi

The Meaning of State and Theory of State

The concept of the state, or the theory of the state, is a vast and complex discussion because, on one hand, the state is the most common and controversial concept in the field of political science. It refers to different realities in terms of time and space, and the criteria for these differences can be demographic composition (whether homogeneous or heterogeneous), the form of organization (e.g., unitary, federal, or empire), the method of governance (e.g., democratic, autocratic, or dictatorial), or political modernity. Although due to the diversity, multiplicity of fields, and levels that the concept of the state encompasses, it is impossible to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive definition of the state, we can at least define it with two key characteristics: (1) The state refers to a coordinated legal-political system; (2) bureaucracy, and in short, the state, meaning state as a collection of employees, specialized executives, and most importantly, a clear hierarchy within the executive apparatus, which undertakes essential tasks of the political system, such as maintaining internal order and protecting society from external threats, based on Sharia and Islamic teachings.

Thus, in political theory and systems, the state is used in four distinct meanings: first, state in the broadest sense, which goes back to the political system and the governing regime of a country, which includes population, territory, government, and political sovereignty. Second, state in a general sense, which refers to the governing body and institutions, which themselves consist of various and diverse ruling forces and institutions. Third, state in a specific sense, which refers to the executive branch of government. Fourth: state in the narrowest sense, which refers to the council of ministers or cabinet.

Given the above points, in this article: Firstly, the state refers to the governing entity, encompassing all power institutions such as the parliament, judiciary, presidency, and bodies like the Supreme Audit Organization, the cabinet, the Administrative Justice Court, etc. (Bashiriyeh, 2003, p. 57). Secondly, the theory of the state in this article aligns with Vincent's perspective, who argues that when we discuss the necessity, nature, and ultimate purpose of the state alongside its goals and the articulation of its functions, we are, in fact, addressing the theory of the state (Vincent, 1997,

p. 7). Thirdly, the theory of the state of Da'wa (invitation) refers to the idea that Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, based his theory of the Islamic state on the concept of "Da'wa" (invitation). He believed that the Islamic state should be built on the principles of Islamic Sharia, with its main goal being the implementation of Islamic law and guiding society toward Islamic values. In this theory, the state acts as a tool for achieving the objectives of Islamic Da'wa, with its primary duty being the education of society and the creation of a unified Islamic Ummah. Al-Banna believed that the Islamic state should gradually emerge through the reform of the individual, the family, and society. Lastly, the theory of "Theodemocracy" (Divine Democracy) by Abul A'la Maududi means that absolute sovereignty belongs to God, and divine laws (Sharia) must form the foundation of governance. Maududi argued that within the framework of Sharia, the people have the right to participate in governmental affairs, and the government should be administered in a consultative manner with public participation. He viewed this system as a blend of democratic principles and divine sovereignty, where people play a role in decision-making, but these decisions must not contradict divine laws.

Formulating the Ideas of Post-Ottoman State

The Islamic world, under the rule of the Sunni caliphate during the Ottoman Empire, eventually collapsed. As a result, scholars proposed political theories, some of which were extensions of Western theories of the state, adapted to fit the context of the Islamic world. This shift occurred because they considered the religious governance systems during the Umayyad, Abbasid, and Ottoman eras to be indefensible. These scholars argued for a modern, secular, non-religious government, meaning they believed in the separation of religion from politics or religion from the state. Figures like Abdel Raziq, Kawakibi (who strongly believed the solution to the problems of the Islamic world lay in the separation of religion from governance), and Shibli al-Aysami were proponents of this separation. These thinkers rejected the "theory of the unity of politics and religion" for two main reasons: (1) The political power and authority of the government, even though it may be necessary for achieving Islamic ideals, does not inherently belong to the essence of Islam and is not one of its essential components. (2) If Islam is understood correctly, it allows Muslims the freedom to choose any form of governance that they find suitable for ensuring their welfare. The belief contrary to this, namely that religion and politics form a unity in Islam, is incorrect. This view links politics primarily to

the caliphate and, from there, connects it to the authoritarian regimes that have ruled over Muslims throughout history (Enayat, 2005, p. 120). As mentioned earlier, one such thinker was Ali Abdel Raziq. He believed that Islam did not prescribe the caliphate system as a mandatory form of government for Muslims. He was the first to try to present Islam as a secular religion or in alignment with secularism in Egypt. He argued that discussing religious governance and linking the caliphate to religion was an innovation (bidʿa). He viewed governance as a worldly matter under the control of the people and did not consider the governance of the Prophet Muhammad as part of his prophetic duties.

However, in contrast to the primary concern of Muslim thinkers after the collapse and dissolution of the Ottoman Caliphate, there was a focus on Islamic governance and the inseparability of religion and politics, with an emphasis on the necessity of governance in Islam as a religious principle (Ahmadi, 2011, p. 112). Although the outcome of Europe in the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries was the decline of political power of religious institutions and the rise of secularist thought, which forced religious power to retreat and limit its domain of influence, ultimately, the ideology of modernism, accompanied by imperialistic policies, spread across the globe (Esposito, 2016, p. 10). Therefore, the Islamic world faced significant challenges from the culture and civilization of Western modernism-secularism, and it was necessary for it to find a way to address these challenges. From Napoleon's invasion of Egypt to World War I, the Islamic world witnessed three major social transformations: (1) The political decline of the Ottoman Empire in comparison to the expansion of the West, which led to the empire's collapse after 1918. (2) The economic integration of various Islamic states into global capitalism, based on dependence on the West. (3) Significant reactions in the form of religious movements against these worldly transformations. Regarding the first transformation—the political decline of the Ottoman Empire—several events can be noted, such as: (i) The loss of Spain in 1492. (ii) Military defeats at the gates of Vienna in 1529 and 1683. (iii) The defeat of the Ottoman fleet in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, which weakened and led to the decline of the Ottoman Caliphate. Another significant event that occurred in the West was that Western powers, with military and economic superiority, began asserting their dominance in the world, encircling Islamic territories. By the 19th century, the Islamic world had completely entered a defensive mode against Western imperialism, and many Islamic societies came under direct or indirect control of Europe (Outhwaite, 2013, p. 72). In such a context, what ideas did

Muslim intellectuals have for freeing themselves from these challenges, and what theories of governance did they propose?

Although before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the theory of the caliphate was the dominant theory of state among Sunni thinkers, after the fall of the "sick man of Europe," other theories emerged. One of the challenges of the political system based on the caliphate in the Islamic world was that the Ottoman Empire collapsed after World War I, and the Ottoman Caliphate was abolished in 1924. As a result, after the collapse and abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, new theories about the caliphate or the theory of the state were developed in the Islamic world, including in Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, and Pakistan. In the following, we will conduct a comparative study of the theories of Hassan al-Banna and Abul A'la Maududi.

Hassan al-Banna and the Theory of the State of Da'wah or Mission

Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, was deeply concerned with the implementation of Islamic laws in society and the establishment of a government that would enforce Sharia. He founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1920 in Egypt, aiming to combat imperialism, promote Islamic unity, and delegitimize pro-Western Islamic states. To achieve these goals, he proposed a theory of the state that called for the comprehensive Islamization of social life in Egypt, which eventually pressured the Egyptian King, Sadat, to implement Islamic principles into the fabric of Egyptian society (Outhwaite, 2013, p. 73). Hassan al-Banna was recognized by the Muslim Brotherhood as their leader (imam) and was officially introduced by this title (Khadduri, 1990, p. 86).

The Muslim Brotherhood was first dissolved in December 1948 (three years after World War II) after holding its sixth congress, under the order of King Farouk, the government of Nakrashi Pasha. Following the dissolution, Nakrashi, the Prime Minister, was assassinated by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. A few months later, on February 12, 1949, Hassan al-Banna himself was assassinated. Their slogan was: "Allah is our goal, the Messenger of Allah is our leader, the Quran is our guide, Jihad and effort are our work, and martyrdom is our aspiration" (Bagheri & Khalili, 2014, p. 14). He was a disciple of Rashid Rida and one of the early figures in the Salafi movement, holding a strict, purist interpretation of Islam (Qaradawi, 1992, p. 79). Al-Banna believed that the caliphate was a symbol of Islamic unity, representing the bond between Muslim nations. He considered the caliphate as

the essential framework for the Muslim community and emphasized that Muslims should strive towards its establishment. In his "Risāat al-Taʿālīm" (The Message of Teachings), he regarded the foundation of an Islamic government in the form of a caliphate, centered around the caliph, as the fundamental principle of the Muslim Brotherhood's program (Fozi & Payab, 2011, p. 79).

As previously mentioned, Hassan al-Banna, born in 1906 and assassinated in 1949, lived through the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, an event that set the stage for the formulation of his theory of the Islamic state. This historical context shaped the rivalry of his theory with two competing models: the nation-state theory (which emphasizes nationality as the cornerstone of modern state identity) and the ethnic state theory (such as Pan-Arabism, with Sati' al-Husri at its forefront in 1930s Egypt). Al-Banna sought to establish a just government that would practically implement the Islamic laws and teachings within the society, while safeguarding and promoting Islam outside of it (Moradi, 2002, p. 84). This state, according to him, could only be realized through Da'wa (Islamic call), and he argued that the Islamic state is a state of the mission. It is not just an administrative structure, nor a lifeless or soulless government. Da'wa can only thrive under the support of an institution that sustains, propagates, and strengthens it (Moradi, 2002, p. 85; al-Banna, 1946, p. 120). Some believe that, although Hassan al-Banna initially did not offer a complete program beyond emphasizing the essence of Islam, he attempted to summarize the goals of Islamic revival in simple phrases such as "Return to Islam," "The Quran is our constitution," and others. However, over time, he declared that Islam is not limited to religious and spiritual matters but also regulates worldly affairs. Islam is a comprehensive and universal religion — a religion of peace, cooperation, and mutual help. Therefore, Muslims do not need to adopt ideas or institutions from other societies because Islam encompasses all values and systems necessary for its followers (Khadduri, 1990, p. 87).

Hassan al-Banna's "State of Da'wa" or "State of the Mission" is not confined to national identity, territory, or national interests alone. In his view, the homeland extends beyond the geographical boundaries of Egypt. In a speech he gave in 1943, he said: "When I say homeland, I do not mean Egypt alone, but I mean all the Arab countries and Islamic states. Our homeland, the homeland of the Muslim Brotherhood, is any land where a Muslim resides" (al-Banna, 1946, p. 129). Therefore, instead of focusing on nationalist (such as nationality) and ethnic components, he emphasizes Islamic brotherhood

("al-Ikhwat al-Islāmiyya"), which forms the second core principle of his state theory. This Islamic brotherhood encompasses both religious and territorial unity. Thus, it can be said that because Da'wa (the call to Islam) is one of the fundamental pillars of his state theory, he rejects the previously mentioned rival theories. He firmly believes that "Da'wa is the foundation of the state, and the state is the guardian of Da'wa. Together, they are the basis of a correct and proper human life" (Moradi, 2002, p. 90; al-Banna, 1947, p. 1). Based on this ideology, al-Banna's Islamic state design is not restricted to a specific territory. Instead, it seeks to encompass all Muslims on earth under its power. In other words, the borders of countries are not defined by geography, but by religious conviction. According to al-Banna, anyone who believes in Tawhid (the Oneness of God), the Prophethood, and adheres to Shari'ah, the Quran, and Sunnah is considered a member of the Islamic Ummah (community) (Aslani & Marandi, 2014, p. 120). Elsewhere, discussing the importance of Da'wa as one of the key pillars of his state theory, he states: "Once this purpose is realized, and the state is connected with this approach and ideology, taking on the character of Da'wa, the result will undoubtedly be that the rulers will adhere to the obligations of Islam and exemplify its values and virtues. Subsequently, all regulations, laws, and social systems in the state will be aligned with the guidance and commands of Islam. This way, the Divine Government will be realized in individual, social, and governmental domains, and this is what we seek" (Moradi, 2002, p. 91; al-Banna, 1948, p. 1).

As mentioned, Hassan al-Banna sought to establish an Islamic state because he believed that Islam, as a system, has come with a religious and political framework, and its laws remain intact. In his view, Islam continues to serve as a guiding principle for leadership. Al-Banna and his followers believed that fighting corruption and eliminating it could only be achieved through the establishment of an Islamic government. While al-Banna initially denied that the Muslim Brotherhood was involved in politics, shortly before World War II, he and some of his leaders began to show political engagement, declaring that the Brotherhood was not just a social and religious association, but a political organization as well. They argued that power originates from a divine source and that those in power must be guided by a higher religious purpose. Hence, they clarified that Muslims who did not engage in politics had misunderstood the true meaning of Islam. During the Fifth Congress in 1939, they declared one of their goals to be the establishment of a righteous state that would practically implement and protect the teachings of Islam, and promote it abroad (Aslani & Marandi, 2014, p. 120; Hosseini, 2008, p. 116). If asked

what the fundamental principles of the Islamic government or state of the Muslim Brotherhood were, the answer would be that, according to them, three principles were emphasized (Khadduri, 1990, pp. 88-90). According to these principles, the theory of the Islamic state in their view entails a power in society that is embodied in the state, which oversees both religious and worldly affairs. The state, therefore, is a power that addresses societal matters, implements Islamic laws, maintains security, and ensures justice (Moradi, 2002, p. 84; al-Banna, 1978, p. 24). Since his theory of the state is based on three main principles (1) the principle of the ruler's responsibility or the principle of representation, (2) the principle of the unity of the Ummah or national unity (The Brotherhood sees the unity of Islam and the connection between nations in the concept of the Caliphate) (Khadduri, 1990, p. 90), and (3) respect for the people's will (the principle of national will) (Moradi, 2002, p. 88), al-Banna and the Brotherhood believed that any government that sought legitimacy must fulfill these essentials. Ultimately, sovereignty belongs to God, but its implementation is entrusted to the people. Therefore, an Islamic government should be one of representation and should be responsible for the people's will. Such a responsibility implies that those in power are not the masters of the people (Khadduri, 1990, p. 90). Hence, the ruler must serve the people and cannot engage in tyranny or evade responsibility. The ruler is chosen through bayʿa (pledge of allegiance), and principles such as advice, enjoining good and forbidding wrong, and respecting the people's will must guide their relationship with the people (Moradi, 2002, p. 88). If the ruler commits a sin, the people have the right to remove him. However, this right, along with the principle of respecting the public will, does not equate to complete freedom and participation in all matters. He accepts a parliamentary system (Moradi, 2002, p. 89) and considers it based on the Islamic principle of Shūrā (consultation). In al-Banna's theory of the Islamic state, the legitimacy of the Islamic government depends on the implementation of Islamic laws, and it is this implementation that distinguishes its functions from those of a modern state (Bagheri & Khalili, 2014, p. 149; Michel, 2007, p. 182). However, he draws a distinction between the participation of people in Islam and in the new political system, stating that Islam does not require all members of the Ummah to vote on every issue, as in modern referendums. In normal circumstances, it is sufficient to seek the opinion of the Ahl al-Ḥall wa-l-ʿAqd (people of decision and contract). When asked who these individuals are, al-Banna identifies them as three groups: (1) qualified jurists whose legal opinions are trusted and relied upon, (2) experts (specialists) in

general affairs, and (3) those who hold a type of leadership or authority over people, such as heads of dynasties, clan leaders, and heads of organizations or associations (Moradi, 2002, p. 84).

The Muslim Brotherhood believed that Islam mandates the government to be ultimately responsible for maintaining and safeguarding the health of the social and economic system. The government should oversee the economic life of the community and implement rules and regulations in a way that enhances the welfare of society, supporting the legitimate interests of individuals. The government must prevent officials from exerting influence at the expense of others, as corruption, bribery, and even the acceptance of gifts by law enforcement officers are contrary to Islamic principles. Government officials should be viewed as servants, not masters or exploiters of the people. Only God is the ultimate ruler, and those in power should rule according to divine decrees (Khadduri, 1990, pp. 70, 82).

Jamaat-e-Islami and the Theory of State (Abul A'la Maududi and the Theodemocracy Theory)

Abul A'la Maududi (1903-1979) was primarily concerned with the role of colonialism in the disintegration of Muslim unity. He sought a solution to the issue of how to revive the Islamic caliphate, which had been the source of Muslim unity, and free Muslims from the ignorance of the modern era, namely the separation of religion from politics (Maududi, 1954, pp. 14-16). In 1941, he founded the Jamaat-e-Islami to achieve religious objectives, as he believed that nationalism, which was influenced and derived from Western thought, had caused division and fragmentation among the Muslim community. Therefore, he saw the establishment of an Islamic state, based solely on religious principles, as the path to liberation. The efforts of this movement (Jamaat-e-Islami) in the 1970s led to the rise of the Pakistan People's Party, under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to power, and exerted pressure on General Zia-ul-Haq to implement the "Nizam-e-Mustafa" (System of Mustafa) (Outhwaite, 2013, p. 72).

Abul A'la Maududi founded the Jamaat-e-Islami in 1941 with the help of a group of seventy-five individuals, and was chosen as its first "Ameer." He led the movement for 31 years, until 1972 (Araghchi, n.d., p. 79). Jamaat-e-Islami pursued both short-term and long-term objectives. The short-term goal was to prepare a well-organized and committed group of Muslims capable of advancing Islam and achieving its victory in the subcontinent. The long-term goal sought to establish a system of human life in all its aspects centered on

the worship of God and adherence to the teachings of His Prophet. However, after the partition of Pakistan from India, Jamaat-e-Islami split into two factions: Jamaat-e-Islami India and Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan. Maududi, along with 385 others, formed Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, with its core mission being the Islamization of Pakistan through religious activities. This is why, from 1941, the movement adopted a political-religious agenda. After Pakistan's independence, Jamaat-e-Islami prevented Pakistanis from pledging allegiance to the government (bayʿa) until the state was Islamized. During the nine years between 1947 and 1956, when Pakistan's constitution was being drafted, Jamaat-e-Islami managed to incorporate many of its demands into the constitution. Consequently, Jamaat-e-Islami affirmed the Islamic character of the constitution and prepared for political participation. However, this did not last long, as in 1958, control of Pakistan fell to the armed forces under General Ayub Khan, who opposed the involvement of religion in politics. During Ayub Khan's coup, the leader of Jamaat-e-Islami was imprisoned, and the party focused on removing Ayub Khan and establishing a politically religious environment. When East Pakistan (Bangladesh) seceded in 1971 and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power, Jamaat-e-Islami's activities intensified. However, as Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party, pursued socialist policies, Jamaat-e-Islami once again opposed the government. In 1977, Maududi took leadership of the opposition to Bhutto, and in July of that year, General Zia-ul-Haq led a coup that overthrew Bhutto's government. Zia's eleven-year rule (1977-1988) marked an era of unprecedented political success and influence for Jamaat-e-Islami, with its leaders occupying significant government positions. However, after Zia's death, the party's presence in the political arena weakened as it struggled to secure electoral seats.

The principles that Maududi considers for his theory of theodemocracy can be outlined as follows:

✦ Islam is a comprehensive, complete, and inclusive system, as well as a revolutionary ideology aimed at establishing social order across the world and reconstructing it based on its own principles and ideals. It has the capacity to respond to the demands of the modern age (Moten, 1979, p. 19).

✦ The true ruler is God, and the right to rule and govern belongs to Allah. Humans are God's vicegerents and bear the responsibility of transforming the earth, which has been entrusted to them, based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad.

✦ The source of all social and political problems of humanity, and the root of all evils and misguidance in the world, is the dominance of one human over

another. The ultimate goal of the comprehensive Islamic system is to eliminate human dominance over human beings and establish the absolute rule of God over the world (Alipour, Gheitasi, and Darabi, 2017, p. 45; Maududi, 1998, p. 304).

✦ Since humans, both individually and collectively, have no right to governance, legislation, or the exercise of power over others, no one should be allowed to issue commands on their own or impose rulings. Nor should anyone accept such commands or submit to such rulings. These rights belong solely to God, and even His Prophet has no such right in this regard.

✦ An Islamic government must be established in all its dimensions based on the laws that God has revealed through His Prophet. The state that administers such a government, being a political organization tasked with implementing divine law, is obligatory to obey as long as it fulfills this duty. If this government disregards the laws of divine revelation, the believers are not obliged to follow its commands.

✦ The form of government proposed by Maududi's Jamaat-e-Islami is neither a theocracy nor a democracy, but rather a theodemocracy. Firstly, he distinguishes his vision from Christian theocracy and leans toward the idea of theodemocracy by stating: "The theocracy established by Islam will not be governed by any particular religious class, but by the entire Muslim ummah, from the young to the old. All Muslims will govern in accordance with the Book of God and the Sunnah of His Messenger." Secondly, in distinguishing democracy from theodemocracy, he states: "In Western democracy, the people are the rulers. In Islam, sovereignty belongs to God, and the people are His vicegerents on earth. In the former, people make their own laws, while in the latter, people must obey the divine law revealed by the Prophet. In one, the state is the executor of the people's will; in the other, both the state and the people are executors of the will of the Lord. Western democracy is a form of despotic power that exercises its authority in a free, uncontrolled manner, whereas Islamic democracy submits to divine law and exercises its power in accordance with God's commands and within the constraints He has set."

✦ The executive power is formed through the general will of the Muslims, and the head of state is elected by the Muslims. All administrative affairs, the manner of executing policies, and any other matters for which there is no explicit and specific directive in Islamic law are to be resolved through the consensus of the Muslim community (Araghchi, n.d., p. 84).

✦ In Maududi's theory of the state, non-Muslims have no role in political participation, even though they may enjoy other rights. He states that anyone

who has accepted Islam and adheres to the Sharia can join the circle of those who govern the Islamic state, regardless of their race, nationality, or country of origin. However, those who are not Muslim have no right in this regard. It goes without saying that such individuals have the right to live within the territory of the Islamic state and benefit from the rights and privileges that Islam has granted them, but they should have no role in the political affairs of the Islamic government.

✦ The administrators of an Islamic government must be those whose entire lives are devoted to upholding and implementing the Sharia—individuals who not only believe in the reformative program of the Sharia and support it, but also deeply understand its spirit and are thoroughly familiar with its details.

✦ Governance on earth is not limited to any individual or specific group; it belongs to the entire community of believers. Citing verse 55 of Surah al-Nūr—"God has promised those of you who believe and do righteous deeds that He will surely grant them succession [khilāfa] on the earth…"—Maududi believes that the authority to govern the earth has been promised to the whole community of believers, "not just to elites" (Esposito et al., 2017, p. 35). Thus, the caliphate granted by God to the believers is a collective right of all those who accept the absolute sovereignty of God over themselves. This universal caliphate reflects the notion of true democracy in Islam. Therefore, the executive institution responsible for administering the affairs of government must be established based on the will of these caliphs or successors (that is, the members of the community). The power of the state is merely an extension of the authority delegated to it by the people. Their vote and opinion are decisive in matters of governance, and it is according to their will that the state manages public affairs. Whoever enjoys their trust will be entrusted with the responsibilities of the caliphate on their behalf, and when that trust is lost, such a person must step down from office (Araghchi, n.d., p. 88).

✦ The leader of the community must be chosen from among those whom the general body of Muslims fully trusts on the basis of their faith and righteous conduct. Therefore, once the leader is selected through consultation among the trusted members of the community, he will possess full authority and discretion in all matters. As long as he adheres to the laws of Islamic Sharia and follows the commands of God and His Messenger, his orders are binding and must be obeyed. Maududi believes that by implementing the laws of the Sharia, a harmony is created between individual and collective interests, such that both the individual and society can attain their respective rights (Maududi, 1986, pp. 44–45).

Similarities and Differences Between the Two Theories

To identify the points of convergence and divergence between Hassan al-Banna and Abul A'la Maududi in their theories of the Islamic state, the following points can be noted:

Points of convergence:

1) Divine Sovereignty: Both thinkers hold that ultimate sovereignty belongs to God. This means that all forms of power and governance must conform to divine laws and rulings, and no individual has the right to legislate independently.

2) Necessity of an Islamic Government: Hassan al-Banna and Maududi both emphasize that the establishment of an Islamic government is necessary for the realization of social justice and the fight against corruption. They believe Islam should be regarded as a comprehensive and complete system in both political and social dimensions.

3) Attention to Society: Both thinkers stress the necessity of Muslim participation and cooperation in the administration of political affairs. They advocate for an active role of society in political and social decision-making.

4) Emphasis on the role of Sharia and Religious Authority: Both emphasize the implementation of Sharia in all aspects of life, particularly in the sphere of governance. They believe that Islamic law must be the foundation for administrating the society. Both consider the legitimacy of rulers to be rooted in religion and assert that the state must operate based on Sharia.

5) Unity of the Muslim Ummah: Both Hassan al-Banna and Maududi stress the concept of the "unity of the Muslim Ummah." They view the homeland as transcending geographic borders and present Islamic brotherhood as the foundation for Muslim unity.

6) Combating Corruption and Establishing Justice: Both are committed to fighting corruption and establishing a just system that can secure the social and economic well-being of the people.

Points of divergence:

1) Concept of Homeland: In Hassan al-Banna's thought, the concept of waṭan (homeland) transcends geography and nationality; anyone who believes in monotheism (tawḥīd) and prophethood is considered a member of the Muslim ummah. In contrast, Maududi, although committed to Islamic unity, tends to frame his views within ethnic and national contexts more explicitly.

2) Structure of the State: Hassan al-Banna emphasizes a hierarchical

structure and a "state of da'wah" (state of the mission), in which the ruler operates under the oversight of the Ahl al-Ḥall wa-l-ʿAqd (people of decision and contract) and is guided by principles such as responsibility and respect for the people's will. Maududi, on the other hand, presents the theory of theodemocracy, where divine sovereignty over the Muslim community is central, but executive authority and public responsibility are to be exercised by Muslims under the guidance of Sharia.

3) Public Participation: Hassan al-Banna supports limited public involvement in the political process and emphasizes oversight of the ruler through the Ahl al-Ḥall wa-l-ʿAqd, distinguishing between general public participation and consultation among scholars and elites. Maududi, by contrast, explicitly states that non-Muslims have no right to participate in governance and that only Muslims may occupy leadership positions.

4) Position on Parliamentary Systems: Hassan al-Banna accepts the parliamentary system and believes that it is based on the principle of shūrā (consultation). Maududi, however, argues that no individual can be directly and systematically elected to leadership or responsibility unless it is under strict Sharia guidance.

5) View of Democracy: Maududi regards Western democracies as unchecked and despotic systems, believing that Islamic democracy must be subordinated to the Sharia. Hassan al-Banna, on the other hand, rarely addresses this issue and focuses more on the principles of popular participation and accountability.

This comparison, firstly, shows that while Hassan al-Banna and Abul A'la Maududi are closely aligned on general principles, their application and interpretation of Islamic tenets—especially in political and social domains—can differ significantly. Secondly, identifying these points of convergence and divergence helps provide a clearer understanding of the respective theories of these two major Islamic thinkers and their distinct approaches to the concept of the Islamic state.

Conclusion

Hassan al-Banna and Abul A'la Maududi, as two prominent Islamic thinkers, both emphasized the importance of divine sovereignty and the necessity of an Islamic government. However, their views differ in how these ideas should be implemented.

1) Commonalities: Both thinkers believed that sovereignty ultimately belongs to God and that Sharia should govern all social and political aspects

of life. They also emphasized the importance of Muslim participation and cooperation in managing society and politics, and viewed Islam as a comprehensive system capable of addressing the needs of the modern era.

2) Differences: Nevertheless, there are significant differences in their theories:

✦ **Concept of Theodemocracy:** Maududi emphasizes theodemocracy as a distinct form of Islamic governance in which political power must be exercised under the supervision of Sharia. In contrast, Hassan al-Banna emphasizes parliamentary and representative methods.

✦ **Participation of Non-Muslims:** Maududi explicitly states that non-Muslims have no right to participate in governance, whereas Hassan al-Banna does not address this issue.

✦ **Electoral System:** According to Maududi, no individual may directly and systematically present themselves for governmental responsibility, while Hassan al-Banna stresses transparency and accountability in the process.

✦ **View on Democracy:** Maududi views Western democracies as problematic due to their lack of divine oversight and argues that Islamic democracy must operate under Sharia. In contrast, Hassan al-Banna may place greater emphasis on people's participation and public enlightenment.

These commonalities and differences reflect the diversity of thought regarding how to implement Islamic principles in governance and politics. Understanding these distinctions can contribute to the reform and improvement of political processes in Islamic societies and demonstrate how Islamic principles can be employed to address contemporary challenges.

In summary, this article, through its descriptions and analyses, contributes to a better understanding of the diversity of views among Islamic thinkers and demonstrates how Islamic principles can be applied in addressing contemporary challenges. These differences can also aid in reforming and improving political processes in Islamic societies, offering strategies for engaging with modern issues. Ultimately, I sought to show that Islam, as a dynamic intellectual system, possesses a wide range of capacities to respond to the needs of diverse societies and can be applied flexibly in various contexts.

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