

A Reflection on Abū Ḥanīfa's Political Thought through the Lens of Spriggs' Problematic Logic

Mohammad Aref Fasihi Dolatshahi 

Ph.D., Al-Mustafa International University, Qom, Iran; Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Dawat University, Kabul, Afghanistan. Dwlat352@gmail.com



Abstract

This study aims to analyze Abū Ḥanīfa's political thought within the context of the political and intellectual crises of his era, and seeks to demonstrate how this thought was shaped in response to the turbulent and tense conditions of the Islamic world in the early centuries. The main question of the research is what analysis Abū Ḥanīfa offered regarding phenomena such as political despotism, lawlessness, the corruption of rulers, the lack of judicial independence, and intellectual and theological disorder, and how his political thought was formulated in reaction to this critical situation. Within this framework, the article attempts to clarify whether Abū Ḥanīfa's positions were merely a moral and individual reaction to the conditions of his time, or whether they can be interpreted as a coherent framework for understanding the relationship between power, justice, and human responsibility within the Islamic legal and political tradition. This research has been conducted using a descriptive-analytical method and employing Spriggs' problematic logic. The research data have been collected and analyzed based on historical sources, works attributed to Abū Ḥanīfa, and accounts and reports related to his political actions and positions. Within this framework, the political and intellectual crisis of Abū Ḥanīfa's era is first formulated, and then his theoretical and practical response to this situation is examined in order to clarify the relationship between the historical conditions and the formation of his political thought. The research findings indicate that Abū Ḥanīfa did not interpret the crisis of his time merely at the level of moral or social disorders, but regarded it as the result of unjust power structures, coercive and dominant rule, political corruption, and the spread of lawlessness. Within this framework, by critiquing deterministic tendencies, he emphasized the role of human will and choice in the formation of social order or disorder, thus highlighting human political and moral responsibility. Furthermore, in his thought, human freedom and rationality hold a fundamental place, and government should not interfere in matters pertaining to the choice and judgment of a rational person. An examination of Abū

Cite this article: Fasihi Dolatshahi, M.A. (2026). A Reflection on Abū Ḥanīfa's Political Thought through the Lens of Spriggs' Problematic Logic. *Journal of Islamic Political Studies*, 8(2), pp. 181-204.
<https://doi.org/10.22081/jips.2026.80177>

Received: 2025/10/26 ; **Received in revised form:** 2026/01/03 ; **Accepted:** 2026/01/22 ; **Published online:** 2026/07/10
Article type: Research Article **Publisher:** Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy

©2026/authors retain the copyright and full publishing rights



Ḥanīfa's practical positions also shows that he did not cooperate with the despotic governments of his time and adopted a critical stance against oppression and injustice. From this perspective, his thought can be seen as an effort to counter despotism, critique a political order based on coercion and domination, and defend rationality and human responsibility in the sphere of politics. In sum, the research results show that Abū Ḥanīfa's political thought was a coherent response to the political and intellectual crises of his era—a response shaped by critiquing tyranny and despotism, defending rationality and human freedom, and emphasizing human responsibility vis-à-vis political power. This rereading can be significant for the historical understanding of the relationship between jurisprudence and politics in the Islamic tradition, as well as for rethinking the foundations of justice and political legitimacy in the Islamic world.

Keywords

Abū Ḥanīfa, Political Thought, Spriggins' Problematic Logic, Political Crisis, Despotism, Rationality, Human Freedom.

1. Introduction¹

The scholarly life of any thinker maintains a close relationship with the conditions of his time. This is why Spriggs has likened ideas to pearls (Spriggs, 2003, p. 40). According to Spriggs' theory, Abū Ḥanīfa's political thought also establishes an evident connection with the exigencies and congruities of his era. Hence, understanding Abū Ḥanīfa's political thought is a reliable step toward comprehending the social crises of this historical period. Therefore, understanding Abū Ḥanīfa's thought requires reconstructing the crisis-ridden environment in which his thought reached maturity (Fasihi Dolatshahi, 2022, p. 21). In his intellectual endeavor, Abū Ḥanīfa sought to grasp the dimensions and nature of the social crises of his time. Thus, in order to understand his political ideas, the first question is: in Abū Ḥanīfa's thought, what is corrupt, and what ideal solution does he offer for overcoming the disorders? In the diagnostic stage, Abū Ḥanīfa considered the root cause of all disorders to be the system of tyranny and intellectual confusion, and therefore, in the therapeutic stage, he proposed the establishment of a political order under the leadership of a rightful person, as well as the abandonment of doctrinal narrow-mindedness, adherence to the principle of tolerance, and free scholarly dialogues as his prescribed remedy for setting the affairs of society in order. This hypothesis has been tested and confirmed through the study of documents and by the descriptive-analytical method.

1. Abu Hanifa has the largest following among the jurisprudential schools. Just as he possesses profound reflections in theology and jurisprudence, he also holds precise views and political stances on political matters. His good relations with the Shiite imams and his particular devotion to the Ahl al-Bayt (Sharabāshī, n.d., pp. 41-43; Abū Zahra, 2012, p. 71), his support for Shiite movements (Abu Zahra, 2012, p. 71; Iṣfahānī, n.d., p. 141; Balādhurī, 1977, vol. 3, p. 239), and his theory permitting rebellion against an unjust ruler all indicate the existence of a conciliatory thought between the Hanafis and the Imamiyya. The family to which Abu Hanifa is attributed is renowned for its love and transmission of the virtues of the Ahl al-Bayt. Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqalānī (1968, vol. 1, p. 88) counted him among the Followers (Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, 2005, vol. 15, p. 445; Ibn Bazzāzī al-Kardārī, 2000, vol. 2, p. 5). Al-Mālikī acknowledged his perfections, and al-Shāfiʿī considered the people, in jurisprudence, to be the dependents of Abu Hanifa (Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, n.d., p. 193). His love of freedom and freethinking (Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, n.d., p. 267; Ibn ʿĀbidīn, 1856, vol. 1, p. 23), piety (Mullā ʿAlī Qārī, 1914, p. 488), the theory of the justice of the imam (ʿAllāma Shaʿrānī, 1925, vol. 1, p. 61), critical views toward the sayings of the Companions and Followers (Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd al-Muʿtazilī, 2000, vol. 4, p. 68), and refusal to declare Muslims unbelievers (Samarqandī, 1969, pp. 35-36) are considered among his scholarly and moral characteristics.

1.1. Research Background

Regarding Abū Ḥanīfa's political thought, works have been produced either in a fragmentary manner or solely within the scope of the political thought of Muslim thinkers in general; however, in the present study, firstly, his thought has been explained independently and comprehensively. Secondly, this explanation has been carried out from the perspective of the crisis theory framework designed in Spriggs' political theory. (Halabi (2001), in his book *History of Political Ideas in Iran and Islam*, devoted a discussion to Abū Ḥanīfa, but his work lacks methodological considerations, nor is his examination comprehensive or independent. Qaderi (2012), in his book *Political Ideas in Islam and Iran*, has well represented Abū Ḥanīfa's political thought; however, this study, in addition to the aforementioned shortcomings, also lacks any theoretical approach and research logic. Fallah and Alikhani (2011), in a study titled *Political Thought of Muslim Thinkers*, although more comprehensive than similar works, have examined the foundations and political thought of Abū Ḥanīfa, but it still lacks the necessary comprehensiveness and independence and is devoid of any theoretical framework and conceptual model).

1.2. Theoretical Framework

In the present study, Abū Ḥanīfa's political thought has been explained according to Spriggs' method. Spriggs processes political ideas through patterns such as observing disorder, diagnosing the ailment, envisioning the ideal society, and identifying solutions. In his view, all political thinkers begin their theories by observing and identifying a problem in the political life of their time. Thus, the question arises: what is corrupt? Once the theorist diagnoses a situation as disordered, the logic of observation requires that the context of observation also be examined, because mere diagnosis is insufficient; rather, the fundamental roots of the malady must be discovered. At this stage, the following questions are raised: if the conditions are disordered, what are the reasons for this? In the third stage, Spriggs undertakes the mental reconstruction of the political society. The reconstructed society presents norms as criteria that are essential for an orderly political life. Accordingly, the theorist must answer the question: if this situation is undesirable, then what is the desirable situation? Finally, appropriate proposals must be offered for treating or alleviating the ailment.

2. The Turbulent Conditions During Abū Ḥanīfa's Time

The period of Abū Ḥanīfa's life was turbulent. Fifty-two years of his life

passed under Umayyad rule and eighteen under the Abbasids. When al-Ḥajjāj left the political scene, he was fifteen years old, and in the time of ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz he was still young. He witnessed the critical days of the governorship of Yazid ibn Hubayra, the last Umayyad governor (Mian Muhammad Sharif, 1986, vol. 2, p. 125). With his own eyes he saw the transfer of power in Iraq and experienced the oppression of Ibn Hubayra, the last Umayyad governor; he also witnessed the call to the Abbasid uprising. The observation of such disorders marked the beginning of his political thought and was the motivating factor for identifying the malaises and offering solutions to overcome the disordered situation. In the conditions in which Abū Ḥanīfa lived, severe disorder prevailed. Hence, he vehemently refused the position of judge, suffered physical torture, and died in prison (Halabi, 2001, p. 184). What prevented him from accepting the office of judge in the Umayyad and Abbasid periods was a chain of crises that had taken hold of his mind and of politics and governance. In that era, he regarded the judiciary as subordinate to the caliph's will. It was unlikely that the caliph would submit to the law of the Sharia; on the other hand, he feared that he himself might become an instrument of injustice and be asked to issue incorrect fatwas, and finally that not only the caliph himself but also his associates in the palace would interfere in his work (Mian Muhammad Sharif, 1986, vol. 2, p. 138). Abū Ḥanīfa also experienced these disorders in his personal life. He depicts a situation that reflects the impact of the crisis of his time on his inner self. This situation not only guides us to Abū Ḥanīfa's subjective problem but also informs us of the political crisis surrounding him. In discussing the political and intellectual predicaments that constituted his mental motivator, one cannot overlook the subjective crisis that constituted his own problem. The eagerness to attain the science of theology (*kalam*) in order to defend the domain of belief and triumph over the adversary was what preoccupied him greatly. After mastering the conventional sciences of his era, he reached such a level in theology that he became well-known (Makkī, 1903, vol. 1, p. 162); but after a while he turned to jurisprudence (*fiqh*). He deeply regretted and grieved that he had occupied himself for a time with theology, and therefore forbade his companions and children from engaging in it (Makkī, 1903, vol. 1, p. 11). His mental oscillation between theology and jurisprudence reflected the influence of the environment of his day, because Kufa not only a was center of dialectical theology, but was also considered the counterpart of Medina in jurisprudential studies (Abū Zahra, 2012, p. 57).

With his intellectual inclination, he could not find himself drawn to the

method of the People of Hadith (*Ahl al-Ḥadīth*). Hence, he joined the Iraqi school, which was rationalist and whose center was Kufa. The truth was that Abū Ḥanīfa's mind was entangled in a web of countless conflicting issues. On the one hand, he was caught up in the intense disagreements among the sects; on the other hand, he was engaged in resolving the conflict between jurisprudence and practical politics. By examining the conflict between jurisprudence and practical politics, he turned away from politics in favor of jurisprudential teachings and directed the edge of his criticism toward the government, calling them usurpers (Sarakhsī, 1957, p. 130). Abū Ḥanīfa's era can be called an age of ideological chaos. Among the most important intellectual schisms of this period was the opposition between the People of Hadith and the People of Opinion (*Ahl al-Ra'y*). The People of Hadith posed a challenge to Abū Ḥanīfa, and this tendency in its enmity toward him went so far as to insult him. At this time, the Kharijites were the most radical sect, holding rebellion against the ruler to be obligatory. They generally deemed it permissible to kill their opponents, even women and children, and thus the Kharijite sedition was accompanied by severe and sudden bloodshed (Halabi, 2001, p. 58). All these issues occupied Abū Ḥanīfa's mind. His subjective problem, as one of the motivating factors of his intellectual endeavors, was very specific. The fundamental problem was that the Islamic caliphate, during the years from the rule of 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān to the caliphate of Manṣūr al-'Abbāsī, which encompassed Abū Ḥanīfa's lifetime, was in a disordered state. The internal conditions of many cities were unstable, and intra-governmental and sectarian conflicts had thrown them into turmoil. The society of that day was intellectually brilliant yet at the same time the victim of the worst political corruption and moral bankruptcy. The ruling power rarely paid any heed to morality and the prophetic legacy. It was a period in which people endured all kinds of injustices and follies. Aristotle's words found application: when man is far from justice, he is more wicked than all animals (Spriggs, 2003, p. 58).

One aspect of the crisis in this period was the severance of legal, jurisprudential, and political ties from religion. The disconnection of politics from these continuities indicated the depth of the crisis in this era. In this age, a reading of religion was presented that served to preserve and expand power. For example, because the Murji'a and the Jabriyya insured the caliphs' power against political fluctuations, they were accepted by the ruling apparatus; but other readings that posed a challenge to power were denied. In the belief of the Murji'a, the Umayyad government was legitimate even if they committed sins.

Al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf supported the Murji'a and placed them in sensitive positions. The caliphate of 'Umar ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz also provided an opportunity to strengthen this sect (Moraveji Tabasi, 2010, p. 81). They considered the theory of "overlooking" toward the caliph as a premise, and therefore did not deem it permissible for those who took up arms under the slogan of enjoining good and forbidding evil (Ghaderi, 2012, p. 66). The Murji'a, as a state ideology, intellectually deluded the people and practically entangled them in indifference. The perpetration of injustice and its justification for the people was no small crisis that the Islamic society of Abū Ḥanīfā's era was grappling with. Abū Ḥanīfā, who himself was among the moderate Murji'a, recognizing the danger that this extremist faction posed to his society, proceeded to refute them, and in practice never recognized the ruling government, never justified the tyrannies of the regime, and conversely supported popular uprisings against the ruler. Another issue that fueled the crisis in this period was the promotion of the jurisprudence of domination (*fiqh al-ghalaba*). In the jurisprudence of domination, "whoever opposes the ruler with force is an unbeliever whose blood is lawful." Because they sought a religious basis for such fatwas, they resorted to fabricating hadiths. In these narrations, rebellion against the ruler is deemed to constitute unbelief and to merit the fire of hell (Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, n.d., hadith 1848). Jurists, based on such hadiths, deemed unconditional obedience to the rulers' commands obligatory; but Abū Ḥanīfā, against this great slander, first cast doubt on the authenticity of the hadiths, and second formed an opposition front against the theory of obedience to the unjust ruler, making obedience to the ruler conditional upon his justice, and spoke of civil rebellion against tyrannical rulers (Jaṣṣāṣ, 1985, vol. 1, pp. 86-87). In this period, enjoining good and forbidding evil, which was a principle and among the religious duties, was turned into an instrument of repression. Abd al-Malik used to say: whoever enjoins good upon me, his punishment is the sword (Suyūṭī, 1992, p. 218). Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan publicly bade farewell to the Qur'an (Suyūṭī, 1992, p. 217). Wālīd ibn Yazīd shot arrows at the Quran (Mas'ūdī, 2006, p. 216). Al-Ḥajjāj bombarded the Kaaba with catapults (Ibn A'tham al-Kūfī, 1991, vol. 6, p. 279). Other caliphs also engaged in open corruption (Iṣfahānī, 1963, p. 47).

Another aspect of the political crisis in this period was the separation of politics from ethics. In this era, politics had not only lost its religious backing but had also lost its moral foundation. The religion propagated by the rulers could not secure ethics in society. The predominant characteristic of the

governments of Abū Ḥanīfa's time was usurpation and tyranny, and thus, in his view, they lacked legitimacy. Unbridled violence was a feature of political power in this period. Although the exercise of violence was a legacy of Mu'āwiya's era, since his agents showed no mercy to opponents, after him—especially in the time in which Abū Ḥanīfa lived—violence was exercised openly. Mu'āwiya practiced covert violence, but after him violence became overt and even radicalized the counter-discourses to the Umayyads; that is, it not only kept the Kharijites alive but also drove the Shia into crisis. The Zaydiyya emerged from this violence, and the Umayyad factions also became violent, and this trend continued (Zarifian, 2020). Moral laxity and political corruption advanced side by side. Abū Ḥanīfa's ethical ideas were formulated from the observation of such disorders in order to remedy the deficiencies and disorders. In fact, Abū Ḥanīfa's political thought began with the observation of disorders in the Umayyad period and ended with the study of the upheavals in the early Abbasid period. Thus, unveiling the functional disorders of the Abbasid period is also necessary for understanding Abū Ḥanīfa's political thought. The Islamic society in the early Abbasid period, which coincided with the final part of Abū Ḥanīfa's life, became the victim of the worst political corruption and moral bankruptcy. The Abbasids obtained their interests at the cost of losing virtues. The nakedness of power from ethics was a characteristic of Abbasid rule, including that of Manṣūr. Manṣūr, through deceit—which was a feature of his political ethics—killed Abū Muslim with trickery and false promises. The killing of Muslim created many troubles for Manṣūr's government, "and many uprisings took place to avenge him, which had numerous consequences for the Abbasids" (Taqoush, 2004, p. 46). Religious movements such as the Rāwandīyya and Sinbad, and the uprisings of Ibrāhīm and Nafs al-Zakiyya, which were suppressed with great cruelty by Manṣūr al-'Abbāsī, were among these revolts. After suppressing the Alid uprisings, Manṣūr chained all the descendants of Imam Hasan, brought them in humiliation to Hira, and treated them so harshly that they could not distinguish night from day (Allah Akbari, 2002, pp. 22-23). Despite the fact that the Abbasid caliphate began with the slogan "al-riḍā min Āl Muḥammad" (the chosen one from the family of Muhammad), it gradually moved toward enmity with the Ahl al-Bayt. In building Baghdad, Manṣūr placed Alids within the pillars and covered them with mortar and plaster (Ṣadūq, n.d., vol. 1, p. 71). The Abbasids also pressured and tortured the Shiite leader because of his belief in the theory of textual designation (*naṣṣ*) and appointment (*naṣb*). Thus, Imam Sadiq was constantly subjected to oppression by the Abbasids,

until, according to the narration of Ibn Shahr Āshūb, he was poisoned and martyred (Ibn Shahr Āshūb, 2000, vol. 4, p. 280). Manṣūr also mistreated Sunni jurists who did not regard his government as legitimate. Concurrent with the uprising of Nafs al-Zakiyya in Medina, Mālik ibn Anas declared that the oath of allegiance given by the residents of Medina to the Abbasids, which had been brought about by force, was invalid (Zaydan, 2015, pp. 104-105). Abū Ḥanīfā, Sufyān al-Thawrī, al-A'mash, and other jurists of Kufa and the People of Hadith also declared their support for the uprising of Nafs al-Zakiyya. After reconquering Medina and suppressing Ibrāhīm's uprising, Manṣūr ordered Mālik ibn Anas to be flogged and kept Abū Ḥanīfā in prison until the end of his life (Jafari, 2001, p. 326). The great problem of the Abbasid government was the crisis of legitimacy. The Abbasids based their rule on inheritance from their ancestor 'Abbās, as the uncle of the Prophet. This government was not legitimate according to the patterns of legitimacy in both Sunni and Shiite traditions. Mālik also did not consider the Abbasid caliphate legitimate (Zaydan, 2015, pp. 104-105). Abū Ḥanīfā likewise regarded the Abbasid government as tyrannical. The conflict between the Alids and the Abbasids was another problem of this period. Manṣūr is considered the first person who, during his caliphate, sowed discord between the Abbasids and the Alids (Suyūfī, 1992, p. 317). In this struggle, Abū Ḥanīfā sided with the Alids and distanced himself from the Abbasids. By supporting the Alid uprisings, Abū Ḥanīfā effectively advanced his goal of establishing a just system and expressed his opposition to the system of tyranny. Manṣūr, even for his own political purposes, pitted the leaders of the jurisprudential schools against one another. Instigating Anas ibn Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfā against Imam Sadiq is a notable example in this regard (Ibn Khallikān, n.d., p. 135; Dhahabī, 1995, p. 212; Ṣadūq, 1984, vol. 2, p. 519).

3. Diagnosis

3.1. Philosophy and Theology

The era of Abū Ḥanīfā was the era of the emergence of theological sects (*kalām*), each of which was engaged in promoting its own ideas. Abū Ḥanīfā recognized this condition as disordered, and the logic of his inquiry required that he examine the root causes. In fact, in Abū Ḥanīfā's intellectual system, the ultimate cause of the intellectual confusions of this period was the discipline of *kalām*. Abū Ḥanīfā was well versed in *kalām* and philosophy, to the point that he was singled out (or: became well known) in this regard. To that end, he went to Basra to engage in debate with the Mu'tazila and also

debated with the Khawārij. In the end, he distanced himself from *kalām*. He used to say: "I saw the people of *kalām* as having a countenance unlike that of the righteous forebears (*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*), and their method unlike the method of the righteous. I found them hard-hearted. They have no share in asceticism (*zuhd*) and piety" (Abū Zahra, 2012, pp. 55–56). Abū Ḥanīfa attacked the theologians severely, because the theologians not only exerted themselves through disputation to crush the opponent and display their own superiority, but they also hoped for the opponent's misstep. In his view, whoever hopes for his rival's misstep will also hope for his excommunication (*takfīr*) (Kardārī, 1976, p. 111). Thus, in Abū Ḥanīfa's perspective, the root of many corruptions lay, in the first place, in the science of *kalām*, and in the second place, in the sectarian factions (*firaq*) that posed a threat to the unity of the Islamic community. The theological disputes were such that they sometimes led to bloodshed. Every household was a venue for argument and contention, and each of these debates in turn fueled new political and theological issues.

3.2. Jurisprudence (*Fiqh*)

In tracing the roots of disorder, Abū Ḥanīfa's passions are still active, and in this inquiry his view tilts toward hadith-oriented traditionalism. The school of the People of Hadith (*Ahl al-Ḥadīth*) was a cause of crisis because it disregarded reason in deriving legal rulings and led to the excommunication of the adherents of the school of opinion (*Ahl al-Ra'y*). The serious divergence between the school of *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* and the school of *Ahl al-Ra'y* is among the causes of intellectual confusion in this period. "For Abū Ḥanīfa and, in general, the People of Opinion, the lawgiver is reason" (Jaberi, 1997, p. 12); but in the approach of the traditionists, this is considered innovation (*bid'a*) and unbelief. The literalists, due to their adherence to the outward meanings and their literal reading, arrived at rigid rulings, whereas Abū Ḥanīfa, by introducing the elements of time and place and the higher purposes of the Sharia, arrived at flexible rulings suited to the conditions of the day. Thus, the fundamental methodological and epistemological divergence of these intellectual currents released much energy to neutralize the capacity of the opposing force, and in this way it became epidemic and fueled the crisis of excommunication. Abū Ḥanīfa's method of legal reasoning and his use of reason in solving societal problems were viewed by the text-bound school as a kind of confrontation with the prophetic tradition, and for this reason he was censured and excommunicated. The renowned traditionist Ibn Ḥibbān al-Bustī (d. 354 AH / 965 CE) considered Abū Ḥanīfa an innovator (Ibn Ḥibbān

al-Tamīmī al-Bustī, n.d., p. 64).

The People of Hadith vied with one another in accusing Abū Ḥanīfa of unbelief. It is transmitted from Mālik ibn Anas that he said: "Abū Ḥanīfa practices deceit in religion, and whoever practices deceit in religion has no religion" (ʿUqaylī, 1984, p. 281). In fact, the hostility of the People of Hadith toward Abū Ḥanīfa is not something that can be concealed; but perhaps the greatest antagonist of Abū Ḥanīfa is Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal. He says: "The People of Opinion are innovators, misguided, and enemies of the Sunna and Hadith" (Ibn Abī Yaʿlā, 2005, p. 71). Strangely enough, the excommunication of Abū Ḥanīfa by the People of Hadith did not remain confined to Abū Ḥanīfa's own time; rather, according to the narration of Shaykh Muḥammad Ghazālī from the shaykhs of al-Azhar, the leader of the Salafiyya in Egypt (Shaykh Ḥāmid al-Qifī) swore by God in his presence and that of several others that Abū Ḥanīfa is an unbeliever (Ghazālī, 2006, p. 52).

3.3. Politics

In the era of Abū Ḥanīfa, the government suffered from deficiencies in both structure and content. This deficiency crystallized in the form of tyrannical rule (*ḥukm al-jawr*). Now the question arises: does the political problem in question—such as tyranny and non-observance of the law (the Sharia)—have a political root? In his etiology of the problem, Abū Ḥanīfa focuses on elements such as the lack of judicial independence from the executive, rule by force and domination, the corruption of rulers, and lawlessness (Jaṣṣāṣ, 1985, vol. 1, pp. 86–87). In his view, these elements operate like a chain and complete one another. The government in Abū Ḥanīfa's time was not legitimate according to the Sharia; rather, it had come to power through force. Abū Ḥanīfa's reaction was that seizing power by force and then legalizing it through coercive allegiance is not a legal path. The caliph must be chosen after consultation and exchange of views among the wise men who have the right to express their opinion (Mian Muhammad Sharif, 1986, vol. 2, p. 135). Hence, in his address to al-Manṣūr, he says: "You have become caliph without even two men of legal opinion having consented to it, whereas the caliph must be elected through consultation and the agreement of the Muslims" (Mian Muhammad Sharif, 1986, vol. 2, p. 135). In this period, Abū Ḥanīfa witnessed a caliphate of corrupt men—those who, despite their disobedience, demanded obedience from the people and issued unjust rulings (Jaṣṣāṣ, 1985, vol. 1, pp. 86–87). The caliphate in this period was entangled in a chain of corruption. This chain had ruined order, law, and justice. Instead of applying the Sharia,

the caliphs occupied themselves with wine-drinking and sexual gratification. In addition to this, illicit exploitation of the public treasury (*bayt al-māl*) had turned society into an arena of persistent corruption. Abū Ḥanīfa had correctly diagnosed the roots of the malady. In his view, the most reprehensible negligence of the caliphs of his time was the misappropriation of the Muslims' public treasury and the unlawful seizure of people's property (Mian Muhammad Sharif, 1986, vol. 2, p. 138). Thus, according to the narration of al-Dhahabī, Abū Ḥanīfa held that whoever misuses the public treasury or the people's money, or issues unjust rulings, is not worthy of remaining in the seat of the caliphate (Dhahabī, 1995, p. 17).

In tracing the roots of political corruption, Abū Ḥanīfa had also identified the lack of separation between the legislative and judicial powers. If in this period the caliph was not punished for violating the rights of the people, and the sitting judge could not compel the ruler to submit to the ruling of the Sharia (Makkī, 1903, p. 100), its root must be sought either in the concentration of power in the hands of the rulers or in the failure to separate the legislative from the judicial power (Makkī, 1903, p. 162). A question that requires an answer is: do the social disorders diagnosed by Abū Ḥanīfa have political causes, or are they a product of Abū Ḥanīfa's own psychological makeup? It is true that Abū Ḥanīfa refrained from entering the arena of practical politics, did not accept government gifts, and considered the government altogether illegitimate (Fasihi Dolatshahi, 2022, p. 286); but as a theorist, he was confident that his observation of political disorder was not a product of psychological projection. Rather, it was the result of dehumanized and deviant social patterns.

The second point is that, from Abū Ḥanīfa's perspective, the root of disorder is not natural factors. At a time when rulers tied their governments to the destiny of society, and the ideology of predestination served as a strong support for justifying their illegitimate policies, Abū Ḥanīfa called determinism into question (Fallah & Alikhani, 2011, p. 56). This indicates that the disorders did not arise from natural factors; rather, in his theory, the issue stems from human will, and for this very reason, one is able to adjust or change them according to proportionality. He believed: "God has not compelled any of His creatures to unbelief or faith; rather, faith and unbelief are the acts of servants" (Abī Muṭī' al-Balkhī, n.d., p. 26). This way of thinking places him squarely in the camp of those who believe in free will. His support for the uprisings and movements that formed against the Umayyad and Abbasid rulers (Jāhīz, 1933, vol. 1, p. 106; Shahrastānī, 1956, vol. 1,

p. 170) and his opposition to the extreme Murji'a are the best proof of this. He was ardently eager for positive change in government. Belief in human free will is the factor that connects Abū Ḥanīfa, as a political actor and protester, to the revolutionary movements of his era and sets him against the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs.

Imaginary Order: Leadership of the Rightful Person; Acting Upon the Law; Distribution of Power

After observing the disorders and diagnosing their real causes, Abū Ḥanīfa turned to envisioning a revived political system. If he saw his society in disarray, he had to show what an organized society is. Of course, undertaking to reconstruct a new political system did not mean that Abū Ḥanīfa himself sought to build a new society; for this task is not that of a theorist, but rather belongs to the functions of practical politics and the grave duties of pragmatists. Yet as a theorist, he strove to draw in his mind a model of a well-ordered society and to provide a standard for it. If society is intellectually incoherent, if the government is illegitimate, he must precisely show what a coherent society and a lawful government mean. This reconstruction constitutes the foundation of Abū Ḥanīfa's political thought. Abū Ḥanīfa's image of the reconstructed society is one in which "a just and pious ruler" (Mian Muhammad Sharif, 1986, vol. 2, p. 132) stands at its center, and economic, political, and cultural activities are carried out under his leadership. Unlike the disordered society, in which a corrupt and tyrannical person holds the reins of the community, in the reconstructed society "a corrupt person cannot be a judge, ruler, or *mufīṭ*" (Jaṣṣāṣ, 1985, vol. 1, p. 80). In the chaotic society, the ruler has dominated the people's affairs through force and subjugation; but in the reconstructed society, "the caliph is chosen after consultation and exchange of views with the People of Opinion" (Jaṣṣāṣ, 1985, vol. 1, pp. 134–135), and "the caliphate rests upon the consensus of the believers and their consultation." In this new political system, therefore, the leader worthy of obedience is the one who is just and has come to power through the consensus of the Muslims. In Abū Ḥanīfa's ideal political order, popular legitimacy and their satisfaction are a principle and the greatest criterion. Given the place of popular satisfaction in the new order, the individual and social spheres are distinguished: in the individual and devotional sphere, the standard is the Creator's satisfaction, but in the public sphere, the standard is the people's satisfaction. It is clear that when the religiously committed think of the people's satisfaction, it is on the assumption that the Creator's satisfaction lies in the people's satisfaction. Given this

distinction between the two spheres, the function of the new system in Abū Ḥanīfa's theory is, in the social sphere, social justice and the rights of people (*ḥaqq al-nās*), and in the individual sphere, individual virtues (Fallah & Alikhani, 2011, p. 65). In the individual sphere, tolerance and leniency prevail, while in the public and social sphere, strictness obtains. Examples of his emphasis on individual freedoms include freedom in transactions, private property, and his view on legal interdiction (*ḥajr*) (Makkī, 1903, p. 157; Tūsī, 1997, vol. 3, p. 268). He preferred individual freedom as a principle, even when it conflicted with weak transmitted sources (Pakatchi, 1988, vol. 5, p. 399).

In Abū Ḥanīfa's symbolic depiction of his ideal society, he pays special attention to moral precepts. In his advice to the one bound for Basra to assume its governorship, it is stated: "Be lenient with the people, adopt good character, manifest friendliness, refrain from oppression, and do not betray trusts" (Elahi Bolandshahri, 2015, p. 16). In Abū Ḥanīfa's theory of ethical politics, the corruption of society stems from the moral corruption of rulers, and the reform of society is likewise tied to the righteousness of rulers. The society he envisions is moral; its citizens are happy, and the public interest and norms are everywhere clear and evident. In Abū Ḥanīfa's reconstructed society, the people enjoy special rights: the right to revolt against an oppressive ruler (Jaṣṣāṣ, 1985, vol. 1, pp. 78–86), the right to supervise power (commanding right and forbidding wrong), the right to private property (Abū Yūsuf, 1997, p. 399), and the right to choice in marriage (Sarakhṣī, 1957, vol. 10). Among the most important rights in the new order, around which all other social rights revolve, is the right to freedom of expression. In Abū Ḥanīfa's ideal society, freedom—and especially freedom of expression—enjoys a worthy place both as a moral virtue and as an individual and social right. In his ideal society, not only is the right to freedom of expression not disregarded, but it is "stubbornly defended" (Fallah & Alikhani, 2011, p. 67). Emphasis on tolerance, free thinking, and dialogue instead of excommunication and violence are characteristics of the revived society. In creating such a society, Abū Ḥanīfa seeks a model of government to propose in the arena of politics and governance. In Abū Ḥanīfa's theory, the caliphate of 'Alī is presented as a model of the new political system, renowned for defending freedom of expression. In this type of society, even if someone insults their leader, and beyond that, says they intend to kill him, no punishment is envisioned for them (Fallah & Alikhani, 2011, pp. 140–141). Abū Ḥanīfa's image of the reconstructed society is "rationality." A rational society is, in fact, a plan for a

society in which political decisions are made on the basis of collective reason. The orderly administration of such a society takes place within the framework of laws that can be divided into devotional (*ta'abbudī*) and non-devotional (based on public interest, *maṣlaḥa*). In classifying rulings for the better administration of the revived society, Abū Ḥanīfā not only introduced rational custom (*sunnat al-ʿuqalāʾ*) into the legislative apparatus but also "was able to open the door of rational consideration of public interest in political and social affairs" (Fallah & Alikhani, 2011, p. 77). In devotional rulings, he expects obedience to the commands and prohibitions of the Sharia from the members of society; but in political affairs, he values the higher purposes of the Sharia, rationality, and reason. In designing the new order, Abū Ḥanīfā resorts to a relative separation of powers as a model for governance, in order to prevent the government from falling into political despotism and the monopoly of power. According to this plan, the government is divided into various branches, each having an independent sphere of authority and responsibilities, such that the powers of each branch do not conflict with those of the others. Since in the ruling system of his time all powers were monopolized by the rulers, he did not accept the office of chief judge (*qāḍī al-quḍāt*) and thus codified law outside the circle of power (Mian Muhammad Sharif, 1986, p. 143); but in his ideal system, where the monopoly of political power is broken and it is shaped according to the theory of separation of powers, he considers cooperating with the government and obeying its commands as obligatory under the injunction "Obey God ..." (Samarqandī, 1969, p. 179).

4. Solution

At this stage, Abū Ḥanīfā presents his practical proposals and prescribes a well-ordered political system. The following sets out his prescriptions.

4.1. Curing the malady of tyranny

4.1.1. Care in selecting the ruler and officials

In Abū Ḥanīfā's thought, preventing power from sliding into despotism requires special measures. For his ideal political system not to descend into tyranny, Abū Ḥanīfā believes in the method of free election of the ruler. He places this selection in the hands of the council of the people of loosing and binding (*ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʿaqd*) (Maududi, 2019, p. 304; Halabi, 2001, pp. 323–324) and advises the council to choose, through voting, the most worthy person for this office. Once elected, the caliph of the Muslims is obliged to consult with experts in political decision-making, and in this matter

he must follow the example of the Prophet, who was commissioned to consult with the believers in affairs (Quran, 3:159).

4.1.2. Institutionalized oversight of government

In the absence of supervisory systems, government can descend into despotism and violate citizens' rights. Hence, Abū Ḥanīfa has proposed mechanisms for overseeing power. He divides oversight into internal and external. Internal oversight is the most effective mechanism for controlling power, and external oversight will be "useful" only if these individuals also exercise self-supervision from within. In his view, God-consciousness (*taqwā*) is the best controlling force for a person. Thus, he advises his student Abū Yūsuf to always watch over his own soul, and also recommends that he constantly remember death and visit graves and sacred places (Elahi Bolandshahri, 2015, pp. 15–17). He also advises that one's dealings with God in private should be as they are in public, for the fruit of knowledge becomes manifest when one is the same in seclusion and in the open (Elahi Bolandshahri, 2015, p. 14). Alongside internal oversight, Abū Ḥanīfa also speaks of a public supervisory system called commanding right and forbidding wrong (*amr bi-l-ma'rūf wa-nahy 'an al-munkar*). This supervisory system not only puts an end to the arbitrary excesses of power but also enhances the efficiency of the political system. Criticizing and advising the ruler, and overseeing his conduct, hold particular importance in Abū Ḥanīfa's thought, to the point that in discussing the mutual rights of ruler and people, attention is given to the reciprocal nature of the principle of sincere advice (*naṣīḥa*). Abū Ḥanīfa refers to this principle as a religious duty: if the ruler does something contrary to the Sharia, he must be reminded; and if the ruler does not desist from his error, one should go to his house and advise him privately, in accordance with Quranic proofs and the Sunna (Elahi Bolandshahri, 2015, p. 16).

4.1.3. Heedfulness of Individual Rights and Freedom

One of the means in Abū Ḥanīfa's theory that leads to the deliverance of society from despotism and provides the ground for the desired order is fundamental attention to individual freedoms, such as the right to private property (Makki, 1903, p. 157), the right of women to freedom in marriage (Sarakhshī, 1906, p. 10), the right to overthrow the government (Jaṣṣāṣ, 1985, vol. 1, pp. 86–87), and the right of sincere advice (Elahi Bolandshahri, 2015, p. 16). In this regard, he took a step forward and focused on the key concept of individuality. Abū Ḥanīfa's presupposition in the notion of individuality is

human dignity, freedom, and rationality. Abū Ḥanīfa showed great enthusiasm for respecting human freedom as long as one possesses reason (Abū Zahra, 2012, p. 93). The immediate raising of the issue of individuality by Abū Ḥanīfa, aimed at establishing a just order, means that the government is by no means permitted to interfere in the sphere of the special prerogatives of a rational person (Abū Zahra, 2012, p. 93). Needless to say, individuality in this solution is used not in its negative sense but in its positive sense. In this sense, an individual is a citizen who enjoys rights and freedoms, and the sovereign power must be accountable to them. In despotic governments, the individual is one who seeks to secure their own rights at the cost of depriving others of rights and freedoms; but in Abū Ḥanīfa's ideal government, the observance of these rights is made possible through the institutional observance of the rights of others. Hence, securing individual rights and freedoms in this solution is never outside legal rules; rather, freedom and public rights are the most important criteria in this regard. Thus, in Abū Ḥanīfa's ideal system, everything is systematic and measured, which itself can lead to the desired social order and organize the pursuit of freedom within legal frameworks. Attention to individual rights and freedoms as a fundamental solution in Abū Ḥanīfa's intellectual system falls "within reasonable limits," and if it "takes on an immoral or even insulting form" (Mian Muhammad Sharif, 1986, vol. 2, p. 140), it will not be acceptable.

4.1.4. Avoidance of power and non-complicity with tyrannical government

The masses and elites, as their first practical stance, are to boycott the despotic ruler—that is, they are not to treat him as a reference in legal and political matters; otherwise, they become complicit with the despotic ruler in consolidating the foundations of despotism and committing political crime. Abū Ḥanīfa's theory of the impermissibility of complicity with an unjust ruler brings his jurisprudence closer to Shiite political jurisprudence. The prevailing opinion in Sunni jurisprudence permits complicity with a tyrannical government; but Abū Ḥanīfa advocates avoidance of power, non-complicity, and even the obligation of emigration (hijra). He instructs his student Abū Yūsuf as follows: "Do not approach him, for you will burn and suffer harm from him. The ruler is usually such that he does not attribute to others the value he attributes to himself." He advises against taking shelter near the ruler's house and against accepting his gifts. He also advised keeping away even from the ruler's associates (Elahi Bolandshahri, 2015, pp. 10–11). He himself, in accordance with his political theory, did not accept governmental positions in practice and also refused to accept the ruler's gifts.

4.1.5. Riot and Uprising Against Tyranny

One of the possible means of eliminating the monopoly of political power is combating tyranny. Abū Ḥanīfa's strategic approach to struggle is, in the first step, accompanied by leniency; and if conditions are favorable, his prescribed remedy for uprooting despotism in society is to motivate the people toward a general uprising. He himself, in practice, employed both methods. In practice, he supported the armed uprisings of the Alids against the caliphs of his time, and as he himself acknowledged, if conditions had been ripe, he would have personally participated in these uprisings. The cautious behavior that Abū Ḥanīfa advocates in combating despotism is rooted in his security concerns. In his view, enduring a tyrannical ruler is more beneficial than a rebellion that brings affliction upon the Islamic community (Samarqandī, 1969, p. 41). Moreover, adopting a cautious path in the struggle against despotism gives the vanguard of freedom-seekers the opportunity to draft laws for an ideal life and to provide legal and political education to society. He himself, taking advantage of the opportunity at hand, founded a school of jurisprudence (*madhhab*) and thereby reinforced tolerance (*sa'at al-ṣadr*) in his students. In addition, he established a consultative assembly (*majlis shūrā*) for codifying laws; "Abū Ḥanīfa's students constituted the members of this assembly" (Mian Muhammad Sharif, 1986, vol. 2, p. 144). In this assembly, which functioned as a legislative council, 83,000 rules and jurisprudential issues were codified (Maududi, 1978, p. 149). The primary principle in Abū Ḥanīfa's thought on combating despotism is leniency; but if this method cannot straighten the crookedness of despotism, then, should conditions be ready, Abū Ḥanīfa's final recommendation is its overthrow through armed uprisings (Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, 1931, p. 395; Mian Muhammad Sharif, 1986, vol.2, pp. 141-142). Abū Ḥanīfa's theory shows proximity to Shiite theory.

5. Cure of Intellectual Confusions

5.1. Curing Excommunication

The healing remedy that Abū Ḥanīfa prescribed for treating the chronic ailment of excommunication is to overcome doctrinal narrow-mindedness. To this end, he offered a broad definition of faith. His definition of faith included wrongdoers and transgressors, by virtue of mere faith and general acknowledgment of what the Prophet brought (Pakatchi, 1988, vol. 5, p. 385). In his view, all Muslims are equal in faith; what constitutes superiority is religious practice alone (Ḥanafī, 2007, p. 325). With this definition, excommunicating the people of the qibla (*ahl al-qibla*) is an improper act; one

must shun those who pass judgment on others regarding Paradise and Hell, and leave the fate of believers to God. He advocated adherence to tolerance and free scholarly dialogue instead of excommunication. In accordance with this theory, in practice he "did not call the people of the qibla unbelievers" (Samarqandī, 1969, pp. 35–36) and engaged in debate with those of differing views. Leniency in faith and strictness in politics are among Abū Ḥanīfā's recommendations for curing this destructive phenomenon. He held a fundamental belief in social unity, and for this reason he put forward the theory of moderate *irjā'*. The theory of moderate *irjā'* was highly valuable in establishing peaceful relations among Muslims, especially in an era when unity was severely threatened due to the spread of theological and jurisprudential narrow-mindedness (Fallah & Alikhani, 2011, p. 60).

5.2. Curing Doctrinal and Political Determinism

His theory against determinism sought to establish intellectual order in Islamic society "between determinism and free will." The solution for applying this theory in politics and society was to emphasize human agency. Among the various doctrines of the Murji'a, Khawārij, and Mu'tazila, Abū Ḥanīfā adopted the middle path and formulated a moderate, centrist school that, on the one hand, prevented Islamic society from disintegrating through mutual hatred and hostility, and on the other, preserved it from falling into moral chaos and becoming emboldened to commit sins on the basis of a feeling of being absolved (Mian Muhammad Sharif, 1986, vol. 2, p. 133).

6. Research Findings

The research findings are indicated in the following table (1):

Table 1. Findings of the Research

Crisis	Diagnosis of Causes	Design of the Desired Order	Proposed Solution
Despotism	Establishment of government through force and domination	Just and lawful (<i>shar'i</i>) order	Separation of powers – defense of individual freedoms
Legitimacy	Deviation from the pact of the caliphate	Reconstruction of the caliphate system	Election of the caliph by consensus of the Muslims – voluntary allegiance (<i>bay'a</i>) of the Muslims
Lawlessness	Absence of law – failure to act according to law	Formation of a legislative assembly	Codification and application of law

Crisis	Diagnosis of Causes	Design of the Desired Order	Proposed Solution
Excommunication (<i>takfir</i>)	Doctrinal exclusivism	Broadening the concept of faith – unity of Muslims	Leniency in creeds – facilitating relations among Muslims
Intellectual conflict of rival groups	Absolutism and desire to overpower the opponent	An intellectual order free from violence	Tolerance – rationality – free dialogue
Text-bound literalism (<i>naṣṣ</i> orientalism)	Disbelief in rationality – promotion of rational rulings	Reason-centered order	Harmonization of text and reality
Inefficacy of jurisprudence (<i>fiqh</i>)	Inattention to public interests (<i>maṣāliḥ</i>) and the exigencies of the time	Establishment of a jurisprudential school – systematization of jurisprudential teachings	Going beyond outward meanings and attending to higher purposes (<i>maqāṣid</i>)
Religious conflicts	Othering and inattention to commonalities	Creation of a moderate Islamic society	The authority of 'Alī and the political role of the Ahl al-Bayt
Predestinarianism	Theological justification of government	Doctrinal and political order between determinism and free will	Emphasis on human agency and accountability
Promotion of corrupt custom (<i>'urf</i>)	Erroneous policies of the rulers	Regulation and promotion of sound custom	Combating corrupt custom

7. Conclusion

Abū Ḥanīfa's political thought began as a reaction to the phenomenon of crisis and ultimately evolved with the aim of providing solutions for setting affairs in order. In this process, Abū Ḥanīfa's political thought distances itself from the dominant Sunnī discourse and aligns itself alongside Shī'ī theories and, in some instances, alongside modern theories. Abū Ḥanīfa completely rejected the theory of *al-mulk li-man ghalaba* (rule belongs to the one who prevails) and, in his own theory, endowed power with a human dimension. In Abū Ḥanīfa's view, those who have seized power by the sword are not in the right; rather, those who are in the right possess legitimacy. In his theory, not every act of opposition against a deceitful ruler is considered rebellion (*baghy*); rather, it is counted among the indisputable rights of the people. His material and moral support for the Shiite movements against the Umayyads and Abbasids is the best proof of this claim. His articulation of the theory of the sovereignty of the qualified or rightful individual indicates the affinity of his thought with Shiite theory. Despite placing security at the core of his political theory, his consideration of justice as one of the elements of legitimacy gives his theory a Shiite orientation. Some of his juridical propositions concerning government and politics show affinity with modern theories, particularly the

theory of separation of powers. The theory of separation of powers emphasizes that the concentration of power in the hands of the ruler leads to corruption. In his thought, the judge must be independent in his rulings, and even the sovereign must follow the law as determined by the judge. Freedom of expression, the separation of the public sphere from the private, the emphasis on popular satisfaction, the articulation of the people's rights vis-à-vis the ruler, and the substitution of tolerance for violent thinking—these put forward the early nuclei of religious democracy within the context of political jurisprudence and demonstrate that his political thought was pioneering and can still offer guidance for contemporary society.

References

The Holy Quran.

- Abī Muṭī‘ al-Balkhī. (n.d.). *Al-Sharḥ al-muyassar lil-fiqh al-absaṭ al-mansūb li-Abī Ḥanīfa riwāyat Abī Muṭī‘ al-Balkhī ‘an Abī Ḥanīfa*. URL=
<https://ketabonline.com/ar/books/5213/read?part=1&page=71&index=2793234>
 [In Arabic]
- Abū Yūsuf, Y. (1997). *Ikhtilāf Abī Ḥanīfa wa-Ibn Abī Laylā*. Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifa.
 [In Arabic]
- Abū Zahra, M. (2012). Ārā’ wa-andīshah’hā-yi fiqhī, uṣūlī, kalāmī wa-siyāsī-yi Imām Abū Ḥanīfa (Tārīkh al-madhāhib al-islāmī). In ‘A. Raḥīmī (Trans.) & M. ‘Azīzī (Ed.), *Barrīsī-yi ārā’ wa-andīshah’hā-yi Imām Abū Ḥanīfa*. Tehran: Ehsan. [In Persian]
- Allah Akbari, M. (2002). The Relationship between Alids and Abbasids. *Tārīkh dar Āyīnah-‘i Pizhūhish*, Pre-issue (1), pp. 11–30. [In Persian]
- Balādhurī, A. (1977). *Jumal min ansāb al-ashrāf* (Vol. 3, M. B. Maḥmūdī, Ed.). Beirut: Mu’assasat al-‘A‘lamī lil-Maṭbū‘āt. [In Arabic] (Original work published 1397 AH)
- Dhahabī, Sh. al-D. (1955). *Tadhkirat al-huffāz*. Beirut: Dār Ihya’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī. [In Arabic] (Original work published 1374 AH)
- Elahi Bolandshahri, M. A. (2015). *Majmū‘ah-‘i waṣāyā-yi Abū Ḥanīfa* (‘A. Ḥaydarī, Trans.). s.l.: s.n. [In Persian]
- Fallah, R., & Alikhani, ‘A. A. (2011). *The Thought of Muslim Thinkers*. Tehran: Institute for Cultural and Social Studies, Ministry of Sciences, Research, and Technology. [In Persian]
- Fasihi DOLatshahi, M. A. (2022). *Abū Ḥanīfa’s Political Thought*. Kabul: Al-Mustafa International University. [In Persian]
- Ghaderi, H. (2012). *Political Thoughts in Islam and Iran*. Tehran: SAMT. [In Persian]
- Ghazālī, M. (2006). *Sirr ta’akhhur al-‘Arab*. Cairo: al-Nahḍa. [In Arabic]
- Halabi, ‘A. A. (2001). *History of Political Thought in Islam and Iran*. Tehran: Asāṭīr. [In Persian]
- Ḥanafī, M. (2007). *Sharḥ kitāb al-fiqh al-akbar* (‘A. M. Dandal, Ed.). Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya. [In Arabic]
- Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, Y. b. ‘A. (n.d.). *Al-Intiqā’ min faḍā’il al-thalātha al-a’imma al-fuqahā’*. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya. [In Arabic]
- Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd al-Mu’tazilī, ‘A. b. H. (2000). *Tarjamah-‘i sharḥ-i Nahj al-balāgha* (Vol. 4, Gh. Lāyiqī, Trans.). Tehran: Neyestan. [In Persian]

- Ibn Abī Ya‘lā, M. (2005). *Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila* (‘A. al-Ghuthaymīn, Ed.). Mecca: Jāmi‘at Umm al-Qurā. [In Arabic]
- Ibn ‘Ābidīn, M. (1856). *Hāshiyat Radd al-muhtār ‘alā al-durr al-mukhtār: Sharḥ tanwīr al-abṣār* (Vol. 1). Cairo: Būlāq. [In Arabic]
- Ibn A‘tham al-Kūfī, A. M. A. (1991). *Al-Futūḥ* (vol. 6). Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwā’. [In Arabic]
- Ibn Bazāzī al-Kardārī, M. b. M. (1976). *Manāqib Abī Ḥanīfā*. Qom: Maktab al-Dāwarī. [In Arabic]
- Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī. (1968). *Tahdhīb al-tahdhīb* (Vol. 1). Hyderabad Deccan: s.n. [In Arabic]
- Ibn Ḥibbān, A. M. b. Ḥ. al-Tamīmī al-Bustī. (n.d.). *Ṣaḥīḥ Ibn Ḥibbān*. East Germany: Maktabat Dār al-‘Ulūm al-Almānīya. [In Arabic]
- Ibn Khallikān, A. (n.d.). *Wafāyāt al-a‘yān wa-anbā’ abnā’ al-zamān* (2nd ed., A. ‘Abbās, Ed.). Qom: Manshūrāt al-Raḍī. [In Arabic]
- Ibn Shahrāshūb, M. (2000). *Manāqib Āl Abī Ṭālib* (Vol. 4). Qom: ‘Allāma. [In Arabic]
- Iṣfahānī, A. (1963). *Al-Aghānī*. Cairo: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-al-Irshād al-Qawmī, al-Mu‘assasa al-Miṣrīya al-‘Āmma. [In Arabic]
- Jaberi, M. (1997). The science of jurisprudence, the foundation of Arabic-Islamic rationality methodology (Takwīn al-‘aql al-‘Arabī) [M. Khallaji, Trans.]. *Naqd va Naẓar*, (12), pp. 114–140. [In Persian]
- Jafari, Ḥ. M. (2001). *Shiism in the path of history* (10th ed., M. T. Ayatollahi, Trans.). Tehran: Daftar-i Nashr-i Farhang-i Islāmī. [In Persian]
- Jāḥiẓ, ‘A. (1933). *Faḍl Hāshim ‘alā ‘Abd Shams*. In Ḥ. Sandūbī (Ed.), *Rasā’il al-Jāḥiẓ* (Vol. 1). Cairo: Maktabat al-Sa‘āda. [In Arabic]
- Jaṣṣāṣ, A. (1985). *Aḥkām al-Qur’ān* (Vol. 1, M. Ṣ. Qamḥāwī, Ed.). Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī. [In Arabic]
- Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, A. B. A. b. ‘A. (1931). *Tārīkh Baghdād*. Cairo: Maktabat al-Sa‘āda. [In Arabic]
- Makkī al-Khwārazmī, M. b. A. (1903). *Manāqib al-imām al-a‘zam Abī Ḥanīfā* (Vol. 1). Hyderabad Deccan. [In Arabic]
- Mas‘ūdī, A. (2006). *Murūj al-dhahab*. Beirut: Dār al-Andalus. [In Arabic]
- Maududi, A. (1978). *Khilāfat wa mulūkīyat*. Kuwait: Dār Qalam. [In Arabic]
- Mian Muhammad Sharif, M. (1986). *Tārīkh-i falsafa dar Islām* (Vol. 2, N. Pūrjawādī, Trans.). Tehran: University Publishing Center. [In Persian]
- Moraveji Tabasi, M. A. (2010). The Umayyad Hidden Face. *Farhang-i Kawthar*, (81), pp. 66–77. [In Persian]

- Muslim b. al-Hajjāj. (n.d.). *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* (M. F. ‘Abd al-Bāqī, Ed.). Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī. [In Arabic]
- Pakatchi, A. (1988). *Abū Ḥanīfa*. In K. Mousavi Bojnourdi (Ed.), *Dā’irat al-ma’ārif-i buzurg-i Islāmī* (Vol. 5). Tehran: The Great Islamic Encyclopedia Center. [In Persian]
- Ṣadūq. (1984). *Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh* (Vols. 1–2). Qom: Nashr-i Islāmī. [In Arabic]
- Ṣadūq. (n.d.). *‘Uyūn akhbār al-Riḍā* (Vol. 1, M. T. Esfehāni, Trans. & Comm.). Tehran: Intishārāt-i ‘Ilmīyah-i Islāmīya. [In Persian]
- Samarqandī, A. (1969). *Al-Sawād al-a’zam* (‘A. Ḥabībī, Ed.). Tehran: Intishārāt-i Bunyād-i Farhang-i Īrān. [In Arabic]
- Sarakhsī, A. (1906). *Al-Mabsūt*. Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Sa‘āda. [In Arabic]
- Sarakhsī, A. (1957). *Sharḥ al-siyar al-kabīr*. Cairo: Sharikat Musāhama al-Miṣrīya. [In Arabic]
- Shahrestānī, M. b. ‘A. (1956). *Al-Milal wa-l-niḥal* (Vol. 1). Cairo: Maktabat al-Ḥusayn al-Tijārīya. [In Arabic]
- Sharabāshī, A. (n.d.). *Al-A’imma al-arba’a*. Beirut: Dār al-Jīl. [In Arabic]
- Spriggins, T. (2003). *Understanding Political Theories* (F. Rajā’ī, Trans.). Tehran: Agah. [In Persian]
- Suyūṭī, J. (1992). *Tārīkh al-khulafā’* (M. M. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd, Ed.). Beirut: Dār al-Jīl. [In Arabic] (Original work published 1371 AH)
- Ṭaqoush, M. S. (2004). *The Abbasid Government*. Qom: Research Institute of Hawza and University. [In Persian]
- Ṭūsī, M. (1997). *Al-Khilāf* (Vol. 3, S. A. Khorasani, Ed.). Qom: Islamic Publishing Institute. [In Arabic]
- ‘Uqaylī, M. (1984). *Al-Ḍu‘afā’ al-kabīr al-‘Uqaylī*. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya. [In Arabic]
- Zarifian, Gh. R. (2020, July 30). *From Alid government to Umayyad governance*. Culture, Arts, and Communications Research Institute. URL= <https://B2n.ir/s01335> [In Persian]
- Zaydan, J. (2015). *History of Islamic Civilization* (A. Javaher Kalam, Trans.). Tehran: Intishārāt-i Amīr Kabīr. [In Persian]