

## **The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Way of Solving Quintuple Crises with a Democratic Mechanism**

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### **Abstract**

Because of the reality that the concept of citizenship would be defined alongside and in relation to the concept of state, some other concepts, such as identity, participation, rights, and responsibility of citizens, are related to the state in which they live. Explaining the context, scope, content, and the depth of the concept of citizenship in a democratic state arose from an Islamic school. Using the qualitative content analysis method, the present paper aims to prove its claim that the content of citizenship in Iran, based on the theological, juridical, and ethical substances of Imam Khomeini's thought, differs from the content of citizenship in its common use. The paper addresses this question: what kind of mechanism has benefited the Islamic Republic of Iran in identical, participatory, distributive, legitimately, and efficient levels? Answering this question, the paper comes to the conclusion that though the Islamic Republic of Iran, because of the eight years' war, economic sanctions, and other obstacles, lost the opportunity to realize the real setting of citizenship and has solved the problem of identity crisis with the mechanism of political socialization. The Islamic Republic of Iran has also stressed the civic and social equality in the citizenship scope. Because of this and using the mechanism of social justice as equality of opportunities and possibilities, it succeeds to overcome the distribution crisis. Also, applying the mechanism of political recruitment, the Islamic Republic of Iran has scrunched the participation crisis. The concept of citizenship the Islamic Republic of Iran follows the idea of identity and tautology between rights and duties and sees a strong correlation between these two. Thus, it sees itself at the service of the nation and assumes the nation as the helper and assistant of the government. This perspective has helped it to solve the problem of legitimation crisis with the aid of the mechanism of global culture. It has also solved the problem of efficiency with the mechanism of Jihadi management.

### **Keywords**

The Islamic Republic of Iran, Crises, Democracy, Citizens, Minorities.

## Introduction

On the one hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a country, which similar to other countries in the twentieth century, cannot define and realize all concepts alone and independently, but, because there is no other way, it should accept some rules; for example it should accept the concept of border and the international legal rules of borders. On the other hand, it has its own particular definition in the application of concepts, terms, and rules. Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran not only does not agree with some liberalist and socialist rules, notions, and terms, but also it claims that it has achieved to generate an Islamic revolution that negates both liberalist and socialist systems and their ideologies and applied concepts.

Because this political system has its own particular sentences and should and should not about how to apply the concepts, terms, and rules, it should be asked what kind of mechanism has benefited the Islamic Republic of Iran in identical, participatory, distributive, legitimately, and efficient levels, and how can one assess its conditions in this regard? In order to answer this question, this paper first addresses an introduction to one theme: 1) conceptual explanation (what is the meaning of republic and specifically the Islamic Republic of Iran and what should be understood from these concepts)? After that, the paper will address the crises produced in the process of confrontation of citizens with State in the Islamic Republic of Iran as a democratic system, and then it will refer to the mechanism of solving the crises.

## 1. Conceptual Explanation

Because of the conceptual explanation of concepts, among others, “Republic” is one of the difficulties of the research and, at the same time, it can be considered as the base of our future discussions, before anything else, I attempt to present a definition about “Republic”.

### A. The Meaning of Republic in Iran

In order to clarify what the Islamic Republic of Iran means, I first refer to the lexical meaning and idiomatic meaning of the term *Republic* and its

difference with *Democracy* and, subsequently, I will explain the meaning of *the Islamic Republic of Iran*.

The term *the Islamic Republic of Iran*, which is consisted of two words, *Republic* and *Islamic*, is a conventional concept and neither any genus (Jins) nor differentia (fasl). To make more clarification, however, one can consider demos as genus and “Islamic” as differentia that together describe and limit the nature of government in Iran (Javadi Amoli, 1999). Thus, demos means the masses of people who have one goal, a united path, and a unique method, and republic means a government that has all these three components. However, it should be noticed that what distinguishes the Islamic Republic of Iran from a non-Islamic Republic is that Islam, and not people, determines the above components (path, goal, and method) in the former, which is because Islam is the supervisor (Vali) of people (Javadi Amoli, 1999) and people are

the followers of Islamic laws (Khomeini, 1999). Consequently, the link between demos (the masses of people) with Islamic verdicts (Ahkam) is a guardianship (vilaei) linkage (Javadi Amoli, 1999). In a guardianship linkage, the people are only one pillar of legitimation and play a role merely in one part of the political sphere. In other words, people are not the whole fundament of legitimation because the political system in Islam, in addition to the will and vote of people, is based on piety and justice. From an Islamic perspective, therefore, if the person who is selected as a governor does not have piety and justice, his governance is illegitimate even if all people agree with him... . If he does not rule justly, then he is illegitimate, apart from the point that who has selected him; as a result, "the fundamental base of government is not merely the vote of people, but it is piety and justice, which, are, however, not functional without the vote and acceptance of people. Therefore, the vote of people is both necessary and decisive regarding to a candidate who has the necessary criteria (piety and justice). Nonetheless, it should be remarked that the vote and election cannot give

legitimation to a candidate who has not the necessary criteria (Khamenei, 2003)." Imam Khomeini has also stressed this point because he says it is obvious that before the religious and divine legitimizing of government, its related organizations, and their issues, most of their activities, among others, those of legislative, judiciary, and executive departments, are religiously without permission; thus, the organizations that need religious permission for their activities have no authorization to act. Consequently, if the government and its organizations act without divine authorization, it (and all of its affairs) are religiously unlawful and idolatrous (Khomeini, 1999). The last word here is that the Islamic Republic in the Occultation era is a government that all its social, political, and economics affairs are authorized and directed by sharia laws and (in such a government) the Islamic law under the Allah's commandment rules all individuals and Islamic governance (Khomeini, 2000). He has also adds that the interpretation and applying the sharia are assigned to Islamic jurists (Fuqaha) (Khomeini, 1999, ). This is because the administrator and Imam of society is who Allah has trusted him and he has the mission of guiding, supporting, and focusing on the community in order to emigrate to its original position (Javadi Amoli, 1999), albeit the vote of people is necessary to determine such a person.

### **B. The Difference between Democracy and Republic**

Among existing discussions about the difference between democracy and republic, the two sentences below can be sufficient:

1. Some do not differ between democracy and republic, stating that it is actually a linguistic difference only. From the advocators of this theory, among others, one can point out to Robert Alan Dahl (2010), who believes that there is no difference between these two and the only difference is in language because "republic" was used in Roman language and the Romans called their Roman government "Republic", but the Greeks called their popular governments "democracy".

2. Some differentiate between democracy and the republic. I point out some of them below only as examples:

A. Javadi Amoli. In *The Philosophy of Human Rights*, he considers democracy as paganistic. Answering the question about the reason of this, and referring to multiple meanings and the use of common words in definitions, he argues that there are two kinds of democracy: 1) democracy in law, and 2) democracy in the manner of the execution of sentences and issues. The first one is not compatible with oneness (tawhid) and religiosity because in this kind of democracy, man either sees himself needless from the divine law or he permits himself to change the commandments of Allah. The second one, however, is acceptable and has no conflict with oneness (tawhid) because in this kind of democracy, man accepts divine laws but he engages people and the majority in managing the country and controlling the economic, social, and cultural structure (Javadi Amoli, 1999, p. 515).

B. James Madison, the president of the United States (1809- 1817), also differentiates between democracy and the republic. He argues that democracy is a community consisting of a few citizens who are personally responsible for the state. He defines republic as the government doing things in the form of representation (Robert A. Dahl, 2010, pp. 38 -39).

### **C. The Islamic Republic of Iran**

The Islamic Republic of Iran means a political system in which people, attending the April 1979 ballot, created and established it with a majority of 98.2% positive votes. After that, they brought the interim state and later seven states to power each in turn. The Islamic Republic of Iran is known with the following characters:

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran does not believe in the separation between state and religion. In the religious state of Iran, Islam is accounted as an important component of government, which is

inspired from Islamic values and acts according to the law of Islam. Such a religious government should observe and apply the rules of Sharia and should be at the service of Islam. In this government, politics and religion are combined because its reading of Islam is such that puts politics in the heart of Islam and Islamic rules. This reading believes that the claim of separation of state and religion is false and is the induction of aliens. This reading believes that those who say “Islam is detached from politics” are unfamiliar with Islam (Khomeini, 1999, Vol. 3, p. 228). Now, this religious government has endeavored for four decades, with all its possibilities and in spite of all obstacles, for its steadiness. If we do not say that all conflicts of the seven states of Islamic Republic of Iran was that state and religion, we can at least claim that some of them finished their period of power with this conflict. For example, although the conflict of the interim state of Bazargan was that of state and the revolution (Bazargan, 1983a), their main and deep-rooted conflict was that of religion and state; in other words, the problem was the domain of religion and its presence in political sphere. Bazargan writes: the delicate, sensitive, and invisible disagreement that I said before was that the leader of the revolution believed that the movement, suffering, and martyrdom of people were for Islam, and he knows the state as an Islamic state, while the selected prime minister, who was appointed by the leader (namely Bazargan), has accepted the mission and all its dangers and difficulties because of the precious people of Iran or Iran (Bazargan, 1983b).

2. After the interim state, the conflict between state and religion is also seen in some other states. For instance, we can consider the conflict of Khatami’s state as that of state and religion because the religious and moral task of state is to answer the problematic debates, such as confrontation with religious and denominational minorities, the border of private and public spheres, the matter of veil (hijab), the matter of apostasy, and the way of religious propaganda, from a religious perspective.

3. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a non- pre- modern and non- modern state that does not resemble the “Salazarism” state rejecting the combination of religion and politics. It does not also resemble “Frankism” state that argues the priority of community on individual. The Islamic Republic of Iran is also not similar to “Vichy” state that rejects liberation and individualism. Why the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a pre-modern and a modern state? This is because different states in the Islamic Republic of Iran do not have the eight characteristics of pre-modern state as described by Morris Barbie (Barbie, 2004). The Islamic Republic of Iran is not also a modern state because in this political system, not only the institution of state but also all other institutions need to have a validity and conformation decree from the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution (Wali Faqih) to be authorized to act and interfere in different issues (Khomeini, 1999, Vol. 6, p. 59). In addition, they need to catch satisfaction of the Supreme Leader. Article 57 of the Constitution endorses this. It says: “the ruler forces on the Islamic Republic of Iran are under the supervision of absolute authority of Supreme Leader (Imam of Ummah (Islamic community) or Wali Faqih)”.
4. Another characteristic of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been expressed in the 177 Articles of the revised version of the Constitution in 1989. Considering all these Articles, one can say that citizenship rights have been considered in “40 Articles”. This shows and narrates the way of presence and participation of citizens in determining their own fate.
5. The Islamic Republic of Iran has accepted the territorial governments as an inevitable reality in the modern world. It believes that the Islamic countries, simultaneously to their independence and enjoyment of recognized nations – states condition, can constitute a large Islamic state according to their Islamic commons (Hashemi, '2003, p. 109). However, it also should be said that they could not yet solve the problem of incompatibility between genesis and legislative rights about Islamic Ummah.

6. The Islamic Republic of Iran strives, on the one hand, to disappear the restricted ethnical, tribal, and supremacist approach and, on the other hand, attempts to present the Islamic approach as an alternative to Muslim's life (Khomeini, 2003, Vol. 12, p. 259 and Vol. 15, p. 369).
7. From the viewpoint of the Islamic political system of Iran, the world is divided into two categories: 1) the Muslim world (or Dar al-Iman (the world of faith)), and 2) the non-Muslim world (or Dar al-Kufr (the world of disbelief)). The second category is in turn divided into three categories, namely A) the neutral countries (Dar al-Hiyad), B) countries (including Dar al-Zemmah, Dar al-Ahd, Dar al-Aman, and Dar al-Hudnah) that are in peace with it, and finally C) countries that are in war with it). According to this categorization, the Islamic states do not want to fight with non-Muslim states and they would communicate and interact with each other based on a "peaceful coexistence".
8. The slogan of the Islamic Republic of Iran is the simultaneous construction of this world and the world hereafter in shadow of an Islamic government. This is because the regime believes that Islam has a program for governance and its government, and has an organization the same as other governments. However, it is remarkable that its organization is based on justice (Khomeini, 1999, Vol. 4, p. 420).
9. The Islamic Republic of Iran is based on argument and relies upon logic and has no fear from the freedom of speech and the freedom of writing (Khomeini, 1999, Vol. 10, p. 82).
10. This political system allows the application of violence against some who allow the application of violence (Khomeini, 1999, vol. 330, p. 291 and Vol. 9, p. 343).
11. The Islamic government of Iran is a system based on invitation and not on victory with war, conflict, and violence. The Islamic Republic of Iran does not want to conquer other countries, or to apply violence against people (Khomeini, 1999, Vol. 9, p. 289).
12. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a system that respects and regards the vote of the majority (Khomeini, 1999, Vol. 9, P. 255). This is because Imam

Khomeini says: “naturally, when people are free, they select a proper and righteous candidate and the public votes do not make mistake. Sometimes one or another wants to do something (he or she may make mistake), but a population of 30 million cannot make mistake” (Khomeini, 1999, Vol. 5, p. 322). The vote of majority is valid; what they say is valid even though that they vote against their own interests (Khomeini, 1999, Vol. 9, p. 304). You are not the controller of the people to say, for example, this is to your disadvantage... .People have voted and their vote should be acceptable (Khomeini, 1999, vol. 9, p. 304).

#### **Crises and Solutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran**

In this section, before anything else, it is necessary to explain the author's view of the concept of crisis. Therefore, the following statements are reported briefly:

1. In the discussion on the crisis, we do not focus on the critical point, but rather on a critical distance or critical situation. As a result, this term more than anything else highlights the deterioration of a particular situation for prominent policymakers and encourages them to take appropriate actions.
2. The discussed crises can fluctuate between seven crises of identity, legitimacy, participation, influence, distribution, integration, and efficiency, which we will refer to five crises.
3. The quintuple crises or other crises are not just devoted to transition countries, but all countries, even developed countries, can suffer from these crises.
4. The severity and type of crises can be different in diverse societies hence crises do not occur everywhere in the same way because their rotation depends on the logic and harmony that societies have (Badiei, 2004, p. 34).

Regarding the above-mentioned propositions, we consider the quintuple crisis: legitimacy, participation, distribution, identity, and effectiveness in the Islamic Republic of Iran as follows.

### 1.State, Citizens, and the Problem of Identity

If we accept that the definition of the identity crisis to be the conflict between ethnic loyalty and national commitments (Qawam, 2000, p. 17), then a question arises: how national states, including the state of the Islamic Republic of Iran, establish the same and coordinated loyalty among national, transnational, and subordinate national identities, and do not face the identity crisis? The answer is that the mechanism for resolving the identity crisis is socialization or internalization of values. In this regard, the Constitution can play the role of consolidating the process of socialization, because no nation is free against the law and each nation respects freedom in the sphere of law, not against or outside the law (Javadi Amoli, 1999, p. 518). Therefore, the subordinate national identities, namely ethnic identities and religious as well as denominational identities, should obey the Constitution and define the life in line with the Constitution because today no society can be found that has escaped the issue of ethnicity. At present, 180 from about 200 countries around the world are ethnically heterogeneous and almost 90% of the states worldwide are multi-ethnic, about half of which are heavily involved in ethnic cleavages. However, their populations have come together and created a common history; these countries include Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the last example, the Islamic Republic of Iran, people with 50 languages and dialects and six ethnicities - Fars, Azari, Kurds, Arabs, Baluch and Turkmen (Gohari, 2012) - have made a unitary Iran.

To consolidate its national identity, the Islamic Republic of Iran used the mechanism of socialization and thereby confronted with such tensions as Gunbad and Turkmen Sahara, the Muslim People's Party, Khalq Arab, and that of Kurdistan. All these tensions and, of course, the support of the foreign powers who wish the separation of Iran, were covered with the subordinate national identities. Their slogan was, "the Kurdish are Iranian and it is impossible to keep Kurdistan with supervising each individual (Kurd) with a soldier". It did not allow these chaoses to lead the Islamic Republic of Iran to problems such as "inconsistencies in the definition of

national interests and contradictory positioning in the field of domestic and foreign policy” (Omidi and Khani, 2010, p. 6). The states of the Islamic Republic of Iran have chosen the sponge state or pluralism model for its policymaking in ethnic affairs. Other alternative models in this triple pattern are iron pattern or pattern of simulation, and gelatinous pattern or an unequal pluralist pattern. According to the sponge state or pluralism model, existing identities would be recognized without breakup. Conforming this idea, Imam Khomeini says: “all religious minorities are respected in Islam and have every kinds of freedom to exercise their religious obligatory. We are not against any human being. They are Iranians and, like other Iranians, they have all rights” (Khomeini, 1999, vol. 5, pp. 423 - 425). With the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, these words come up by law in Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution. It is stated in these principles that the Islamic Republic of Iran recognizes only three religions of Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrians as well-known religions. The other denominations of Islam (four Sunni denominations and Zaidi) have also been recognized and are respected (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Articles 12 and 13).

Based on the sponge pattern, the Islamic Republic of Iran has sought to respect the ethnic, religious, and denominational identities in the country and recognize them as Iranian citizens. This is despite the fact that 98% of the Iranian population is Muslim. Of this, 89%, 9%, and 2% are Shiites, Sunni, and other religious and non-religious minorities, respectively. Minorities, in spite of their small populations, follow many of their social and religious issues without any problem. Below we mention some examples of this freedom.

1. The Jewish Minority in the Islamic Republic of Iran has an average population of 11-12 thousands people (according to the declaration of the Association of Jews), most of whom live in Tehran, Shiraz, Isfahan, Kerman, and Kermanshah, respectively. Although they are deprived of the right to promote their religion, they pursue their social and religious issues in Iran without any hindrance (Euro News website, 25/2/2016).

2. Christians or Armenians have 90,000 advocators divided into two categories of the Assyrian community and Chaldeans, with a total number of nearly 250 churches in the Islamic Republic of Iran. . The Assyrian community, with a population of over 30 thousands people, has 65 churches and Chaldeans community, with a population of 60, 000, have their free social activities. All their schools and churches are active and have no problems in their religious issues (Euro News website, 25/2/2016). According to Article 64 of the Constitution, they have two representatives, one from the Armenians of the South and the other from those of the North, in the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Chamly, Manas, 2016). They also have nearly 50 schools for the promotion of Armenian culture and language. It is remarkable that these schools are run by the direct budget of the Iranian government. In these schools, Armenians of Iran study their mother tongue and promote their religious teachings. Studying in these schools is prohibited for other classes of the community, but in addition to their schools, Armenians can study at other schools without any limitation. Additionally, they have about 50 centers and cultural-sports associations in Iran that are established with direct government funds hence the government serves the Armenian community of Iran. Iranian Armenians also have their own cemeteries and nursing homes (Chamly, Manas, 2016).
3. According to statistics, an estimated number of 150 thousands of Zoroastrians exist in the world, 30 thousands of which live in Iran and about 6 thousands reside only in the Yazd province; they have their normal lives (Islamic Republic News Agency, 1313, 23 May 2017).
4. Sunnis comprise 9% of the Iranian population. They have 300 religious schools where all the directors are Sunni with mostly being Shafei and Hanafi. Iranian Hanafis are mostly centered in northeastern, eastern, and southeast areas (Qadyani, 2002, p. 282), and the Hanbalis are a minor group. Sunnis in the Islamic Republic of Iran have 12,000 seminarians in their religious schools and 40,000 clergymen who are engaged in education and religious promotion based on their educational and propaganda system.

## 2.State, Citizens, and the Participation Issue

If a political system or a state does not give the right to participate in political life to certain and limited groups, then it can be stated that the political system is not in a crisis of participation. This is because it has not deprived some of the citizens to access to the political hierarchy of the society and has given them the opportunity to enter the political hierarchy as citizens of that society. Thus, if the process of concentration of power falls into the hands of a few, people believe that the misery and poverty are indifferent for the few rulers. They also believe that the rulers oppose their liberties, including religious, gender, and ethnic freedoms. As a result, people do not support and legitimize the rules. Instead, they resist against rules and do not participate in political issues. Having this in mind as an introduction to the discussion, now the question is “Is the Islamic Republic in a crisis of political participation”?

As in any other country, the Islamic Republic of Iran could be involved in the participation crisis, albeit if the principle of political recruitment is forgotten. This is because the mechanism for solving the crisis of participation is “political recruitment” in the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, it should be noted that this mechanism makes sense when citizens participate with their own will. This is because, though in the Islamic Republic of Iran citizenship can be defined beyond the racial, cultural, and linguistic distinctions, it cannot be defined beyond the religious distinctions. The Constitution and the words of the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran confirm this definition:

1. Speeches of the Leader. The leader of Iran has introduced the right to vote, the right to choose, the right to political activism, the right to make political attempts in Islamic norm as normal rights (Shafaqna News Agency, 2017). However, he says about participation of citizens in Iran: “Some would say that the right to be elected should not be deprived. The right to be elected is not an ordinary citizenship right, such as the right to work and business, to live in the city, walking on the street, buying cars, and so on. This is a citizenship right for which the holder

should have some necessary qualifications that must be verified. This is not only the task of the Guardian Council but both the Ministry of the Interior and the Guardian Council are responsible thereof. In qualifying candidates, people are the best reference and have the uppermost responsibilities in this regard (official Persian website of Khomeini, 2013). Also, Imam Khomeini expresses that it is necessary to select a candidate that believes in the Islamic Republic (Khomeini, 1999, vol. 7, p. 467).

2. The Constitution: Article 115 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran states that there are some conditions to be the President, including the candidate should have Iranian origin, should be citizen of Iran, should believe in the foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and should believe in the official religion of the country. It should be noted, however, that there are exceptions. Article 64 refers to representatives of religious minorities (Armenians, Jews and Zoroastrians). For the infidels who are citizens, on the other hand, no place is foreseen! Article 19 indicates that people are equal and that color, race, and language do not give any privilege. Other Articles remark that religion, denomination, belief and faithfulness give privilege to some people. Therefore, government jobs are exclusively for Muslims because some stipulations and conditions recorded in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran have practically been applied during the past four decades (after the Islamic revolution). Despite this distinction in participation (to select and to be selected), it should be acknowledged that, regarding the matter of participation, the Islamic Republic of Iran has a very favorable position among the countries around the world. This is because the Iranian nation has exhibited the largest participation in the elections of the Islamic Councils, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the presidency (Fars News Agency, 26/2/2009). By 2013, Iran held 10 polling, and the Iranian people casted 217, 412, 279 votes in order to elect a president among 161 candidates nominated for the presidency. The highest rates of participation in the elections during these 10 periods were in the tenth,

seventh, third, first, eighth, second, ninth, fourth, fifth, and sixth periods, respectively (Anvari, 2013, p. 9).

### 3. State, Citizens, and the Distribution Matter

1. Almond (1997) defines the distributive function of any political system as the division of various economic and social values, including money, goods and services, honors and opportunities, by the state and government agencies among existing individuals and groups in society; then, the distribution crisis would emerge at various economic, political and social levels (Omidi and Khani, 2010, p. 7). Since its political level is followed by the participation crisis, what is being discussed here on the distributive crisis is that “Is it possible that some political systems tend to create economic and social inequalities”? Thus, the question is whether one can see equal economic and social distributions in the Islamic Republic of Iran despite the religious, denominational, and ethnic minorities?
2. If we accept that the mechanism for resolving the distribution crisis in the Islamic Republic of Iran is “social justice as equal opportunities and possibilities”, then it should be discussed that whether the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose actions require Islamic endorsement, can pursue the realization of the egalitarian slogan (here, egalitarian means equality and non-discrimination between people who share equally in rights, property and other matters). Exemplary answers would be the following:
  - 1- Some scholars declare that there is no term about the principle of equality in jurisprudential books and that only some debates and references exist to documentation and jurisprudential application of notions with, for example, the title of non-preference among servants when they are equal (Ehsaei, 1410 AH, p. 104) or justice and fairness (Mostafavi, 1415 AH, p. 159).
  - 2- Some other scholars stand firmly on the issue of equality and its implementation and have based their reasoning on the thought and

manner of Imam Ali (AS). This group believes that equality was the principle of rule for Ali (AS). Therefore, if we look into the governmental decree of Ali (AS) to Malik Ashtar, we find that all orders in this command are related to all people who live in the Islamic society and no distinction is made between people regarding their nationality, race, color, class, etc. (Rashad, 2001, p. 70).

- 3- As noted above, there is no consensus among Muslim scholars on the application of the concept of equality, yet, most of scholars and agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran declare and enforce their policies and plans regarding the realization of equality. Among these scholars, Imam Khomeini (RA) can be named, who states that equality must be observed and enforced in society because “in Islam there is no privilege for rich against poor ... they are all equal ... there is no difference in Islam between the prime minister and the non-prime minister” (Khomeini, 1999, vol. 6, p. 461).
- 4- In the Islamic Republic of Iran, one can claim that those, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, who live in the shadow of this Islamic government and those who believe in the Book or not enjoy equal social rights and all citizens are equal before the law (Iranian Constitution, Articles 14, 19, and 23). After accepting the principle of equality and its realization in the Islamic Republic of Iran, a question still remains: is equality realized between citizens in all areas? To reach the answers, we will follow the subsequent topics.
- 5- Equality against the law. Interpreting this verse of Quran: “whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption...”, some scholars stated that the verse is about all human beings since it is not limited to people with virtue and piety. Hence, if one has no hostility and hate, then no one has the right to offend him/her. That is why the Qur'an says: “or for spreading corruption in the land, it should be like killing all humanity, and whosoever saves a life, saves the entire human race” (al-Ma'ida: 32). If a member of the society has hostility and hate and wants to fight, he/she faces special verdicts

and punishments, and there is no difference between infidels, polytheists, and Muslims in this regard. As long as people are not disruptive and do not want to fight, therefore, they definitely have a dignity. Certainly, whatever is given to Muslims must also be given to non-Muslims and what is resolved from Muslims should be resolved from non-Muslims as well (Mazaheri, 2007, p. 11).

6- Equity in salaries and financial privileges. Minorities have also economic rights, such as property right, in the Islamic system. In his comments, Imam Ali (AS) recommends the agents of exchequer to observe their rights (Dashti, 2000, Letter 51, pp. 563 - 565).

7- Social rights of minorities. Minorities should enjoy social rights such as the right to freedom of movement, housing, employment, freedom of opinion and thought, independence in their personal life, and education. Since it is said that the Prophet (SA) has also respected the dead body of the people of minorities (Majlesi, 1403 AH, vol.78, p. 273), they have the right to officially stay on their religion, do their worship, and do their personal affairs according to their religions. The property and life of infidels who live in Islamic countries and have contract with Muslims are reserved. We are not allowed to speak badly behind these people. Imam Ali (AS) says about the social right of minorities: ... I did not find them worthy for approaching because they are idolatrous, however, they do not deserve cruelty and mistreatment because they are in agreement with us; in treating them, therefore, use both the coherence and coarseness, behave intensely and smoothly, and observe moderation in approaching or moving away (Dashti, 2000, Letter 19, p. 356).

#### **4. State, Citizens, and the Issue of Legitimacy**

1. Regarding the importance and status of the crisis of legitimacy, it must be stated that it is a key crisis among others because all the crises somehow create doubt about the legitimacy of the system. On the other hand, if a system has legitimacy, it can prevent other crises (Omidi, 2010,

Pay, 2001, pp. 214, 215 and 206 - 208). However, if the situation of a society is such that most members of the community find it conflicting with their values and interests, then we will have a legitimate crisis.

2. If we accept that the source of legitimacy is sometimes divine and sometimes secular, then a question arises whether the states of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in place of the legitimacy of a single source or the rule of the people, would gain resources other than the people and do not put the other sources into trouble? Since the equivalent of legitimacy in Arabic is religious and something that relates to sharia, i.e. in accordance with religious law in English, the equivalent of legitimacy means being in accordance with the law. Therefore, the scope of the discussion of legitimacy also includes the beliefs of the people in the legitimacy of the political system and in the actions and operation of politicians and governments (Shafiee far, Ghorbani, 2016, pp. 186 - 187). In the Islamic Republic of Iran, both the scopes should be met to ensure that its system of legitimacy is not lost; it is also indifferent what is known as the basics of the initial legitimacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in terms of the divine-moral republic or divine-popular republic (Poursa'id, 2004, p. 726). Now, there is a question: why should both scope of legitimacy and satisfaction be pursued? The answer this question, it is argued that it is not the vote of the people that make a government legitimate or illegitimate (Larijani, 2002, p. 30). Thus, people are only an element of legitimation and not all grounds for legitimacy (Leader's statements in a meeting with Qazvin's professors and students, 22 November 2003). It is also said, on the other hand, that the legitimacy of all system officials is dependent on performing the task and the efficiency of performing the task. That is, in this political system, attention is also paid to the laws that are based on Sharia, as well as to the efficiency (statements of the leader in the meeting of the members of the Assembly of Experts of the Leadership, 22 November 2003). Hence, when these two lack the legitimacy, the Islamic Republic of Iran will face the crisis.
3. Since one of the foundations of legitimacy is efficacy and there is a

close relationship between these two, to the extent that efficiency is a precondition for understanding legitimacy, we will, therefore, continue our discussion with the effectiveness of the crisis. We believe that the crisis of legitimacy is resolved by cultural mechanism. This means that an intellectual space should prevail in the country in which citizens accept that the people who rule them are really right and are considering both Islamic and national interests. Otherwise, the lack of attraction of confidence in politicians, state figures, political institutions, and political system will be problematic. Accordingly, if each of these three levels realizes their promises, citizens are satisfied with the government, common obedience and loyalty will occur with the least cost, and crisis of legitimacy will appear. Otherwise, the cultural space of the country will come across the actions of the authorities and lead to a crisis of legitimacy.

##### **5. State, Citizens, and Efficiency Issues**

Efficiency means doing things right and is synonymous with the optimal use of resources (cost reduction) and increase in production; it is close to the meaning of the term effectiveness that means doing things right and moving toward the goals of the organization (Abtahi & Kazemi, 1999). Although they are two different terms, some scholars say that efficiency and effectiveness are synonyms (Zahedi, Alvani and Faqihi, 2004, p. 111). Because of this, we also first consider efficiency and effectiveness as two synonymous concepts in this paper. Secondly, we will pay attention to both theoretical and functional aspects of efficiency because either our understanding of Islam is not sufficient and does not fit in with efficiency, or external barriers hence our performance will be ineffective.

In the course of past 40 years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been able to resolve the crisis of the Iraq war against Iran, incidents, revolts, and sanctions in various political, economic, cultural, and social spheres, thereby being able to prove its efficiency. However, since states have to pay serious attention to efficiency, or “secondary legitimacy”, to increase their citizens'

satisfaction, a question arise that “Does the Islamic Republic of Iran contemplate to people's desires and wishes?The answer is that the officials of the system and all seven Iranian presidents claim that they have been paying attention to the will of the people within the framework of the Islamic system and have made an extra effort in line with their demands.This is because there is no sign of a critical situation in efficiency in the statistical reportsprovidedby all seven states.All thestates were not only behind the previous states and were not indifferent about the demands of the people, but they also made significant progress. For example, the head of the state, known as the stateof construction, stated that 47% of the population had been below the poverty line in the past. After changingthis situation, the proportion reduced to 30 percent during the war period due to the distribution of facilities and paying attention to villages; itlater reduced to 18 percent during the construction period. We have had significant successes in steel industry, damming, and construction of roads and refineries (Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1999, pp. 25-73). In short, what the statistics of state officials and experts suggest is that the Islamic Republic of Iran has increasingly been moving towards a fairer distribution of the wealth.Therefore, although there are some deficiencies, the system does not have efficiency crisis.

In contrast to the view and statements of the statesmen, people complain about inefficiencybecause the real facts, which are apparent in the society and the realities that are visible in people’s life, represent a fundamental challenge in the field of efficiency. Some examples are the closure or semi-closure of important factories such as the Arj factory, Hepco factory, Sanati Azmayesh factory, Varamin sugar factory, Ghoo oil factory, Chite Rey factory, Pars Electric factory, Sahand steel factory, Zagros Car factory, Iran Choob factory, and the largest bicycle manufacturing of the Middle East in Qoochan (<http://www.mehrnews.com/news3689722>). Another example is people's economic problems. This claim is supported by theauthor’s observations of an article from the Iranian society and the announcement of the presidential candidates in 2005. They have admitted that:

1. People suffer from the economic inflation and have a livelihood problem.
2. Today, we have problems in the realization of justice, and there are the issues of injustice, discrimination and bribery in our country, which show the face of our system as unpleasant.
3. Today, there has been a situation of injustice in our country that does not allow the realization of the Islamic state.
4. The existence of poverty, discrimination, corruption, and deprivation are among the problems that the Iranian people encountered and people suffer from discrimination, monopoly, and bribery (Iran Newspaper, Khordad 2005).

Considering the above problems, we can introduce a mechanism, namely specialization along with commitment (or jihadi management), for solving the crisis of efficiency in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This model has some characters such as belief in Allah, self-confidence, tirelessness, trust, avoidance from disagreement, recognizing enemy, thinking, and pursuing the ideals of the revolution (Karimzadeh, 2014, p. 18). With these characters, we can overcome any kind of rentier state, deprivation, corruption, injustice, discrimination, incuriosity, and unreasonableness that will lead to people's distrust and ultimately the crisis.

### **Conclusion**

With the above characters, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a system that, on the one hand, seeks its fundamental base of legitimation in relying upon religious beliefs insofar as one can claim that all pillars of the political system rely somehow upon this pattern of legitimation. On the other hand, it claims that the regime, with the slogan of Iran for all Iranians (including religious and other minorities), and based on the principle of commitment, is the most popular political system in the world that observes and applies the rights of citizens. Relying upon the two mentioned pillars (Islamic and revolutionary characters), this system has governed the country for four

decades and achieved to take essential steps in spheres such as political, economic, and cultural dependency. It has also achieved to survive the quintuple crises with help of the ideology of Islamic state, which organized all states that rose in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The evidence of these achievements are defend against foreign enemies, ending chaoses, eliminating background elements of internal insecurity, high level of participation in different elections, international recognition, and resistance of people against sanctions.

This paper concludes that the identity crisis in the Islamic Republic of Iran was solved with the mechanism of socialization because social order in this land has occurred through the institutionalization and internalization of values by the majority of people. The sign of this reality is living with peace and tranquility of Iranians with 50 languages and dialects and six ethnics all of which accepted social values, official laws, rules, and norms. It should be acknowledged that, regarding the matter of participation, the Islamic Republic of Iran has a very favorable position among the existing countries around the world. It should also be added that applying the mechanism of political recruitment, the Islamic Republic of Iran has scrunched the participation crisis because the Iranian nation has shown the highest participation in the elections of the Islamic councils, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the presidency. We argued that the mechanism for solving the crisis of distribution was called social justice as equality of opportunities. It was also discussed that the Islamic Republic of Iran is obliged to apply this mechanism in the society based on documents such as Quran, Tradition, and the Constitution.

About the device of the crisis of legitimacy, we also referred to the mechanism of the cultural world meaning that an intellectual space should prevail in the country in which citizens admit that the group ruling them really takes into account the national and Islamic interests. Otherwise, the lack of attraction of confidence in politicians, state figures, political institutions, and political system will be problematic. Thus, if each of these three levels realizes their promises, citizens are satisfied with the government,

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common obedience, and loyalty will occur with the least cost, and crisis of legitimacy will appear. Otherwise, the cultural space of the country will come across the actions of the authorities and lead to a crisis of legitimacy. Finally, it was addressed that the crisis of efficiency would be solved with the mechanism of “specialization along with commitment or jihadi management”. This model has some characters with which one can overcome any kind of rentier state, deprivation, corruption, injustice, discrimination, incuriosity, and unreasonableness that will lead to people's distrust and ultimately the crisis.

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