آمار
| تعداد نشریات | 48 |
| تعداد شماره‌ها | 2,293 |
| تعداد مقالات | 33,216 |
| تعداد مشاهده مقاله | 11,840,650 |
| تعداد دریافت فایل اصل مقاله | 5,023,100 |
Persons without Immaterial Souls | ||
| Theosophia Islamica | ||
| مقاله 1، دوره 1، شماره 1، فروردین 2021، صفحه 7-32 اصل مقاله (218.22 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: Original Article | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22081/jti.2021.60335.1003 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| Lynne Rudder Baker | ||
| Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at University of Massachusetts Amherst | ||
| تاریخ دریافت: 11 اسفند 1399، تاریخ پذیرش: 26 اردیبهشت 1400 | ||
| چکیده | ||
| Traditionally, Christians and Muslims have held that a human person is (or has) an immaterial soul. Since there does not seem to be a place for immaterial souls in the natural world, I offer an alternative view that I call ‘Person-Body Constitutionalism’. Person-Body Constitutionalism holds that there are no (finite) immaterial entities like souls. Instead of distinguishing between souls and bodies, Constitutionalism distinguishes between whole persons and bodies. Human persons are essentially embodied, but do not essentially have the bodies that they in fact have at any given time. So, human persons, though spatially coincident with their bodies, are not identical to their bodies. Persons are distinguished from their bodies by having first-person perspectives essentially. I shall try to show that Constitutionalism is consistent with Christian doctrines. First, I set out Constitutionalism. Then, after critically discussing Thomas Aquinas’s view of Resurrection, I discuss the compatibility between Constitutionalism and the Resurrection, and an intermediate state between death and a general resurrection (e.g., Purgatory). Finally, I have a brief discussion of Constitutionalism and the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. The conclusion is that Person-Body Constitutionalism is congenial to these central Christian doctrines, and the existence of immaterial souls is not required for traditional Christianity. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| Immaterial Souls؛ Resurrection؛ Afterlife؛ Christian | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Research Article Persons without Immaterial Souls | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Traditionally, Christians and Muslims have held that a human person is (or has) an immaterial soul. Since there does not seem to be a place for immaterial souls in the natural world, I offer an alternative view that I call ‘Person-Body Constitutionalism’. Person-Body Constitutionalism holds that there are no (finite) immaterial entities like souls. Instead of distinguishing between souls and bodies, Constitutionalism distinguishes between whole persons and bodies. Human persons are essentially embodied, but do not essentially have the bodies that they in fact have at any given time. So, human persons, though spatially coincident with their bodies, are not identical to their bodies. Persons are distinguished from their bodies by having first-person perspectives essentially. I shall try to show that Constitutionalism is consistent with Christian doctrines. First, I set out Constitutionalism. Then, after critically discussing Thomas Aquinas’s view of Resurrection, I discuss the compatibility between Constitutionalism and the Resurrection, and an intermediate state between death and a general resurrection (e.g., Purgatory). Finally, I have a brief discussion of Constitutionalism and the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. The conclusion is that Person-Body Constitutionalism is congenial to these central Christian doctrines, and the existence of immaterial souls is not required for traditional Christianity. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Immaterial Souls, Resurrection, Afterlife, Christian | ||
| مراجع | ||
|
Aquinas, Th. (1485). Summa Theologica.Einsiedeln: RCL Benziger. Aristotle, De Anima 3.5, 430a17. Baker, L. (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baker, L. (2007). The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bettenson, H. (Ed.). (1963). Documents of the Christian Church (2nd ed.). London: Oxford University Press. Bynum, C. W. (1995). The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336. New York: Columbia University Press. Castañeda, H. N. (1966). "He": A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness. Ratio 8: 130-157. Castañeda, H. N. (1967). Indicators and quasi-indicators. American philosophical quarterly, 4(2), pp. 85-100. Cooper, J. W. (1989). Body,Soul and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing. Cullman, O. (1973). Immortality of the Soul of Resurrection of the Body. Immortality (T. Penelhum, Ed. pp. 53-85). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co. French, P. A., & Wettstein, Howard K. (Eds.). (1999). Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol. 23). New Directions in Philosophy. Boston: Blackwell. Price, H. H. (1964). Personal Survival and the Idea of Another World. Classical and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (J. Hick, Ed., 3rd ed., pp. 364-386). Prentice-Hall, INC. Wolfson, H. A. (1956). Immortality and Resurrection in the Philosophy of the Church Fathers: Being the Ingersoll Lecture on the Immortality of Man, 1955-1956. Harvard Divinity School. | ||
|
آمار تعداد مشاهده مقاله: 210 تعداد دریافت فایل اصل مقاله: 116 |
||