آمار
| تعداد نشریات | 48 |
| تعداد شماره‌ها | 2,293 |
| تعداد مقالات | 33,216 |
| تعداد مشاهده مقاله | 11,836,577 |
| تعداد دریافت فایل اصل مقاله | 5,020,031 |
Dualist Afterlives: Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā | ||
| Theosophia Islamica | ||
| مقاله 3، دوره 1، شماره 1، فروردین 2021، صفحه 56-80 اصل مقاله (289.96 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: Original Article | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22081/jti.2021.60334.1002 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| Jari kaukua | ||
| Academy of Finland and University of Jyväskylä, Finland | ||
| تاریخ دریافت: 11 اسفند 1399، تاریخ پذیرش: 26 اردیبهشت 1400 | ||
| چکیده | ||
| Subscribing to the principles of logically valid reasoning and parsimony of presuppositions in the framework of a religion that hinges on a revealed eschatological message, the medieval Islamic philosophers were bound to interpret the Qurʾānic account of the afterlife in ways that may have compromised at least some of its literal meanings. However, to what extent precisely do these interpretations go against the grain of Revelation has to be determined separately in each particular case. Wholesale statements regarding the alleged coherence or incoherence of general types of philosophical theories with Revelation risk neglecting important variations between theories, and thereby rendering us blind to the scope of possibilities in the concepts involved. From this perspective, I will consider the eschatological implications of the psychological theories of Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā, who both subscribe to a dualistic view of human being and consequently claim that the afterlife does not concern one's body. Two questions will then emerge as especially central to dualistic accounts of the afterlife. (1) How do we make sense of the kind of first-personality that must be an irreducible constituent of existence in the hereafter, provided that the latter fulfills the eschatological promise given in the Revelation? For in order to be a justified reward or punishment for my acts in this life, the afterlife must be in an equally strong sense mine. In the Arabic Peripatetic tradition, many of the central doctrines of which Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā subscribe to, individuality entails materiality, which seems to suggest that human being can have a distinctly first-personal existence only when some kind of connection is preserved to the body as the necessary condition of one's individuation. (2) How do we account for the emphatically sensual descriptions of the hereafter in the Revelation? Again, in the Peripatetic tradition all cognitive acts that involve objects with sensible characteristics require bodily instruments of cognition, in the absence of which the revealed account is in danger of becoming a mere metaphor. In the light of these two questions, I will argue that Avicenna's dualism ends up with a rather narrow conception of the afterlife. He does try to give an account of a genuinely first-personal afterlife, and thereby presents a carefully argued departure from the Peripatetic tradition. But because of the way in which Avicenna separates the soul from the body, Avicennian afterlife is bound to remain exclusively intellectual. Thus, with regard to the second question Avicenna seems forced to interpret the Revelation in almost exclusively metaphorical terms. On the other hand, while following Avicenna in the first question, Mullā Ṣadrā conceives of the separate existence of the human soul in much broader terms than his predecessor. By means of the concepts of mental existence (wujud dhihniyy) and the world of images ('ālam al-mithāl), he ends up with a conception of human afterlife that is rich in terms of experiential content, and thereby potentially more coherent with the revealed account. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| Avicenna؛ Mullā Ṣadrā؛ Dualist Afterlives | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Dualist Afterlives: Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Subscribing to the principles of logically valid reasoning and parsimony of presuppositions in the framework of a religion that hinges on a revealed eschatological message, the medieval Islamic philosophers were bound to interpret the Qurʾānic account of the afterlife in ways that may have compromised at least some of its literal meanings. However, to what extent precisely do these interpretations go against the grain of Revelation has to be determined separately in each particular case. Wholesale statements regarding the alleged coherence or incoherence of general types of philosophical theories with Revelation risk neglecting important variations between theories, and thereby rendering us blind to the scope of possibilities in the concepts involved. From this perspective, I will consider the eschatological implications of the psychological theories of Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā, who both subscribe to a dualistic view of human being and consequently claim that the afterlife does not concern one's body. Two questions will then emerge as especially central to dualistic accounts of the afterlife. (1) How do we make sense of the kind of first-personality that must be an irreducible constituent of existence in the hereafter, provided that the latter fulfills the eschatological promise given in the Revelation? For in order to be a justified reward or punishment for my acts in this life, the afterlife must be in an equally strong sense mine. In the Arabic Peripatetic tradition, many of the central doctrines of which Avicenna and Mullā Ṣadrā subscribe to, individuality entails materiality, which seems to suggest that human being can have a distinctly first-personal existence only when some kind of connection is preserved to the body as the necessary condition of one's individuation. (2) How do we account for the emphatically sensual descriptions of the hereafter in the Revelation? Again, in the Peripatetic tradition all cognitive acts that involve objects with sensible characteristics require bodily instruments of cognition, in the absence of which the revealed account is in danger of becoming a mere metaphor. In the light of these two questions, I will argue that Avicenna's dualism ends up with a rather narrow conception of the afterlife. He does try to give an account of a genuinely first-personal afterlife, and thereby presents a carefully argued departure from the Peripatetic tradition. But because of the way in which Avicenna separates the soul from the body, Avicennian afterlife is bound to remain exclusively intellectual. Thus, with regard to the second question Avicenna seems forced to interpret the Revelation in almost exclusively metaphorical terms. On the other hand, while following Avicenna in the first question, Mullā Ṣadrā conceives of the separate existence of the human soul in much broader terms than his predecessor. By means of the concepts of mental existence (wujud dhihniyy) and the world of images ('ālam al-mithāl), he ends up with a conception of human afterlife that is rich in terms of experiential content, and thereby potentially more coherent with the revealed account. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā, Dualist Afterlives | ||
| مراجع | ||
|
Abdel Haleem, M. A. S. (2010). The Qurʾān: English Translation and Parallel Arabic Text. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Adamson, P., Benevich, F. (2018). The Thought-Experimental Method: Avicenna’s Flying Man Argument. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 4(2), pp. 147-164. Aristotle. (n.d.). De an (III.5, 430a20-25).? Avicenna. (1952). Shifāʾ: Madkhal (I. Madkour, M. El-Khodeiri, G. Anawati, & F. El-Ahwani, Eds.). Cairo: Imprimerie Nationale, Avicenna. (1959). Shifāʾ: Nafs (F. Rahman, Ed., Vol. 3, 4, 6, 7). London: Oxford University Press. Avicenna. (2005). Shifāʾ: Ilāhiyyāt (M. Marmura, Trans.) Provo: Brigham Young University Press. Avicenna. (2013). Taʿlīqāt. (S. H. Mousavian, Ed.). Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy. Avicenna. (1892). al-Ishārāt wa’l-Tanbīhāt (J. Forget,Ed.). Leiden: E. J. Brill. Avicenna. (1984). al-Mabdaʾ wa’l-Maʿād (A. Nūrānī, Ed.). Tehran: McGill University and Tehran University. Avicenna. (1969). al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya fī al-Maʿād (F. Lucchetta, Ed., VI). Padova: Editrice Antenore. Avicenna. (n.d.). Mubāḥathāt.?? Badawī, A. (1947). Arisṭūʿinda al-ʿArab. Cairo: Maktaba al-Nahḍa al-Miṣrīya. Benevich. F. (2019). Individuation and Identity in Islamic Philosophy after Avicenna: Bahmanyār and Suhrawardī. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 28(1), pp. 4-28 Black, D. (2012). Avicenna on Individuation, Self-Awareness, and God’s Knowledge of Particulars (R. Taylor & I. A. Omar, Eds.). The Judeo-Christian-Islamic Heritage. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Fārābī, Cf. (1964). al-Siyāsa al-Madanīya al-Mulaqqab bi-Mabādiʾ al-Mawjūdāt (F. Najjār, Ed.). (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique). Gutas, D. (2014). Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicennaʼs Philosophical Works. Leiden: Brill Ha’iri Yazdi, M. (1992). The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence. Albany: SUNY Press. Henrich, D. (1970). Selbstbewußtsein, kritische Einleitung in eine Theorie (R. Bubner, K. Cramer, & R. Wiehl, Eds.). Hermeneutik und Dialektik. Tübingen: Mohr. Jambet, C. (2008). Mort et résurrection en islam: Lʼau-delà selon Mullâ Sadrâ. Paris: Albin Michel. Kaukua, J. (2015). Self-Awareness in Islamic Philosophy: Avicenna and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kalin, I. (2010). Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mulla Sadrâ on Existence, Intellect, and Intuition. New York: Oxford University Press. Michot, J. R. (1986). La destinée de lʼhomme selon Avicenne: Le retour à Dieu (maʿād) et lʼimagination. Louvain: Peeters. Mullā Ṣadrā. (2001). al-Ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya fī al-asfār al-arbaʿa al-ʿaqlīya (S. M. Khamenei,Ed.). Tehran: Sadra. Mullā Ṣadrā. (1384HSh). Mafātīḥ al-ghayb. (N. Habibi, Ed.). Tehran: Sadra. Reisman, D. C. (2002). The Making of the Avicennan Tradition: The Transmission, Contents, and Structure of Ibn Sīnā’s al-Mubāḥathāt. Leiden: Brill. Suhrawardī. (1999). Ḥikmat al-ishrāq (J. Walbridge and H. Ziai Eds., II.1.5). Provo: Brigham Young University Press. | ||
|
آمار تعداد مشاهده مقاله: 160 تعداد دریافت فایل اصل مقاله: 153 |
||