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“A Review and Critique of the Cognitive–Analytical Approach to Moral Self-Deception” | ||
| Theosophia Islamica | ||
| مقالات آماده انتشار، پذیرفته شده، انتشار آنلاین از تاریخ 26 اسفند 1404 | ||
| نوع مقاله: Original Article | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22081/jti.2026.74406.1117 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| Javad Danesh* | ||
| تاریخ دریافت: 21 اسفند 1404، تاریخ بازنگری: 17 خرداد 1405، تاریخ پذیرش: 26 اسفند 1404 | ||
| چکیده | ||
| The issue of moral self-deception has always been one of the most intricate puzzles in the philosophy of mind and ethics, due to its entanglement with epistemic paradoxes—a phenomenon that apparently requires the simultaneous acceptance of two incompatible cognitive states. In other words, the agent believes a proposition while possessing strong evidence to the contrary. Focusing on a cognitive–analytical approach, this article argues that, within this framework, the problem goes beyond a mere explanation of neurocognitive mechanisms,Focusing on a cognitive–analytical approach, this article argues that, within this framework, the problem goes beyond a mere explanation of neurocognitive mechanisms, emphasizing instead the logical possibility of self-deception and the attempt to resolve both static and dynamic paradoxes. In the first step, while distinguishing self-deception from similar phenomena such as wishful thinking, the study highlights the central role of motivational components in the formation of beliefs that conflict with available evidence. In the | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| Moral Self-Deception؛ Cognitive-Analytical Approach؛ Static and Dynamic Paradoxes؛ Jeffrey Foss؛ Wishful Thinking؛ Canfield؛ Gustafson | ||
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آمار تعداد مشاهده مقاله: 10 |
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