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ارزیابی امکان صورت‌بندی سودگرایی بنتام در پرتو آموزه‌های قرآن | ||
| نقد و نظر در فلسفه و کلام | ||
| مقاله 1، دوره 31، شماره 123، مهر 1405، صفحه 29-1 اصل مقاله (1.52 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: علمی ـ پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22081/jpt.2026.73949.2328 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| علیرضا آل بویه* | ||
| دانشیار، گروه فلسفه اخلاق، پژوهشکده فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، پژوهشگاه علوم وفرهنگ اسلامی، قم، ایران. | ||
| تاریخ دریافت: 13 دی 1404، تاریخ پذیرش: 28 دی 1404 | ||
| چکیده | ||
| سودگرایی اخلاقی، یکی از نظریه‌های مهم در اخلاق هنجاری است که با صورت‌بندی جرمی بنتام، جایگاه ویژه‌ای یافت و به‌تدریج دستخوش اصلاحات و برداشت‌های گوناگون شد. برخی اندیشمندان مسلمان، پس از آشنایی با الگوی سودگرایانۀ بنتام، کوشیده‌اند با افزودن برخی قیود، آن را با تعالیم قرآن هماهنگ نشان دهند و حتی آیات قرآنی را پشتیبان معیارهای هفت‌گانۀ وی قلمداد کنند. نقد اصلی آن‌ها این است که بنتام مفهوم سود را در چارچوب لذت، آن‌هم لذت دنیوی، محدود ساخته است؛ درحالی‌که در نگاه دینی، سود و لذت، گستره‌ای فراتر از دنیا دارد و لذات اخروی را نیز در بر می‌گیرد. اما مسئلۀ مهم این است که پیش از جست‌وجوی آیات هماهنگ با سودگرایی بنتام، باید روشن شود آیا اساساً می‌توان بر پایۀ قرآن، صورت‌بندی تازه‌ای از سودگرایی ارائه کرد یا خیر؟ ازاین‌رو این نوشتار ضمن بررسی و نقد دیدگاه مدافعان سازگاری، نشان می‌دهد که شکل‌دهی به قرائتی نو از سودگرایی بر مبنای آیات قرآن، امکان‌پذیر نیست. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| قرآن؛ سودگرایی اخلاقی؛ نظریه‌های اخلاقی؛ معیارهای هفت‌گانۀ بنتام | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Evaluation of the Possibility of Formulating Bentham's Utilitarianism in Light of Quranic Teachings | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Alireza Alebouyeh | ||
| Associate professor, Department of Moral Philosophy, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Research Center, Qom, Iran. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Moral utilitarianism is one of the most important consequentialist theories in normative ethics, which gained a prominent position in the modern era with Jeremy Bentham’s formulation. According to this theory, the moral value of actions stems not from their intrinsic nature, but from the consequences they produce. Relying on the principle of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people," Bentham maintains that an action is morally right if it produces the greatest amount of pleasure and the least amount of pain and suffering for the greatest number of individuals. In the contemporary era, this theory has also attracted the attention of certain Muslim scholars, and efforts have been made to reconcile it with the teachings of the Quran and Islamic ethics. The main problem of this research is to investigate the possibility of such reconciliation and to evaluate the Quranic foundations of the utilitarian rendition of Islamic ethics. Bentham's utilitarianism rests on two essential elements: first, pleasure as the criterion of utility; and second, a focus on the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people. Therefore, the elimination of either of these two components removes the theory from the framework of utilitarianism. Bentham considers pleasure primarily in the form of material and worldly pleasure, and to measure it, he puts forward seven criteria: "intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent." He formulates utilitarianism as act-utilitarianism; meaning that the moral value of each action must be determined by calculating the amount of pleasure and pain resulting from that very action. The practical difficulty of such a calculation and the probability of conflict among the various criteria are among the most important criticisms leveled against Bentham's theory. In reaction to this problem, rule-utilitarianism was introduced, which, instead of evaluating individual actions, takes as its criterion rules whose observance brings about the greatest utility for the greatest number of people. Some Muslim thinkers, including Mansour Nasiri and Mohammad-Taqi Sobhaninia, while accepting the principle of Bentham's utilitarianism, have sought to present a theory compatible with Islamic teachings by modifying some of its components. Criticizing the limitation of utility to material and worldly benefits, Nasiri introduces the concept of "supreme utility" or "supreme utilitarianism," considering sustainable utility as a benefit that also encompasses the afterlife. From this perspective, ethical behavior, in addition to securing worldly benefits, can lead to human perfection and the attainment of eternal bliss. Sobhaninia likewise regards the most important flaw in Bentham's utilitarianism to be its inattention to the metaphysical realm and its restriction of utility and pleasure to material affairs. By accepting the principle of utilitarianism and expanding the concept of utility to spiritual and otherworldly benefits, he attempts to provide Quranic and traditional evidence for Bentham's seven criteria. According to this view, the criterion of intensity can be observed in the Quran's emphasis on the great reward for righteous deeds. The criterion of duration gains meaning in light of the eternity of the afterlife; hence, sustainable otherworldly benefits are preferred in the event of conflict with transient worldly benefits. The criterion of certainty is also considered explainable through verses that present divine promises as true and certain. Propinquity, in Sobhaninia's view, is not incompatible with religious teachings either; because the Quran and traditions, despite the temporal difference between this world and the next, introduce the afterlife as near and deter man from considering the results of actions to be distant. The criterion of fecundity implies preferring a pleasure that generates greater pleasures and benefits. Within the Islamic framework, a moral action, alongside worldly effects and spiritual perfection, can also entail divine recompense and reward. The criterion of purity is likewise deemed adaptable to the Quran's description of heavenly blessings that are free from suffering, hardship, and adversities. Finally, the criterion of extent is based on the principle that the wider the scope of the good and pleasure of an action to encompass more individuals, the greater its value; Islamic teachings concerning attention to believers, relatives, neighbors, and other humans have been cited as evidence for this criterion. Despite these efforts to harmonize Bentham's utilitarianism with Islamic ethics, the fundamental problem of the article is whether merely adding qualifiers such as otherworldly and spiritual utility can transform Bentham's theory into an Islamic theory. The present research, conducted using a descriptive, analytical, and critical method, ultimately argues that such an interpretation faces fundamental problems and that Islamic ethics cannot be reconstructed within the framework of utilitarianism. This is because, in Islamic ethics, the moral value of actions is not determined on the basis of consequences and the amount of utility and pleasure, but is determined on the basis of rational intrinsic goodness and badness (husn and qubh). Consequently, this perspective faces multiple criticisms: Impossibility of a utilitarian formulation of Islamic ethics Confusion between the criterion of moral value and motivational force Internal contradiction within the theory Inability to achieve the objective of presenting the theory and providing practical guidance for moral agents Ambiguities in analyzing the seven criteria based on Quranic verses Lack of comprehensive examination of Quranic verses and a one-sided focus on otherworldly rewards In short, the endeavor to combine utilitarianism and Islamic ethics through a limited focus on certain verses and consequentialist criteria is not only incompatible with the principles of utilitarianism and Quranic foundations, but it also fails to provide a normative theory and practical guide for moral agents. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Quran, Moral Utilitarianism, Ethical Theories, Bentham's Seven Criteria | ||
| مراجع | ||
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* قرآن کریم (مترجم: محمدمهدی فولادوند)
** نهج‌البلاغه
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