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بازخوانی نظریۀ ضمانت پلانتینگا در پرتو نقدهای معرفت‌شناسی فضیلت‌محور و اجتماعی | ||
| نقد و نظر در فلسفه و کلام | ||
| مقاله 2، دوره 31، شماره 123، مهر 1405، صفحه 32-1 اصل مقاله (1.19 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: علمی ـ پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22081/jpt.2025.73101.2288 | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| فهیمه خوشنویسان* | ||
| دکتری تخصصی فلسفۀ دین، دانشکدۀ الهیات علوم اسلامی، دانشگاه پیام نور مرکز تحصیلات تکمیلی تهران، تهران، ایران. | ||
| تاریخ دریافت: 13 مهر 1404، تاریخ بازنگری: 10 آبان 1404، تاریخ پذیرش: 26 آبان 1404 | ||
| چکیده | ||
| مسئلۀ اصلیِ مقاله، بازخوانی نظریۀ ضمانت پلانتینگا براساس نقدهای واردشده ازسوی معرفت‌شناسان فضلیت‌محور و اجتماعی است. پلانتینگا در معرفت‌شناسی، با تمایزنهادن میان توجیه و تضمین و نقد مبناگرایی سنتی، مدل معرفتیِ نوینی را مطرح می‌کند که در آن، باورهای دینی به‌مثابۀ باورهایی پایه و تضمین‌شده تلقی می‌شوند، مشروط بر آنکه در بستر عملکرد صحیح معرفت‌شناسی به کار گرفته شوند. در این میان، نظریۀ ضمانت با اتکا بر عملکرد صحیح معرفت‌شناسی، با نقدهایی از جانب رویکردهای معرفت‌شناسی فضیلت‌محور و اجتماعی مواجه شده است. این مقاله با رویکردی تحلیلی - انتقادی، و باهدف بررسی مبانی این دیدگاه و نسبت آن با تحولات معرفت‌شناختی معاصر، امکان بازخوانی آن را در پرتو فضایل معرفتی و زمینه‌های اجتماعی باور دینی ارزیابی می‌کند. مقالۀ حاضر با بازخوانی نظریۀ ضمانت، به تحلیل عناصر مغفول‌مانده‌ای چون فضایل معرفتی، زمینه‌مندی اجتماعی و مسئولیت معرفتی می‌پردازد. نتیجۀ پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که بازخوانی مدل ضمانت در قالب یک الگوی تلفیقی - با بهره‌گیری از معرفت‌شناسی فضیلت‌محور زاگزبسکی و سوسا و معرفت‌شناسی اجتماعی فریکر - چارچوبی منسجم‌تر و پاسخ‌گوتر برای تبیین عقلانیت باور دینی فراهم می‌کند. در این رویکرد، افزودن عناصر فضیلت‌محور همچون تواضع، صداقت و شجاعت معرفتی، در کنار ملاحظات اجتماعی مانند عدالت معرفتی، به بازخوانی دیدگاهی جامع‌تر منتهی می‌شود. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| پلانتینگا؛ ضمانت؛ معرفت‌شناسی فضیلت‌محور و اجتماعی | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| A Rereading of Plantinga's Theory of Warrant in Light of Criticisms from Virtue Epistemology and Social Epistemology | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Fahime Khoshnevisan | ||
| PhD, Philosophy of Religion, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Sciences, Payam-e Noor University, Center for Graduate Studies, Tehran, Iran. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| The main issue of the article is a rereading of Plantinga's theory of warrant based on criticisms put forward by virtue and social epistemologists. In epistemology, by distinguishing between justification and warrant and criticizing traditional foundationalism, Plantinga proposes an epistemic model in which religious beliefs are regarded as basic and warranted beliefs, provided they are employed within the context of proper epistemic functioning. In contemporary epistemology, Plantinga's theory of warrant is presented as an important model in justifying religious belief, in which the proper function theory along with the reformed epistemological approach, in a new synthesis, offers a new meaning of "warrant" in cognition. Contrary to traditional approaches that mainly emphasize argumentative and rational justification, Plantinga's theory—especially in the field of the epistemology of religion—replaces "justification" with "warrant" and thus makes religious belief knowledgeable. In his view, this belief must be such that it possesses warrant itself; meaning that the structural features and the epistemic process alone can determine its validity. Among the foundational principles of this theory is reliance on the proper functioning of epistemic faculties. In Plantinga's view, a true and warranted belief is formed only when human cognitive faculties operate properly and are designed toward the realization of truth. In this regard, he points to four essential conditions for the proper functioning of epistemic faculties: first, the faculties must function properly; second, these faculties must operate in their appropriate environment; third, the faculties must operate with pre-designed programs; and fourth, the faculties must operate in accordance with the goals determined for them. If these four parameters are observed in the cognitive process, the faculties will operate effectively and reliably, and the beliefs derived from them will be knowledgeable and valid. Nevertheless, in recent decades, new epistemological changes and developments—such as the two prominent currents of virtue epistemology and social epistemology—have provided new contexts for critiquing and rethinking Plantinga's view. In virtue epistemology, attention to the moral and epistemic virtues of the knowing subject, such as honesty, courage, and epistemic humility, holds a special place. This approach emphasizes that a justified belief must be shaped not only structurally, but also ethically, based on the virtues of the knowing subject. On the other hand, social epistemology, by emphasizing the importance of social conditions, power, and trust in epistemic processes, highlights that social structures can heavily influence the production and justification of epistemological beliefs. These two approaches can, on the one hand, play a role in better understanding and strengthening Plantinga's theory of warrant; however, on the other hand, they raise new questions that may challenge Plantinga's model. From this perspective, the main questions are: Does Plantinga's "proper function" model harmonize with new concepts such as religious virtues and epistemic justice or not? In other words, can this model, whose basis is placed upon the rational and teleological design of cognitive faculties, be horizon-aligned with the emphasis of virtue and social epistemology—which pay more attention to the human agent and social contexts? This article, with an analytical-critical approach and with the aim of examining the foundations of this view and its relation to contemporary epistemological developments, evaluates the possibility of rereading it in light of epistemic virtues and the social contexts of religious belief. The present research, with the aim of critically rereading the theory of warrant in the epistemology of religion, concludes that despite Plantinga's efforts to save the rationality of religious belief against skeptical challenges, his theory of warrant at some levels—especially in the domains of epistemic reflection, the agent's cognitive virtues, and the impacts of social contexts in the formation of beliefs—faces structural shortcomings. Plantinga emphasizes in his theory that religious belief must originate from a sound cognitive system that operates in accordance with divine design; however, in this framework, he ignores many of the complex epistemological aspects that seem necessary in contemporary conditions; in particular, he does not pay attention to the agent's responsibility in evaluating and critiquing their own beliefs, and downplays the important impacts of power relations in social structures and its effect on the validity of religious beliefs. While Plantinga's theory emphasizes features such as the proper functioning of cognitive faculties and their conformity with divine goals, contemporary theories of virtue and social epistemology emphasize that the epistemic process cannot be complete merely as a mental and cognitive mechanism. These approaches emphasize the role of the epistemic agent's moral virtues and consider belief as the product of an ethical, conscious, and responsible action of the individual. Among the prominent views in this field, one can point to the views of Sosa and Zagzebski in virtue epistemology, who consider knowledge as the result of moral virtues such as honesty, humility, and rigor. Similarly, theorists like Fricker in social epistemology specifically point to the role of social contexts, trust, and power structures in epistemic processes. This research suggests that in order to reconstruct and strengthen Plantinga's theory of warrant in the contemporary world, the concept of knowledge must be expanded from a passive mechanism to an active, reflective, ethics-oriented, and social process. In the reconstructed model, a religious belief is considered warranted not only when it originates from a sound and valid cognitive system, but also as a result of the conscious, reflective, and virtue-driven action of the epistemic agent. In this proposed integrative model, the goal is that while preserving the internal coherence and structure of Plantinga's model, we update it with contemporary and postmodern epistemological concerns. This updating not only leads to the strengthening of the rationality of religious belief, but also links it to the ethical and social realm of knowledge. Keywords: Plantinga, warrant, virtue epistemology, social epistemology | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Plantinga, warrant, virtue epistemology, social epistemology | ||
| مراجع | ||
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